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CHAPTER 3 
Criminal Law and Procedure 
MICHAEL REILL y* 
§ 3.1. Summary Criminal Contempt. ** Rule 43 of the Massachusetts 
Rules of Criminal Procedure governing summary contempt proceedings is 
not an exact duplicate of its federal counterpart, Rule 42(a) ofthe Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Present in the Massachusetts Rule, but 
absent from the Federal Rule, is the qualification that summary proceed-
ings must be "necessary to maintain order in the courtroom" before they 
may be used.! A reasonable inference from this difference between the 
two rules is that a more rigorous standard will be applied in Massachusetts 
than is used in the federal courts when determining when summary 
contempt proceedings may be used. During the Survey year, however, in 
Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court apparently re-
jected that inference when it held that a newspaper reporter who made an 
erroneous but good faith claim of privilege at a hearing on a motion to 
suppress could be held in summary criminal contempt without violating 
Rule 43 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure.3 
Paul Corsetti was a reporter for the Boston Herald American in 1979 
when he interviewed a murder suspect, named Edward Kopacz, in a 
Florida jai1.4 He subsequently published a story entitled "Convict, 18, 
Admits Role in Gay Murder."5 On March 24, 1980 he was subpoenaed to 
a Middlesex County Grand Jury to testify about his conversations with 
Kopacz. He refused, claiming a reporter's privilege, and was held in civil 
contempt.6 That case, Corsetti 1,7 was dismissed by the Supreme Judicial 
Court as moot when the grand jury which had summoned Corsetti ex-
* MICHAEL REILLY is an associate in the Boston law firm of Hausserman, Davison & 
Shattuck. 
§ 3.1. ** Mr. Reilly's former firm was counsel for the defendant in the focal case of this 
section, Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1,438 N.E.2d 805 (1982). 
1 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 43(a) (emphasis added). 
2 387 Mass. 1, 438 N.E.2d 805 (1982). 
3 The Court's holding on the issue of the existence of an evidentiary privilege for 
reporters is not discussed in this section. 
4 387 Mass. at 2 & n.2, 438 N.E.2d at 807 & n.2. 
5 See id. at 3, 438 N.E.2d at 807. 
6 [d. at 7, 438 N.E.2d at 810. 
7 Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 381 Mass. 778,411 N.E.2d 466 (1980). 
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pired.8 That grand jury returned an indictment charging Kopacz with first 
degree murder. 
Prior to the murder trial Kopacz filed a motion to suppress his state-
ments to Corsetti on the grounds that Corsetti had acted as an arm of the 
Commonwealth and that he, therefore, should have given Kopacz his 
Miranda Rights prior to taking a statement. 9 Kopacz also attempted to 
suppress his statements to Corsetti on the grounds that they were not 
voluntary.lo Corsetti was called as a witness on March 6, 1981 during the 
hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress. 11 He refused to state 
whether he was the author of the story about the murder ,published under 
his byline. 12 He claimed a reporter's privilegeP The Court held him in 
summary criminal contempt and set a hearing on Mal1ch 11, 1981 for 
disposition of the case against Corsetti. 14 That finding of contempt was 
dismissed on March 11 when Corsetti acknowledged his authorship of the 
article. IS Corsetti answered several questions concerning the circum-
stances of these trips to Florida and to the jail where Kopacz had been 
incarcerated. 16 Corsetti was then asked to tell the Court the content of a 
telephone conversation with Kopacz which Corsetti felt was confiden-
tial.n His answer, "[a]s a result of the conversation I wrote the article," 
was stricken as unresponsive. He was instructed to provide a more 
complete answer. Corsetti stated, "I respectfully refuse to answer that 
question based on my rights under the First Amendment, Article 16 of the 
Massachusetts Constitution and the common law. "18 Consequently, Cor-
setti was summarily found in contempt.t 9 The trial judge then held Cor-
setti in summary criminal contempt and sentenced him to the house of 
correction for three months. 20 The Supreme Judicial Court took the case 
on direct appellate review and Corsetti's sentence was stayed until the 
Court issued its decision. 21 
8 387 Mass. at 7, 438 N.E.2d at 810. 
9 [d. at 2, 438N .E.2d at 807. The irony of Kopacz claiming that Corsetti was a tool of the 
Commonwealth while Corsetti was being prosecuted for his refusal td cooperate with the 
Commonwealth was heightened by the final outcome ofthe proceedings; Kopacz was found 
not guilty of murder and Corsetti, the alleged agent of the Commonwealth, served several 
weeks in jail on his summary contempt conviction. 
10 [d. 
II /d. 
12 [d. 
13 [d. See supra note 3. 
14 [d. 
15 /d. at 3, 438 N.E.2d at 807. 
16 [d. 
17 [d. 
18 See id. 
19 Record Appendix. 
20 387 Mass. at 3, 438 N.E.2d at 808. 
21 [d. at 4, 438 N.E.2d at 808. The trial judge issued a 48-hour stay. A single justice of the 
2
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The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the trial court's decision to hold 
Corsetti in summary criminal contempt rather than give him the right to a 
trial on the issue of his contempt. 22 The Court initially noted that sum-
mary proceedings are disfavored. 23 The Court went on to state, however, 
that this defendant was not surprised by the contempt proceedings since 
the prior proceedings in Corsetti ]24 had put him on notice that this issue 
would arise. 25 The Court indicated that a polite claim of privilege could be 
said to disturb order in the courtroom when it delayed or disrupted a 
trial.26 The Court determined that this type of conduct could be as unset-
tling to order as a more violent type of disruption. 27 Finally, the Court 
noted that as a practical matter a full jury trial in this case on the issue of 
contempt would serve "no useful purpose" for the Commonwealth or the 
defendant Corsetti. 28 
In its decision the Court blurred the distinction between criminal and 
civil contempt. Civil contempt is remedial. Its purpose is to coerce a 
reluctant witness to testify by use of the stick of imprisonment and the 
carrot of the ability to gain freedom by being purged of the contempt. 29 
Criminal contempt "is punitive: its aim is to indicate the court's authority 
and to punish the contemner for ... failing to act as ordered." 30 Most of 
the rationale used by the Court to justify summary criminal contempt 
proceedings is appropriate to civil contempts but not criminal. The Court 
noted, for instance, that without summary contempt the defendant's 
contempt trial would have either inordinately delayed the Kopacz trial or 
denied evidence to the Commonwealth.3 ! Since there was no possibility 
of Corsetti changing his mind and testifying, and since the decision to hold 
him in criminal contempt precluded the possibility of purging himself from 
contempt, it was inevitable that the Commonwealth would not have its 
testimony. The decision to hold him in summary criminal contempt made 
it no more likely that the Commonwealth would get its evidence. Unlike a 
Appeals Court granted a stay of execution pending further appellate review and a single 
justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied the Commonwealth's petition to vacate the 
Appeal's Court stay. [d. 
22 [d. 
23 [d. at 7, 438 N.E.2d at 809. 
24 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
25 387 Mass. at 7, 438 N.E.2d at 810. 
26/d. at 8-9,438 N.E.2d at 810-11. 
21 [d. 
28 [d. at 9-10, 438 N.E.2d at 811. 
29 See Sodones v. Sodones, 366 Mass. 121, 129-30, 314 N.E.2d 906, 912 (1974). 
30 [d. at 130,314 N.E.2d at 912. 
31 387 Mass. at 8 n.IO, 438 N .E.2d at 810 n.IO. 
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civil contempt, there is no necessity arising from the need for the evidence 
to justify rapidly imposed sanctions since the purpose of a criminal con-
tempt is not remedial but punitive. 
The Court's decision also makes it difficult to understand the sig-
nificance of the requirement in Rule 43(a) of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Criminal Procedure that "[a] criminal contempt may be punished summar-
ily when it is determined that such summary punishment is necessary to 
maintain order in the courtroom. "32 Rule 43(a) mirrors the Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 42(a) except that the emphasized language above is 
absent from the Federal Rule. The Corsetti Court in its holding relies 
heavily on the precedent of United States v. Wilson. 33 Wilson, however, 
interpreted Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules. The Massachusetts Rule 
considered by the Court in Corsetti differs from the Federal Rule and 
apparently altered the standard for summary contempt. Although the 
court noted the difference in language between the rules,34 it made no 
attempt to explain what impact or meaning the new Massachusetts lan-
guage had. This is particularly disturbing in light ofthe reporter's notes to 
Rule 43(a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure which 
emphasized the disfavor for summary contempt. 3S The Court's decision in 
this case appears to have rendered a deliberate attempt to make Massa-
chusetts summary contempt proceedings less available into a nullity and 
merged the Massachusetts rule into the more lax federal practice. 
Finally, it should be noted that there was no claim of actual prejudice by 
Corsetti.36 The trial judge allowed Corsetti's counsel the full opportunity 
to argue. 37 The Court emphasized that its holding was limited to cases in 
which there was no claim that the summary proceedings were procedur-
ally defective.38 As a practical matter, it is difficult to imagine what more 
could have been gained for the defendant at a jury trial. The facts were 
undisputed and the real issue in any trial would be decided by the judge's 
decision in jury instructions.39 In that regard, the summary nature of the 
proceedings probably had little if any effect on the outcome of the instant 
case. In terms of the more long range implications, however, the Corsetti 
Court's decision ends any hope that Massachusetts would limit the use of 
summary criminal contempt more strictly than the federal courts. 
32 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 43(a) (emphasis added). 
33 421 U.S. 309 (1975). 
34 387 Mass. at 7-8 & n.9, 9, 438 N.E.2d at 810 & n.9, 811. 
35 MASS. ANN. LAWS, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 595-96 (1979) (Reporter's Notes to 
Rule 43(a». 
36 387 Mass. at 7 & n.8, 438 N.E.2d at 809 & n.8. 
37 [d. at 7, 438 N.E.2d at 810. 
38 /d. at 9, 438 N .E.2d at 811. 
39 As a practical matter there is also the possibility that the defendant could benefit from 
jury nullification at a jury trial. 
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§ 3.2. Operation of Rule 29 - Upwards Revision of a Criminal Sentence 
After Its Execution - Double Jeopardy. The idea that a criminal sentence 
could be lawfully increased once its execution had begun seemed to be an 
established principle under Massachusetts law. During the Survey year, 
however, the Supreme Judicial Court held that under Rule 29 of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure a criminal defendant's law-
fully imposed sentence may be imposed despite the partial execution of 
the sentence. The Court in Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth 1 held that such 
an increased sentence does not violate double jeopardy. 
In Aldoupolis five co-defendants were charged with rape, unnatural 
rape and malicious destruction of property.2 On October 5, 1981 the 
defendants pleaded guilty and the judge imposed suspended sentences of 
three to five years in state prison, two years probation and court costs of 
$500.3 The defendants contacted the Probation Department, signed proba-
tion contracts and began payments ofthe court costS.4 Three days later on 
October 8th, however, the judge ordered all defendants to appear in court 
on the next day.5 On October 9th the judge revoked his sentencing of 
October 5th and imposed actual three to five year sentences. 6 The judge 
acted under the authority of Rule 29 of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.7 The judge further provided that each defendant 
could withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial on the merits.s Without 
§ 3.2. 1 386 Mass. 260, 435 N.E.2d 330 (1982). Four companion cases involving Mr. 
AJdoupolis' co-defendants were joined before the Court. 
2 ld. at 261, 435 N .E.2d at 331. 
3 ld. 
4 ld. Court costs were imposed at a rate of $5.00 a week over the two-year probationary 
period.ld. at 261 n.3, 435 N.E.2d at 331 n.3. Payment schedules for court costs are normally 
based on the defendant's ability to pay as determined by the Probation Department. 
5 ld. at 261, 435 N .E. 2d at 331. The Court's opinion does not mention that on the morning 
of October 8, 1981 the Boston Herald American's front page consisted of a headline 
concerning the alleged light sentences in this case. The story went on to discuss the 
sentence imposed by the judge in a disapproving manner. Boston Herald American, October 
7,1981. Prior to this headline the case had received little or no pUblicity. (Author's interview 
with P.I. Piscatelli, defense counsel). 
6 ld.Because the sentences were to state prison, the defendants would have to serve two 
years before they were eligible for parole. G.L. c. 127, § 133. 
7 The rule provides in relevant part that: 
(a) Revision or Revocation. The trial judge upon his own motion or the written 
motion of a defendant filed within sixty days after the imposition of a sentence, 
within sixty days after the receipt by the trial court of a rescript issued upon 
affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within sixty days after 
entry of any order or judgment of an appellate court denying review of, or having 
the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction, may, upon such terms and 
conditions as he shall order, revise or revoke such sentence if it appears that 
justice may not have been done. 
s 386 Mass. at 261, 435 N .E.2d at 331. The court's decision is silent on whether this option 
was mandatory because the pleas had been offered pursuant to MASS. R. CRIM. P. 
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providing opportunity to defense counsel to argue, respond or object to 
the proceedings the trial judge ruled that the revocation of the sentence 
was necessary for three reasons.9 First, because of the "public interest in 
the sentences,"IO second, because of the question of the legality of a 
suspended sentence under chapter 279, sections 1 and l(A) ofthe General 
Laws for the crime of rape charged under chapter 265, section 22, and 
finally, because of the District Attorney's objection to the suspended 
sentence and desirability of having the case go to trial on its merits. I I The 
defendant Aldoupolis filed with a single justice of the Supreme Judicial 
Court for relief under chapter 211, section 3. 12 A stay was granted.n All 
five co-defendants petitioned the single justice and he transferred the case 
to the full court. 14 
The first question addressed by the Court was one of statutory con-
struction. Chapter 279, section 1 of the General Laws forbids suspended 
sentences for "a person convicted of a crime punishable by death or 
imprisonment for life." 15 At the time the defendants committed the of-
fense, chapter 265, section 22 provided that a person convicted of rape 
"shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any 
term of years."16 Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the punishment 
clause in chapter 265, section 22 did not preclude the possibility of a 
suspended sentence under chapter 279, section 1. 17 
The Court explained that the meaning of the language, "a crime punish-
able by death or imprisonment for life," in chapter 279, section 1 was 
ambiguous in that it could apply to crimes which were only punishable by 
death or life imprisonment, or it could apply to any crime for which death 
or life imprisonment was a possible punishment. ls The Court reviewed 
the legislative history of chapter 279, section 1 and found it unhelpful in 
discerning the legislative intent. 19 The Court then looked to chapter 266, 
12(c)(2)(A) which gives the defendant a right to withdraw his plea if the judge exceeds an 
agreed upon recommendation. 
9 386 Mass. at 262. 435 N.E.2d at 331. 
10 See supra note 5. 
11 386 Mass. at 262,435 N.E.2d at 331. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14Id. 
15 See id. at 263. 435 N.E.2d at 332. 
16 See Id. 
17 /d. at 267. 435 N.E.2d at 334. 
18 Id. at 264. 435 N .E.2d at 332. 
19 Id. at 265. 435 N.E.2d at 332-33. The legislature from 1925 through 1967 added and 
subtracted various crimes to the list of those which could not be suspended until the list in 
1967 was reduced to "those crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment." 
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section 14.20 That statute provides that burglary while being armed or 
coupled with an assault is punishable by "imprisonment in the state 
prison for life or for any term of years not less than ten years." 21 In 1966, 
one month after the Legislature amended chapter 279, section 1 to forbid 
suspended sentences for crimes punishable by life imprisonment, the 
Legislature amended chapter 266, section 14 to provide that the sentence 
for a second offense under chapter 266, section 14 could not be sus-
pended.22 The Court noted that the adoption of the Commonwealth's 
position that the possibility of life imprisonment precluded a suspended 
sentence under chapter 279, section 1, would render the 1966 amendment 
to chapter 266, section 14 "surplusage" since a suspended sentence 
would already be banned under chapter 279, section l,23 The Court 
concluded that chapter 279, section 1 prohibits suspended sentences only 
when punishment for a crime is limited to death or life imprisonment. 24 
The Court determined therefore that the original sentences were legally 
suspended.25 
The Court next considered whether the trial judge had the power to 
revise and revoke the legal sentence initially imposed. 26 The Court held 
that the literal language of Rule 29 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure which gives the trial judge the power to revise and revoke a 
sentence within sixty days "upon such terms and conditions as he shall 
order"27 must be interpreted to allow such a course of action28 despite the 
reporter's notes to the rule which indicated that the illegality of an in-
crease in a legally imposed sentence "has, however, long been settled. "29 
A review of the cases discussed by the Court indicates that the reporter 
was correct in noting that once execution of a sentence has begun it has 
"long been settled" that a legal sentence may not be increased. The 
Court, however, used the first case it discussed, Commonwealth v. 
20 Id. at 265-66, 435 N.E.2d at 333-34. 
21 Id. at 266, 435 N .E.2d at 333. 
22 Id. 
23 /d. at 266, 435 N.E.2d at 333. The Court's interpretation of this complicated interplay 
between statutes was based on the rule of statutory interpretation that presumes the 
Legislature in passing a later amendment has passed enactments in mind and is deliberately 
designing an integral whole. Commonwealth v. King, 202 Mass. 379, 88 N.E. 454 (1909). It 
must be noted that this presumption of legislative omniscience is pushed to its limits when 
applied to legislative action, such as the above, which seems to be haphazard and un-
planned. 
24 386 Mass. at 267, 435 N .E.2d at 334. 
25 Id. 
26 /d. at 268-75, 435 N.E.2d at 334-38. 
27 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 29(a). 
2. 386 Mass. at 268-71, 435 N.E.2d at 334-36. 
29 MASS. ANN. LAWS, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 474 (1979) (Reporter's Notes to 
Rule 29(a». 
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Weymouth,30 to contradict this apparently settled legal principle. The 
Aldoupolis Court accomplished this result by interpreting the Weymouth 
Court's decision as not relying on the fact that the origi~al sentence had 
not yet been executed in allowing that initial sentence to be increased.31 A 
close reading of Weymouth does not support this interpretation of its 
holding. The Weymouth Court held that "the true test" for whether or not 
a sentence could be revised was "whether it will affect the legal rights of 
the parties. "32 The revising of the original sentence in Weymouth was 
justified by explaining: 
That sentence (the original sentence) never went into operation, and in effect 
was the same as if it had never been passed. So long as it remained 
unexecuted, it was, in contemplation of the law, in the breast of the court 
and subject to revision and aHeration.33 
The Court's holding in Weymouth squarely ruled that a. sentence could 
not be revised unless it was unexecuted. 
That rule was followed by every case decided on this issue until the 
1982 session of the Court.34 The case relied upon by the Aldoupolis Court 
to support its claim that the question of execution was not crucial to the 
holdings in Weymouth and its progeny was District Attorney for the 
Northern District v. Superior Court. 35 Yet in that case the Court em-
phasized at several points that its holding was solely that a sentence could 
be revised downward after execution. The Court in that case, in fact, 
distinguished Weymouth by noting that in Weymouth the issue was not 
whether a sentence could be reduced after execution had pegun but rather 
whether a sentence could be increased "during the sarrle term of court 
before the defendant had started to serve his sentence. "36 Finally, the 
court in the District Attorney case noted that the concern in Weymouth 
that an increase in sentence after execution would raise tihe possibility of 
unfairness and double jeopardy ,,;,as not present when a court reduced a 
sentence after execution since the prisoner "is not likely to com-
plain .... "37 
In summation, the Court in Commonwealth v. Aldoupolis overturned 
30 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 144 (1861). 
31 386 Mass. at 270-71, 435 N.E.2d at 336. 
32 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 144, 147 (1861). 
33 Id. 
34 See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 175 Mass. 37,55 N.E. 466 (1899) (sentence amended 
during stay of execution); Commonwealth v. Sitko, 372 Mass. 305, 36lN .E.2d 1258 (1977) 
(defendant defaulted prior to execution of sentence, thus revision is !permissihle); Com-
monwealth v. Foster, 122 Mass. 317 (1877) (sentence on additional counts after execution is 
improper). 
35 342 Mass. 119, 172 N.E.2d 245 (1961). 
36 /d. at 126, 172 N.E.2d at 249-50 (emphasis added). 
37 /d. at 123-24, 172 N .E.2d at 248. 
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its long-standing rule that a sentence could not be revised upwards after 
execution. In doing so, the Court first denied that such a rule existed and 
secondly, relied upon very weak precedent to support its interpretation of 
the Weymouth case. The Court should have held that under Massachu-
setts practice the legally imposed, partially executed sentences in this 
case could not be revised upwards. 
The Court next addressed the defendant's claim that a rule allowing 
such an increased sentence would violate double jeopardy. The Court, 
relying on United States v. DiFrancesco ,38 first explained that the fifth 
amendment protection against multiple punishment was not offended by 
the procedure in this case because the defendants were not ultimately 
sentenced to a term greater than that prescribed by the Legislature for the 
crime of rape.39 It must be noted that DiFrancesco explicitly withheld 
judgment on whether a sentence may be increased after it has begun to be 
served.40 The Court did not discuss the dicta in the DiFrancesco case 
which noted that the double jeopardy clause was drafted with the common 
law in mind, and at common law the principle against increasing a sen-
tence once the sentence had begun was an accepted one.41 
The second prong of double jeopardy analysis by the Court focused on 
the finality interest of the double jeopardy clause.42 The clause protects 
defendants against repeated attempts to convict them for the same crime. 
Traditionally once a judgment in a criminal case was final, a defendant 
could not be punished again.43 The Court, again relying on DiFrancesco, 
held that since it had determined earlier in the decision that the trial court 
had the right under Rule 29 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to revise a sentence within sixty days of sentencing,44 the 
defendant had no expectation of finality until that point.4s In light of the 
fact that this was apparently the first case in the history of the Common-
wealth which allowed an increase of sentence after the execution had 
issued, it seems disingenuous of the Court to suggest that "the defendants 
should not have had an expectation of finality in their sentences in the face 
of this rule."46 In United States v. DiFrancesco,47 a statute explicitly 
granted the government a right to appeal and discussed at great length the 
38 449 U.S. 117 (1980). 
39 386 Mass. at 274, 435 N .E.2d at 337. 
40 449 U.S. 117, 134 (1980). 
41 /d. 
42 386 Mass. at 274-75, 435 N.E.2d at 337-38. 
43 United States v. Jom, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Fine v. Commonwealth, 312 Mass. 252,44 
N.E.2d 659 (1952). 
44 See 386 Mass. at 268-71, 435 N.E.2d at 334-36. 
45 ld. at 274, 435 N.E.2d at 338. 
46/d. 
47 449 U.S. 117 (1980). 
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procedures for a review of sentence by the court of appeals.48 The 
expectations of a defendant sentenced pursuant to that federal statute are 
not comparable to the expectatiorts of the defendants in the instant case. 
Mr. Aldoupolis and his co-defendartts had every legitimate expectation, 
based on prior law and experience, that once they began to serve their 
sentences they would not later receive more severe ones. That expecta-
tion is protected under the double jeopardy clause and should have been 
upheld by the Court.49 
In summary, the Aldoupolis Court made several major pronounce-
ments. First, the Court restricted the application of chapter 279, section 1 
by holding that its prohibition of suspended sentences would operate only 
where the designated punishment for the crime in question was limited to 
"death or imprisonment for life."so The Court thereby left open the 
possibility of a suspended sentence for a number of serious crimes which 
are punishable by life imprisonment, but which aiso allow for sentencing 
to a term of years. While this was not a key issue for the defendants in the 
instant case,51 it may well prove to be a controversial point in the future. 52 
Secondly, the Court reversed a long-standing rule against increasing a 
criminal sentence once it has been executed.53 The Court interpreted Rule 
29(a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure in a manner 
which gives trial judges virtually unlimited discretion in altering sentences 
within sixty days of the sentencing date. Finally, the Court held that its 
new rule was perfectly consistent with state and federal double jeopardy 
concepts.54 Accordingly, criminal defendants will now have to sit tight for 
60 days after being sentenced, regardless of whether or not they begin 
serving any sentence which is imposed, before they will know with any 
certainty what exactly the full extent of their punishment will be. 
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 3576. 
49 The final portion of the decision held that the resentencing procedure followed by the 
trial judge denied the defendants their right to be heard at sentencing. 386 Mass. at 275-76, 
435 N .E.2d at 338-39. The Court indicated that a judge revising a sentence should provide 
notiCe, a hearing and specific reasons for his finding that "[j)ustice may not have been 
done." ld. at 276, 435 N .E.2d at 338. The Court remanded the case for retrial and suggested 
that the original judge excuse himself from participating in the resentencing. /d. at 276, 435 
N .E.2d at 339. 
50 /d. at 263-67, 435 N .E.2d at 331-34. 
51 Even though the Court held that the defendants could legally have received suspended 
sentences for their crimes, the rest of the opinion ensures that these defendants will serve 
actual time in prison and will in no way benefit from the Court's generous interpretation of 
chapter i79, section 1. 
52 Aside from the legal arguments to be mustered against the majority's interpretation of 
chapter 279, section 1, see 386 Mass. at 276-77, 435 N.E.2d at 339 (Nolan, J., dissenting), a 
crime-conscious Legislature may well be unpleasantly surprised by the Court's handling of 
the apparently "tough" sentencing provision it passed. 
53 See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text. 
54 386 Mass. at 271-75, 435 N.E.2d at 336-38. 
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§3.3. Grand Jury Proceedings - Unauthorized Persons - Invalidationof 
Indictments. Under the Massachusetts Constitution indictment by a grand 
jury is required as a prerequisite to prosecution of "capital or otherwise 
infamous" crimes.! During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court 
strongly reaffirmed the Massachusetts rule that unauthorized persons in 
the grand jury room will invalidate such an indictment. The Court in 
Commonwealth v. Pezzano 2 used that rule to dismiss kidnapping, armed 
robbery and conspiracy charges against two men, Sylvano Pezzano and 
Dante Ferrara. 
In late 1977 or early 1978 an inmate, Alphonse Mellone, agreed after 
negotiations with the district attorney's office to provide information to 
State Trooper John W. Brien against Ferrara, Pezzano, and two other 
men. 3 In June of 1978 Trooper Brien and another trooper went to the 
Billerica House of Correction and attempted to talk to Ferrara who was 
being held there on other matters.4 Ferrara refused to talk to them.s 
Ferrara did agree to talk to the second trooper several days later after 
receiving a promise that he would not be indicted.6 On July 13, 1978 
Ferrara met with the assistant district attorney, Trooper Brien and three 
other state troopers.? Trooper Brien and Ferrara did not talk to each 
other.8 Later on that day, Trooper Brien was appointed by a superior 
court judge to provide security while Mellone and Ferrara testified before 
the grand jury. 9 Brien was sworn to uphold the secrecy of the grand jury 
proceedings.!O He was present while Mellone and Ferrara testified.!! He 
was dressed in plain clothes and was introduced to thejurorsY He stayed 
in the rear of the room and did not question the witness or make any 
comments.i3 
§ 3.3. 1 Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 344-47 (1857) (construing article 12 of 
the Declaration of Rights); see Opinion of the Justices, 373 Mass. 915, 918, 371 N .E.2d 422, 
423 (1977). 
2 387 Mass. 69,438 N.E.2d 841 (1982). 
3 [d. at 70-71, 438 N .E.2d at 842. 
4 /d. at 71, 438 N.E.2d at 842-43. 
5 /d. at 71, 438 N.E.2d at 843. 
6 [d. The decision is silent on why Ferrara was ultimately indicted despite this promise. A 
promise not to indict if a defendant cooperates is enforceable by the defendant. It may be 
that the defendant did not keep his side of the bargain and thereby released the Common-
wealth from its obligation. 
7 /d. 
S /d. 
9 [d. 
10 Jd. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 5(d) which presently governs the secrecy of grand jury 
proceedi ngs. 
11 387 Mass. at 71, 438 N.E.2d at 843. 
12 [d. 
13 Jd. at 71 & n.4, 438 N.E.2d at 843 & n.4. 
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The defendants filed a motion to dismiss because of Trooper Brien's 
unauthorized presence in the grand jury roomY The superior court judge 
found that Brien was a potential witness in the caselS but denied the 
motion and found that Trooper Brien's presence did not influence the 
grand jury or the testimony of Ferrara. 16 The judge reported the issue to 
the Appeals Court17 and the Supreme Judicial Court took the case on its 
own motion. 18 
In overturning the superior court justice, the Court found that the 
question presented when the issue of unauthorized presence is raised is 
whether "the presence of a certain person could interfere with the truth-
seeking goal of grand jury. "19 The Court explained that even if a guard 
was necessary in this case for the security of the grand jury, there was no 
reason why that guard should be the chief investigator in the case.20 The 
Court also held that the codification in Rule 5( c) of the Massachusetts 
Rules of Criminal Procedure of those persons who would be allowed to be 
present at the grand jury proceeding should not be interpreted as a 
liberalization of the rule against unauthorized persons in the grand jury 
room. 21 The Court concluded that once it found that an unauthorized 
person had been present the sanction of dismissal of the indictment was 
automatic. 22 The defendant was not required to show actual prejudice.23 
The Court also indicated that it disagreed with the superior court's factual 
finding that there was no risk of prejudice involved.24 
Justice Nolan dissented. He argued that the Court's decision in Com-
monwealth v. Favuli,2S which allowed multiple prosecutors in the grand 
jury room at one time, should have controlled in this case.26 He also 
pointed to the fact that Trooper Brien had been authorized by a superior 
court judge to be present for security at the grand jury proceeding.27 
14 /d. at 70, 438 N.E.2d at 842. 
15 /d. at 71, 438 N .E.2d at 843. 
16 Id. 
17 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 34. 
18 See 387 Mass. at 69, 438 N.E.2d at 842. 
19 /d. at 73, 438 N.E.2d at 844. 
20 Id. at 74, 438 N.E.2d at 844. 
21 Id. at 72 & n.5, 438 N.E.2d at 843 & n.5. 
22 /d. at 72-73, 76, 438 N.E.2d at 843-44, 845-46. 
23 Id. at 76, 438 N.E.2d at 845-46. 
24 Id. at 77, 438 N.E.2d at 846. The Court does not explain the basis for its disagreement 
on this factual issue other than to say it is based on "our reading of the transcript of the 
hearing on the motion." Id. This fact-finding by the Court is particularly surprising since the 
decision indicates that the superior court justice had the opportunity to see Ferrara testify at 
the hearing on the motion. Id. 
25 352 Mass. 95, 224 N.E.2d 422 (1967). 
26 387 Mass. at 78, 438 N.E.2d at 846. 
27 Id. 
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Finally, Justice Nolan objected to the majority's failure to accept the 
superior court's finding that Ferrara was not influenced by the presence of 
Trooper Brien.28 
The Pezza no Court did not explain in exactly what manner the presence 
of Trooper Brien interfered with the truth-seeking goal of the grand jury. 
Several general concerns were cited by the Court, some of which are 
inapposite in this case. For instance, there is no reason to believe that the 
secrecy of the grand jury29 was imperiled by the presence of Trooper 
Brien. Rule 5(d) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure spe-
cifically forbids him, as "a person performing an official function in relation 
to the grand jury," from disclosing matters before the grand jury.30 
Similarly, the related concern that innocent witnesses or potential grand 
jury targets might be harmed by a breach in grand jury secrecy31 should 
not have been a concern in this case. A second type of concern arising 
from the presence of unauthorized persons at the grand jury proceeding is 
the possibility that the grand jurors or witnesses would be affected by 
their presence.32 The chance that the grand jurors were influenced in this 
case seems slight. Trooper Brien was dressed in plain clothes and said 
nothing to the grand jury. 33 
The most likely legitimate source for the Court's concern is the possibil-
ity that the witness34 was awed or intimidated by the presence of the state 
trooper. The Court's decision in Opinion of the lustices 35 is particularly 
illuminating on this issue. There the Court considered a bill being contem-
plated by the Legislature which would have allowed police to assist the 
district attorneys in the grand jury room and rejected it primarily because 
of the possibility that police officers would subject witnesses to fear or 
intimidation.36 In this case the danger was even more acute. Trooper 
Brien had personally interviewed Ferrara and had apparently been unable 
28 Id. 
29 See id. at 73, 438 N.E.2d at 844. See also MASS. R. CRIM. P. 5(d). 
30 The action of the superior court in appointing Brien seems to clearly put him within the 
definition of "a person performing an official function" for the purposes of MASS. R. CRIM. 
P.5(d). 
31 387 Mass. at 73, 438 N .E.2d at 844. 
32 Id.; see Opinion of the Justices, 232 Mass. 601, 604, 123 N .E. 100, 101 (1919). 
33 Nevertheless, the possibility that the jurors would infer that the defendants were 
particularly vicious or that the case was particularly important from the fact that a guard was 
present only for this case cannot be rejected lightly. The Court in Commonwealth v. Favuli, 
352 Mass. 96, 224 N .E.2d 422 (1967), rejected a similar argument only because in that case 
the importance of the matter was apparent to the grand jury even without the presence of 
extra persons in the grand jury room. 
34 Ferrara, who was the witness, subsequently became a co-defendant. 
35 232 Mass. 601, 123 N.E. 100 (1919). 
36 Id. at 603, 123 N .E. at !OJ. 
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to get him to talk. 37 It is not difficult to imagine that his presence in the 
grand jury room would cause fear or concern in Ferrara. Justice Nolan in 
his dissent38 relies almost exclusively on the Court's decision in Com-
monwealth v. Favuli. 39 That reliance is misplaced. The Favuli Court held 
that having mUltiple assistant attorneys general before the grand jury did 
not constitute the presence of unauthorized persons. The decisions of the 
Supreme Judicial Court, however, have consistently pointed out that the 
presence of district attorneys or assistant attorneys general will be 
measured by a different standard than the presence of police. The pres-
ence of prosecutors before the grand jury is presumed acceptable while 
police in the grand jury room are considered unacceptable unless some 
necessity can be established.40 Justice Nolan glosses over this distinction 
in his dissent by adopting language written to justify the presence of 
prosecutors before the grand jury and applying it to justify the presence of 
police before the grand jury.41 The majority of the Court in Pezza no 
correctly decided that since a police officer, in contrast to a prosecutor, 
has no legitimate purpose for being before a grand jury when he is not 
testifying, the danger of his presence intimidating or affecting witnesses 
cannot be tolerated. 
§ 3.4. Administrative Searches - Statutory Procedures. Chapter 94C, 
section 30 of the General Laws allows administrative searches of "con-
trolled premises" to be made pursuant to an administrative search war-
37 387 Mass. at 71, 438 N.E.2d at 843. 
38 Id. at 77, 438 N.E.2d at 846. 
39 352 Mass. 95, 224 N.E.2d 422 (1967). 
40 This distinction was discussed in Opinion of the Justices, 232 Mass. 601,123 N.E. 100 
(1919), and adopted in In Re Lebowitch, 235 Mass. 357, 126 N.E. 831 (1920), and Common-
wealth v. Favuli, 352 Mass. 95, 224 N.E.20 422 (1967). It was codified by MASS. R. CRIM. P. 
5(c). 
41 387 Mass. at 77-78, 438 N .E.2d at 846. Justice Nolan quotes the following language 
from Commonwealth v. Favuli, 352 Mass. 95, 107, 224 N.E.2d 422, 430 (1967): 
The presence of a particular person who has previously interviewed a witness being 
interrogated may tend to hold the witness to previous testimony. That is always the 
possibility if the prosecutor is the one who has interviewed the witness in the course 
of the investigation. There is no intimidation involved in this. 
This should be contrasted with the language in Opinion of the Justices, 232 Mass. 601, 603, 
123 N.E. 100, 101 (1919), concerning the dangers of police being present in the grand jury 
room: 
The essential characteristics of the Grand Jury would be broken down if a police 
officer or other person who had investigated the evidence, interviewed the witness 
and formulated a plan for prosecuting the accused should be permitted to be present 
during the hearing of testimony. 
The only way to reconcile these 4\'0 cases is to recognize that the Court has used a different 
standard for prosecutors than for police. 
14
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rant. I In 1980, in Commonwealth v. Accaputo,2 the Supreme Iudicial 
Court established detailed guidelines to be followed when applying for an 
administrative warrant pursuant to section 30.3 During the Survey year 
the Court clarified Accaputo and the nature of the procedural require-
ments for administrative searches in two decisions involving searches 'Of 
pharmacies. In Commonwealth v. Lipomi,4 and Commonwealth v. 
Frodyma,5 the Court insisted that the procedures established under sec-
tion 30 for the issuance of administrative warrants be followed precisely. 
In Commonwealth v. Lipomi a state police officer visited Salvatore 
Lipomi, a licensed pharmacist, at Lipomi's store on March 22, 1978 as 
part of an investigation of invalid prescriptions.6 Lipomi allowed the 
offi~er to review his drug registration book.? The officer discovered at 
least thirty-two altered or invalid prescriptions.s The officer obtained an 
administrative warrant and returned to the pharmacy on May 4,accom-
panied by a second trooper and Joseph LaBelle, an inspector from tIle 
Board of Registration in Pharmacy.9 LaBelle condUcted an audit of 
Lipomi's records. I 0 The state police officer removed some records on that 
date and returned the next day to remove other records .11 
Lipomi was indicted on seven counts of illegally distributing controlled 
substances. 12 The trial judge granted his motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained as a result of the May 4 search.13 The Commonwealth's inter-
locutory appeal was allowed by a single justice, and reported to the entire 
Court for decision. 14 
The Commonwealth conceded that the seizure of records Was inva.lid 
because the warrant and affidavit failed to satisfy the requirements of 
§ 3.4. 1 G.L.c. 94C, § 30. "Controlled premises" are defined as "any place or area, 
including but not limited to any building, conveyance, warehouse, factory or establil>hment, 
in which persons registered under the provisions of this chapter or required thereunder to 
keep records, are permitted to hold, manufacture, compound, process, distribute, deliver, 
dispense or administer any controlled substance or in which such persons make or maintain 
records pertaining thereto." G.L. c. 94C, § 30(a). Warrantless administrative searches of 
such premises are allowed where there is consent or where there are exigent circumstances. 
G.L. c. 94C, § 30(g). 
2 380 Mass. 435, 404 N.E.2d 1204 (1980). 
3 The Accaputo decision is discussed in Criminal Practice and Procedure, 1980 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW § 4.9, at 166-75. 
4 385 Mass. 370, 432 N.E.2d 86 (1982). 
5 386 Mass. 434, 436 N.E.2d 925 (1982). 
6 385 Mass. at 371, 432 N .E.2d at 88. 
71d. 
SId. 
9 ld. at 371-72, 432 N.E.2d at 88. 
10 ld. at 372, 432 N.E .2d at 88. 
11/d. 
12 /d. 
13 /d. at 371, 432 N .E.2d at 87. 
14 ld. at 371, 432 N .E.2d at 87-88. 
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Commonwealth v. Accaputo, but argued that the audit by Inspector 
LaBelle should be admissible because the warrant with the affidavit was 
sufficient to justify an audit as opposed to a seizure. IS The Common-
wealth further asserted that no warrant should be required at all l6 for two 
reasons: (1) because chapter 13, section 25 of the General Laws provided 
independent authority for the search absent a valid warrant,17 and (2) 
because pharmacies are traditionally a heavily regulated industry, and 
therefore no warrant was required for an administrative search under the 
Supreme Court's rulings in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States 18 
and United States v. Biswell. 19 
The Court first reviewed its holding in Commonwealth v. Accaputo and 
emphasized that the search in this case failed to satisfy the requirements 
of chapter 94, section 30 as they were interpreted in that decision. 20 It 
rejected the Commonwealth's argument distinguishing an audit from a 
search followed by a physical seizure of evidence by emphasizing that 
"[t]he principles governing our analysis inAccaputo are ... as applicable to 
administrative inspections as they are to seizures made pursuant to such 
inspections. "21 The Court also adopted the trial judge's findings that the 
audit conducted by Inspector LaBelle was not an administrative audit 
pursuant to chapter 13, section 25.22 LaBelle's testimony that he would 
not have entered but for the police, that this was not a normal "random 
check" audit, and that he waited outside the pharmacy until the police 
entered, supported the conclusion that this was a search pursuant to 
chapter 94C, section 30 rather than chapter 13, section 25. 23 The Court 
concluded that this was a search by police and that chapter 94C, section 
30 clearly established the legislative intent that searches by police meet 
the more stringent guidelines of section 30. 24 
The Court next discussed at length the interplay between chapter 13, 
section 25, which grants a general authorization for inspectors to search 
pharmacies without obtaining a warrant, and chapter 94C, section 30, 
which provides detailed guidelines for administrative searches made pur-
suant to a warrant.2s The Court reviewed the Colonnade and Biswell 
IS [d. at 372, 432 N.E.2d at 88. 
16 [d. 
17 O.L. c. 13, § 25 authorizes warrantless searches by inspectors of the Board of Pharma-
cists. 
18 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
19 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
20 385 Mass. at 373-74, 432 N.E.2d at 89. 
21 [d. at 374, 432 N .E.2d at 89. 
22 [d. at 375-78 & nn.3, 4, 432 N.E.2d at 90-91 & nn.3, 4. 
23 !d. at 376-77 & n.4, 432 N.E.2d at 90-91 & n.4. 
24 [d. at 377-78, 432 N .E.2d at 91. 
2S !d. at 378-87, 432 N .E.2d at 91-96. 
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cases26 and concluded that a warrantless administrative search must pass 
a three part test: the search must involve an industry that is heavily 
regulated; the search must be crucial to an urgent governmental interest; 
and the search must be statutorily limited as to time, place and scopeY A 
review of the history of pharmaceutical regulation since 1885 satisfied the 
Court that the drug industry was a "pervasively regulated" industry and 
that searches of pharmacies served a legitimate governmental interest. 28 
The Court concluded, however, that since chapter 13, section 25 contains 
no limits as to time, place or scope of searches, the statute fails the third 
prong of the ColonnadelBisweli test. 29 The Court also rejected the Com-
monwealth's argument that the restrictions contained in chapter 94C, 
section 30 could be grafted onto chapter 13, section 25.30 The Court 
explained that 21 U.S.c., section 880, the federal statute which served as 
a model for chapter 94C, section 30, had been interpreted to exclude such 
a definition.3! The Court followed the federal precedent and ruled that all 
administrative searches of pharmacies must be pursuant to chapter 94C, 
section 30, and therefore a valid administrative warrant under section 30 
was required. 32 
Justice Nolan in his dissent33 argued that chapter 13, section 25 does 
contain limits as to time, place and scope because only searches of 
pharmacies for the purpose of investigating violations of laws relating to 
pharmacy are permitted.34 The dissent asserted that chapter 94C, section 
30 still acts as a valuable control since no seizures are permitted under 
chapter 13, section 25.35 Only a warrant pursuant to chapter 94C, section 
30 would justify a seizure from a pharmacy. 36 
The Court next discussed chapter 94C, section 30 and the Accaputo 
decision in Commonwealth v. FrodymaY On March 5, 1980, Joseph 
LaBelle, a pharmacy agent38 conducted an investigation of the books of 
26 See supra notes 18 and 19 and accompanying text. 
27 385 Mass. at 380, 432 N.E.2d at 92-93. 
28 /d. at 381, 432 N.E.2d at 93. 
29 /d. at 382, 432 N .E.2d at 94. 
30 Id. at 383, 432 N .E.2d at 94. 
31 Id. at 383-86, 432 N .E.2d at 93-95. 
32 Id. at 386-87, 432 N.E.2d at 96. 
JJ /d. at 387, 432 N.E.2d at 96 (Nolan, J., dissenting, joined by Lynch, J.). 
34 Id. at 388-89, 432 N .E.2d at 97. Despite the fact that even Justice Nolan could find no 
limit as to the time of the search in section 25 he insisted that the language of the statute 
"impaTt[ed] into [section] 25 the limitations of time, place and scope of inspection stated 
explicitly in [chapter 94C, section 30]." Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 386 Mass. 434, 436 N.E.2d 925 (1982). 
38 LaBelle was also the agent involved it' Lipomi. See supra notes 9 and 10 and accom-
panying text. 
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Edward Frodyma's pharmacy pursuant to chapter 13, section 25 with the 
consent of Frodyma on duty, and discovered various discrepancies 
indicating that drugs were missing.39 LaBelle went to district court and 
filled out a form for an administrative warrant which required only tbat the 
pharmacy anq the person seeking the warrant be identified.40 The warrant 
was issued and LaBelle served it accompanied by a state trooper.41 
LaBelle seized the records which he had previously r~viewed.42 The 
warrant authorized the seizure of any and all items which were involved in 
any violation of chapter 94C and included a long list of various types of 
documents which could be seized.43 
The trial court granted a motion to suppress the evidence obtained by 
LaBelle because the warrant description of property to be seized was 
overbroad, but held that since LaBelle's initial audit was consensual he 
could testify concerning it, and further held that a new seizure of the 
documents could be made with a properly drawn warrant.44 The Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed the result reached below, but based its ruling on a 
much broader ground than the trial court'S.45 
The Court began its analysis by explaining that "the purposes for which 
a warrant is sought should determine the standards under which it is 
issued."46 The Court explained that the purpose of administrative war-
rants was to allow routine, neutrally selected inspections of regulated 
establishments.47 An administrative search is authorized either upon a 
showing. that an establishment has been selected on a neutral basis or from 
information supplied by a neutral source,48 or upon a showing of probable 
cause that an administrative violation exists.49 Because of the limited 
scope of administrative warrants courts apply a relaxed standard of prob-
able cause.50 Typically, when a violation is alleged there is no possibility 
of criminal action. The Court noted, however, that several courts have 
authorized administrative searches when there was a possibility of crimi-
nal prosecution. 51 The Court noted that it is often difficult to draw the line 
39 386 Mass. at 435, 436 N .E.2d at 927. 
40 ld. at 435 & n.3, 436 N.E.2d at 927 & n.3. 
4\ ld. at 436, 436 N .E.2d at 927. 
42 ld. 
43 ld. at 435-36 & n.4, 436 N.E.2d at 927 & nA. 
44 ld. at 436-37, 435 N .E.2d at 927-28. 
45 ld. at 437-38, 436 N .E.2d at 928. 
46 ld. at 438, 436 N.E.2d at 928. 
47 ld. at 438-42, 436 N .E.2d at 928-30. 
48 ld. at 441-42, 436 N.E.2d at 930. 
49 !d. at 442, 436 N .E.2d at 930-3 \. 
sOld. at 440-42, 436 N .E.2d at 929-30. 
5\ !d. at 443, 436 N.E.2d at 931 (citing cases). 
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between searches for administrative violations and searches for criminal 
violations. 52 
Turning to the case before it, the Court explained that it is clear in the 
area of pharmacies when a case changes from an administrative to a 
criminal investigation.53 The Court insisted that when a search is for 
purposes of criminal investigation the Commonwealth cannot take advan-
tage of the lesser probable .cause standard for administrative searches.54 
The administrative warrant cannot be used as a "subterfuge in avoidance 
of the probable cause burden that must be met to support a criminal 
investigation." 55 
The Court also addressed the particularity of the description of what 
was to be seized.56 Inspector LaBelle used a "canned" form which 
authorized seizure of all documents which were listed in chapter 94C as 
being subject to seizure.57 The Court held that the warrant did not identify 
what was to be seized with sufficient particularity. 58 It was clear on the 
record that Inspector LaBelle knew exactly which documents he wished 
to seize and the warrant should have been limited to those documents. 59 
The Court also noted that even in a routine administrative inspection the 
documents to be seized could be limited to a certain time period and 
certain particularly described documents. 6o In accordance with the above 
reasoning, the Court affirmed the superior court's order granting the 
motion to suppress. 61 
The Court's decisions in the area of administrative search warrants 
indicate a willingness to provide guidance, by way of dicta, for following 
the complex procedural requirements of chapter 94C. The Court's deci-
sion in Commonwealth v. Accaputo62 contained considerable dicta which 
provided guidelines for complying with the statute.63 In Commonwealth 
52 Id. at 443-44, 436 N.E.2d at 931. 
53 /d. In this case, the fact that Agent LaBelle had a state police trooper accompany him 
to the store made the criminal nature of the investigation particularly clear. 
54 Id. at 443-46, 436 N.E.2d at 931-33. 
55 Id. at 445, 436 N.E.2d at 932. 
56 /d. at 446-49, 436 N .E.2d at 933-34. 
57 Id. at 446, 436 N .E.2d at 933. 
58 Id. at 447, 436 N.E.2d at 933. 
59 Id. at 447-48, 436 N .E.2d at 933-34. 
60 Id. at 447, 436 N .E.2d at 933. 
61 /d. at 449, 436 N .E.2d at 934. The defendant's victory was pyrrhic because the Court 
also affirmed the trial court's holding that a new warrant could be issued on the basis of the 
information obtained in the consensual search and the documents could thereby be seized 
properly. The new warrant can be issued by the trial court prior to the defendant obtaining 
an order to have the illegally seized documents returned. 
62 380 Mass. 435, 404 N.E.2d 1204 (1980). 
63 See. e.g .. id. at 438-39, 441-42, 404 N.E.2d at 1207. 1208. 
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v. Frodyma the Court explicity went beyond the narrow issue before it to 
prevent future confusion. The Court explained: 
While we agree with the judge, we conclude further that merely to affirm the 
suppression order because the seizure language of the warrant lacked spec-
ificity (which was available and could be supplied) is to create the unwar-
ranted impression that an administrative inspection warrant may be issued 
for the purpose of seizing evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution.64 
The Court then went on to explain its alternative holding. 
The Court has adopted a similar approach in its decisions interpreting 
the statutory provisions governing wiretapping. 65 That statute also con-
tains detailed procedural steps for the issuance of a warrant. The Court's 
decision in Commonwealth v. Vitello 66 laid out in great detail, much of it 
dicta, the procedures to be followed in drafting and executing a wiretrap 
warrant. The Court's attempt to give guidance to practitioners in these 
new and complex areas of law should be applauded. 
It is worth noting that the Lipomi and Frodyma decisions are likely to 
have an important impact on the sale of liquor as well as prescription 
drugs. The federal courts have made it clear that the liquor industry is a 
heavily regulated industry which could be subject to administrative 
searches.67 It is therefore instructive to compare the statutory authoriza-
tion for searches of liquor establishments with the authorization for 
searches of pharmacies. 
Chapter 138 of the General Laws sets up a statutory scheme which 
could be fairly characterized as pervasively regulating the liquor industry 
in Massachusetts. 68 Seizures of alcohol "intended for sale contrary to 
law"are authorized and regulated by sections 42-46. Those provisions 
limit and regulate what is to be seized and the showing of probable cause 
which must be made prior to seizure.69 Sections 42-46 cannot be used as a 
basis for administrative searches, however, since they only authorize the 
seizure of alcohol. Accordingly, no records could be searched or seized 
under the authority of those sections. 
Administrative searches are authorized by sections 18 and 63 of chapter 
138. Section 63 authorizes local licensing authorities to enter onto the 
premises of a licensee' 'to ascertain the manner in which he conducts the 
business." Section 18 requires that the Alcohol Beverage Control Com-
64 386 Mass. at 437-38, 436 N .E.2d at 1206. 
65 Procedures for wiretaps are set out in G.L. c. 272, § 99. 
66 367 Mass. 224, 327 N.E.2d 819 (1975). 
67 See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
68 G.L. c. 138, §§ 1-78. 
69 Section 46 authorizes only the seizure of alcohol and only upon a showing that two 
persons have reason to believe that it will be found at a particular location. Sections 43 and 
44 place even more stringent controls on searches of dwellings. 
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mission "have access to all books, records and other documents of every 
licensed wholesaler and importer." Both of these sctions provide an 
unlimited right to search the records of licensees. The provisions of 
chapter 94c provide a clear contrast. 70 In that statute the nature and 
extent of pharmacy searches are extensively regulated. These general 
provisions for searches of alcohol licensees are similar to the general grant 
of power to search found in chapter 13, section 25, which the Court in 
Commonwealth v. Lipomi found to be an insufficent basis for a warrant-
less administrative search. 7 ) 
In summary, the Supreme Judicial Court has indicated that administra-
tive searches in Massachusetts will be proper only where there is a 
statutory procedure which provides definite guidelines for searching 
officials.72 It seems clear that the statutory scheme for administrative 
searches of alcohol licensees in chapter 138 does not meet the require-
ment set out in Commonwealth v. Lipomi that there be a statutorily 
authorized procedure which carefully limits the time, place and scope of 
such searches. 73 The legislature should enact provisions similar to chap-
ter 94C if it intends to authorize administrative searches of alcohol li-
censees. 
STUDENT COMMENTSt 
§ 3.5. Respondent's Rights in "Sexually Dangerous Person" Proceed-
ings. * Chapter 123A of the General Laws provides for involuntary com-
mitment proceedings for person asserted by the Commonwealth to be 
"sexually dangerous.") Under this law, a person found to be a "sexually 
dangerous person"2 by the Superior Court3 can be committed to a treat-
70 See supra notes 1-3, 25-32, and 56-60 and accompanying text. 
71 See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text. 
72 See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
t John J. Aromando, Lyman G. Bullard, Jr., Brian J. Knez, Robert L. Miskell, Lauren C. 
Weilburg, Andrew D. Sirkin, Richard J. McCready. 
* JOHN J. AROMANDO, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.5. 1 G.L. c. 123A, §§ 1-11. 
2 A "sexually dangerous person" is defined in chapter 123A as: 
Any person whose misconduct in sexual matters indicates general lack of power to 
control his sexual impulses, as evidenced by repetitive or compulsive behavior and 
either violence, or aggression by an adult against a victim under the age of sixteen 
years, and who as a result is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on objects of his 
uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires. 
G.L. c. 123A, § \. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 376 Mass. 632, 642-45, 382 N.E.2d 725, 
732-34 (1978). 
3 G.L. c. 123A, §§ 4-6. 
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ment center4 for an indeterminate period ranging from one day to life.s 
While the Supreme Judicial Court has made it clear that it considers 
chapter 123A hearings to be civil, not criminal,6 the Court has also 
recognized that the "potential deprivation of liberty" at stake for the 
respondent in these proceedings is "massive."7 
In recognition of the gravity of the rights at stake in a chapter 123A 
commitment hearing, both the courts8 and the legislature9 have accorded 
various protective rights to respondents in these proceeding. This protec-
tion, however, has never been held to equal the full panoply of rights 
which are available to the criminal defendant. 10 During the Survey year, in 
Commonwealth v. Barboza, II the Supreme Judicial Court was faced with 
the issue of whether the protection of the respondent in chapter 123A 
proceedings should include certain constitutional rights which are af-
forded the accused in criminal prosecutions.12 
The commitment process under chapter 123A may be initiated prior to 
sentencing against a defendant who is convicted of one of the crimes 
enumerated in section 4 of the statute,13 or against any prisoner cur-
rently under sentence or in the custody of the department of youth 
services who appears to be sexually dangerousY Upon the appropriate 
4 G.L. c. 123A, § 2. 
S G.L. c. 123A, § 5. 
6 Commonwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 109,438 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (1982); An-
drews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 468, 487, 334 N .E.2d 15, 25-28 (1975). 
7 Commonwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 111,438 N.E.2d 1064, 1069 (1982) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Travis, 372 Mass. 238,246,361 N.E.2d 394, 401 (1977». The Court also 
recognized the stigma involved in being determined to be sexually dangerous. /d. at Ill, 
112; see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488, 492 (1980). 
8 See, e.g., Andrews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 468, 488-91, 334 N.E.2d 15, 25-28 (1975) 
(Commonwealth must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Lamb, 
365 Mass. 265, 270, 311 N.E.2d 47, 51 (1974) (right to a warning that disclosures made to 
psychiatrist will not be privileged); Commonwealth v. Blasda, 362 Mass. 539, 541-42, 288 
N.E.2d 813, 814-15 (1972) (right to exclude certain hearsay from final hearing). See gener-
ally Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1080-85 (1st Cir. 1973); Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 
794, 795.801 (1st Cir. 1973). 
9 See G.L. c. 123A, §§ 4-6 (notice, use of compulsory process, right to counsel at critical 
stages). 
10 See Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1085 n.15 (1st Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. 
Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 112, 438 N.E.2d 1064, 1069 (1982). 
II 387 Mass. 105,438 N.E.2d 1064 (1982). 
12 [d. at 110-11,438 N.E.2d at 1068 (1982). Specifically, the respondent in Barboza relied 
on the criminal due process rights of trial by jury, Miranda warnings, and protection from 
double jeopardy. [d. 
t3 G.L. c. 123A, § 4. The crimes listed in section 4 are essentially violent and sexually 
motivated offenses. 
14 G.L. c. 123A, § 6. 
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motion,15 and notice to the respondent from the court that it is considering 
his commitment to a treatment center, the court may commit the respon-
dent to such a center for a period not more than sixty days for examina-
tion and diagnosis by not less than two psychiatrists,I6 The psychiatrists 
must then file a written report with the court, in.cluding their recommenda-
tions in proceeding with the respondenL17 If the report clearly indicates l8 
that the respondent is a sexually dangerous person, then appropriate 
notice of a commitment hearing shall be given to the respondent, and the 
hearing shall be held pursuant to the provisions of chapter 123A, section 
5,19 
In Barboza,20 the Commonwealth invoked this commitment process 
against a criminal defendant shortly after his conviction for a crime within 
the ambit of section 4,21 Stanley Barboza had pleaded guilty to a charge of 
assault with intent to rape, and on January 23, 1979, the court had 
sentenced him to a one year term in the Plymouth house of correction ,22 
On April 12, 1979, upon the motion of the Commonwealth, Barboza was 
committed pursuant to chapter 123A to the treatment center at the Massa-
chusetts Correctional Institution, Bridgewater, for examination and diag-
nosis for a period not to exceed sixty days to determine whether he was a 
"sexually dangerous person ," 23 Based on that examination, and a second 
psychiatric report which was filed after Barboza requested an indepen-
dent psychiatric examination, the Commonwealth moved for commitment 
pursuant to chapter 123A, section 6.24 A hearing was held and the judge 
15 Under section 4, the court may act upon its own motion, or upon the motion of the 
district attorney. O.L. c. 123A, § 4. Under section 6, the person in charge of the custody of 
the prisoner may have the prisoner examined by a psychiatrist if the prisoner appears to be a 
sexually dangerous person. The results of this examination are to be reported to the person 
supervising the prisoner's detention or to the district attorney, whereupon, if the report 
indicates that the prisoner may be sexually dangerous, the prisoner shall be notified of his 
possible commitment. The report shall be submitted by the supervisor or the district 
attorney to the clerk of the courts in the appropriate county, together with a motion for 
commitment for examination and diagnosis for not more than sixty days. O.L. c. 123A, § 6. 
16 O.L. c. 123A, §§ 4, 6. 
17 O.L. c. 123A, § 4. 
18 O.L. c. 123A, §§ 5, 6. See Commonwealth v. Lamb, 372 Mass. 17,23-25,360 N.E.2d 
307, 311-12 (1977). If there is a difference of opinion between the psychiatrists on whether a 
person is sexually dangerous, the commitment proceedings may not continue. See Com-
monwealth v. Hall, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 918, 918, 379 N.E.2d 1126, 1127 (1978). 
19 O.L. c. 123A, §§ 5, 6. Under the statute, the respondent has the right to appointed 
counsel and the use of compulsory process for the final hearing. O.L. c. 123A, § 5. 
20 387 Mass. 105,438 N.E.2d 1064 (1982). 
21 Id. at 106, 438 N.E.2d at 1066. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 /d. 
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found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Barboza was a sexually dangerous 
person. 25 At an additional hearing, the judge ordered that Barboza be 
committed to the treatment center at Bridgewater for a minimum of one 
day and a maximum of life. 26 Barboza appealed and the appeal was 
tranferred directly to the. Supreme Judicial Court on the Court's own 
motion.27 
In his appeal Barboza contended that the order of commitment was 
invalid, arguing that: privileged statements made by him during his psy-
chiatric examination were erroneously admitted into evidence; his com-
mitment was supported by insufficient evidence; and finally, he was 
denied the fundamental constitutional protections of trial by jury, 
Miranda warnings, protection against double jeopardy ,and due process of 
law. 28 The Court first addressed the evidentiary issues raised by Bar-
boza.29 Barboza asserted that statements made by him during the court 
ordered psychiatric examination which were admitted as evidence at the 
hearing should have been excluded under the patient psychotherapist 
privilege.30 The Court noted, however, that chapter 233, section 20B of 
the General Laws makes such evidence admissible on the issue of a 
patient's mental or emotional condition ifthe patient has been informed in 
advance that the communication will not be privileged.31 Therefore, the 
Court stated, because Barboza had been informed prior to his disclosures 
that they would not be privileged, and because the statements were 
admitted only for purposes related to the respondent's mental or emo-
tional health,32 the evidence was properly admitted.33 
The Court then addressed Barboza's claim thatthe evidence presented 
was insufficient to support his commitment. 34 The Court noted that be-
cause of the weighty interests at stake,35 the same rigorous standard of 
proof which is used in criminal cases is appropriate for chapter 123A 
25 [d. 
26 Jd. 
27 [d. 
28 Jd. at 107-08, 438 N .E.2d at 1067. 
29 Jd. at 109-10, 438 N .E.2d at 1067-68. 
30 /d. at 108, 438 N.E.2d at 1067. 
31 /d. at 108 & n.2, 109,438 N .E.2d at 1067 & n.2. The Court expressly states that section 
20B is applicable to court-ordered psychiatric examinations pursuant to chapter 123A. Jd. at 
108 n.2, 438 N.E.2d at 1067 n.2 (citing Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 266-69, 311 
N.E.2d 47, 49-50 (1974)). 
32 Section 20B expressly forbids the admission of such psychiatric communications as a 
confession or admission of guilt. [d. 
33 [d. at 108-09, 438 N.E.2d at 1067. 
34 Jd. at 109-10,438 N.E.2d at 1068. 
35 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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proceedings.36 The Court stated that the proper appellate function in a 
case such as this is to determine whether the record reasonably supports 
the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent is a sexu-
ally dangerous person.37 The Court had no difficulty in finding that the 
record could reasonably support such a finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 38 
The Court then turned to Barboza's constitutional claims. Barboza 
contended that he was entitled under federal and state constitutional 
principles to a trial by jury, Miranda warnings, and protection against 
double jeopardy, safeguards which are applicable to criminal prosecu-
tions. 39 The Commonwealth asserted that chapter 123A proceedings were 
civil, and thus the rights guaranteed to criminal defendants were not 
necessarily applicable.40 The Court stated that a label of civil or criminal 
would not be dispositive of what procedural rights would be required in 
chapter 123A proceedings.41 The Court indicated that only by assessing 
the gravity of the rights at stake for the respondent in a proceeding could 
the proper amount of procedural protection be determined.42 
Barboza based his argument for the right to a trial by jury on the 
contention that chapter 123A is punitive in nature, and the proceedings 
under that law are therefore actually criminal.43 The Court stated, how-
ever, that the aims of the statute were to both protect the public and 
rehabilitate the sexually dangerous person.44 Chapter 123A, according to 
the Court, is to help persons found to be sexually dangerous, not to punish 
them for any particular crime they may have committed.45 Noting that the 
United States Supreme Court had not yet determined the applicability of 
the various sixth amendment rights to proceedings such as those under 
chapter 123A,46 the Court refused to extend the right to a jury trial to 
proceedings which it considered to be civil, not criminal. 47 
Barboza also contended that he was entitled to a trial by jury under 
. 36 387 Mass. at 109, 438 N .E.2d at 1068 (citing Andrews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 468, 488, 
334 N.E.2d 15, 25 (1975»; compare Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427-31 (1979). 
37 !d. at 110, 438 N.E.2d at 1068. 
38 [d. (citing Commonwealth v. Lamb, 372 Mass. 17,24,360 N.E.2d 307, 311-12 (1977»; 
compare Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 11-12, 307 N.E.2d 844, 846-47 
(1974). 
39 387 Mass. at 110-11,438 N.E.2d at 1068. 
40 [d. at 111,438 N.E.2d at 1068. 
41 [d. 
42 [d. at 111,438 N.E.2d at 1069. 
43 [d. 
44 [d. at 111-12,438 N.E.2d at 1069. 
4S [d. (citing Commonwealth v. Major, 354 Mass. 666, 668, 241 N .E.2d 822, 823-34 
(1968». 
46 [d. at 112, 438 N .E.2d at 1069. 
47 !d. 
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article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution.48 The Court noted that 
article 12 governed principles of due process in noncriminal matters, and 
required a balancing test to determine whether the respondent was due a 
trial by jury in chapter 123A proceedings.49 To be balanced, the Court 
stated, were the interests of the respondent at stake, and the chance that 
those interests might be wrongly deprived, against the interest of the 
Commonwealth in the efficient and economic administration of its af-
fairs. 50 While noting the substantiality of the rights at stake for the 
respondent, the Court stated that no significant additional protection 
would be afforded to him by a trial by jury. 51 The Court indicated that it 
found the procedural protection already provided to respondents in chap-
ter 123A proceedings to be sufficient under article 12.52 The Court stated 
that hearings on sexual dangerousness were concerned largely with expert 
testimony, and therefore, the need for a jury to ensure accurate fact 
finding was greatly diminished.53 Finally, the Court stated that, in its 
opinion, the potential value of community involvement in chapter 123A 
proceedings was outweighed by the Commonwealth's interest in prompt 
hearings and the individual's right to privacy.54 
Next, the Court considered Barbota's claim that the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination and Miranda warnings were applicable 
to chapter 1f3A proceedings.55 Barboza relied primarily on the Supreme 
Court case of Estelle v. Smith 56 in support of this contention.5' In Estelle, 
the Supreme Court had found the use of psychiatric testimony at the 
sentencing stage of a criminal trial to violate the defendant's fifth amend-
ment rights when the defendant did not voluntarily consent to the pretrial 
psychiatric examination after being informed of his right to remain silent 
and that his statements could later be used against him.58 The Barboza 
Court noted, however, that, unlike the Estelle situation, the respondent's 
statements were being used in a noncriminal, non punitive proceeding. 59 
The Court stated that although the privilege against self-incrimination can 
be claimed in any proceeding, it protects only against the use of state-
ments which might be used in criminal prosecution.60 Thus, the Court 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
so Id. 
SlId. at 112-13,438 N.E.2d at 1070. 
52 Id. at 113, 438 N .E.2d at 1070 (citing Andrews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 468,481-90, 334 
N.E.2d 15, 21-28 (1975». 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 /d. at 113-15, 438 N .E.2d at 1070-71. 
56 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
57 387 Mass. at 114, 438 N .E.2d at 1070. 
58 451 U.S. 454, 461-62 (1981). 
59 387 Mass. at 109, 111-12, 114, 115,438 N.E.2d at 1068, 1069, 1071. 
60 /d. at 114, 438 N.E.2d at 1071. 
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concluded, the use at the respondent's chapter 123A hearing of his state-
ments made to the psychiatrists did not violate Barboza's fifth amendment 
right against self-incrimination.6! The Court stated that the warning given 
to the respondent that those statements would not be privileged62 was 
sufficient to preserve his due process rights in this case.63 
The respondent also asserted that he was placed twice in jeopardy 
because he was sentenced twice for the same crime.64 The Court found no 
merit in this contention, stating that the respondent's prison sentence and 
his subsequent commitment to a treatment center were imposed for 
sufficiently distinguishable reasons.65 The Court stated that the issues and 
the evidence presented in the criminal trial were entirely different from 
those of the commitment proceedings. 66 
The respondent's final contention was that he was denied due process 
of law in these proceedings in violation of the fourteenth amendment.67 
The Court disagreed, finding that the proceeding pursuant to chapter 123A 
was conducted so as to preserve the respondent's due process rights. 68 
The Court noted that respondent received adequate and timely notice 
throughout the proceeding and was effectively represented by counse1.69 
Thus, the Court concluded, the respondent was deprived of no constitu-
tional protection to which he was entitled, and there was no error in the 
Superior Court.70 
The Barboza Court indicated that the respondent's procedural rights in 
chapter 123A proceedings would not be determined by attaching a label of 
civil or criminal to those proceedings.7! In actuality, however, the civil! 
criminal distinction was a key factor in the Barboza decision.72 By adher-
ing to its view that chapter 123A proceedings are civil,73 the Court was 
able to determine the rights of the respondent through a due process 
61 /d. 
62 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
63 387 Mass. at 113-14,438 N.E.2d at 1070. 
64 [d. at 115, 438 N.E.2d at 1071. 
6S [d. 
66 [d. 
67 [d. 
68 [d. at 115-16,438 N.E.2d at 1071. 
69 !d. at 116, 438 N.E.2d at 1071. 
70 [d. 
71 [d. at 111,438 N.E.2d at 1068. 
72 See, e.g., id. at 112, 438 N.E.2d at 1069 ("Not all the due process procedures 
applicable to a criminal prosecution for Federal constitutional purposes apply to a [chapter] 
123A proceeding." (emphasis added»; id. at 114, 438 N .E.2d at 1070 ("[W]e do not view c. 
123A proceedings as criminal prosecutions, and thus the Fifth Amendment is not violated by 
the use of respondent's statements to his psychiatrists at his c. 123A hearing." (emphasis 
added». See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
73 See 387 Mass. at 109, 111-12, 114, 438 N.E.2d at 1068, 1069, 1071. 
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balancing test,74 and avoid the automatic applicability of certain constitu-
tional safeguards which would presumably be required in a criminal 
prosecution.7s An examination of the basis for the determination that 
chapter 123A proceedings are civil would therefore seem appropriate in 
assessing the correctness of the Barboza Court's decision that the re-
spondent was not entitled to certain constitutional protections from the 
criminal area in those proceedings. 
The Court has stressed the point that chapter 123A is not motivated by 
any punitive intent.76 Instead, the Court has indicated, commitment under 
chapter 123A is premised on the dual goals of protecting the public and 
rehabilitating the person found to be sexually dangerous. 77 The Com-
monwealth has provided treatment centers78 in order to facilitate a cure of 
the dangerous condition, and chapter 123A cannot be used to justify the 
imposition of prision-like conditions, except as is necessary for security 
reasons.79 The statute provides for an annual opportunity for committed 
persons to petition for their release,8o with the burden on the Common-
wealth to establish the need to continue the commitment.81 These attri-
butes all support the Court's assertion that chapter 123A proceedings are 
civil, and in no way a criminal prosecution seeking to impose punishment 
upon the respondent.82 
74 [d. at 111, 438 N .E.2d at 1068-69; see Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794, 799-800 (1st 
Cir. 1973). 
7S 387 Mass. at 112,438 N.E.2d at 1069: "Not all the due process procedures applicable 
to a criminal prosecution for Federal Constitutional purposes apply to a [chapter] 123A 
proceeding." [d.: see Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1085 n.15 (1st Cir. 1973); Gomes v. 
Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794, 799 (1st Cir. 1973). 
76 See Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265,269,311 N.E.2d 47, 51 (1974); Common-
wealth v. Major, 354 Mass. 666,668, 241 N.E.2d 822, 823-24 (1968). 
77 "General Laws c. 123A ... was enacted 'with the dual aims of protecting against future 
antisocial behavior by the offender, and of doing all that can be done to rehabilitate him.' 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, [376 Mass. 632, 646, 382 N.E.2d 725, 734 (1978)]." Com-
monwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 111,438 N.E.2d 1064, 1069 (1982) (quoting Com-
monwealth v. Knowlton, 378 Mass. 479, 483, 392 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (1979». 
78 G.L. c. 123A, § 2. 
7. See Commonwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, lll-12, 438 N.E.2d 1064, 1069 (1982) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Major, 354 Mass. 666,668, 241 N.E.2d 822, 823-24 (1968»; 
Commonwealth v. Hogan, 341 Mass. 372, 375, 170 N.E.2d 327, 330 (1960); Commonwealth 
v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 313-18,159 N.E.2d 82, 85 (1959). 
80 G.L. c. 123A, § 9. See Trimmer, petitioner, 375 Mass. 588, 590-92, 378 N.E.2d 59, 60 
(1978) . 
81 See Andrews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 468, 485, 334 N.E.2d 15, 24 (1975). 
82 See Commonwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, lll-12, 438 N.E.2d 1064, 1068-69 
(1982). "Both the Massachusetts court and legislature have made considerable effort to 
differentiate between the treatment of the sexually dangerous, on the one hand, and the 
penalizing of criminals, on the other." [d. at 112,438 N.E.2d at 1069 (quoting Gomes v. 
Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794, 800 (1st Cir. 1973». 
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This position, however, is not unassailable. In Specht v. Patterson, 83 
the Supreme Court examined a Colorado statute similar to chapter 123A84 
and found it to be criminal in nature.8S As a result of this finding the 
Specht Court stated that a person subjected to proceedings under the 
Colorado law should be provided with the same constitutional rights avail-
able to a defendant in state criminal proceedings.86 The Supreme Court 
cited with approval United States ex rei. Gerchman v. Maroney,87 in 
which the Third Circuit came to the same conclusion about a Pennsyl-
vania statute.88 The Maroney court stated that a rehabilitative intent 
could not alter the punitive character of extended confinement, and when 
the equivalent of criminal punishment was a potential consequence, the 
procedural protections guaranteed to criminal defendants by due process 
could not be denied.89 
Despite the authority of Specht, however, which might have been read 
to require the full spectrum of constitutional protections from the criminal 
context in chapter 123A proceedings, the reasoning of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court in characterizing the proceedings under chapter 123A as civil 
seems to be sound. The First Circuit, while calling the chapter 123A 
proceedings a "hybrid,"90 has accepted the interpretation of chapter 
123A as non-punitive, and stated that the full range of criminal due 
process protections would not necessarily be required.91 While chapter 
83 386 U.S. 605 (1967). 
84 [d. at 608. "The (Colorado) Sex Offenders Act ... makes one conviction the basis for 
commencing another proceeding under another Act to determine whether a person consti-
tutes a threat of bodily harm to the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill." [d. If 
this determination is in the affirmative, the person may be "sentenced" for a term of one day 
to life. [d. at 607. 
8S [d. at 608-09. "The punishment under the second act is criminal punishment even 
though it is designed not so much as retribution as it is to keep individuals from inflicting 
future harm." [d. 
86 [d. at 609-10. 
87 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966). 
88 [d. at 309-12. 
89 [d. at 309-10. The Court stated: 
This criminal punishment does not lose its characteristic because the Act goes beyond 
simple retribution .... Punishment serves several purposes; retributive, rehabilita-
tive, deterrent - and preventive .... The effort of enlightened penology to alleviate 
the condition of a convicted defendant by providing some elements of advanced, 
modem methods of cure and rehabilitation and possible ultimate release on parole 
cannot be turned about so as to deprive a defendant of the procedures which the due 
process clause guarantees in a criminal proceeding. 
/d.; cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 50 (1967). 
90 Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794, 799 (1st Cir. 1973). 
91 [d. at 799-800; Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1085 n.15 (1st Cir. 1973). The First 
Circuit did state that "realistically we realize that all too often confinement of the emotion-
ally disturbed has been little better than imprisonment. ... " Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 
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123A does present the possibility of a lifetime commitment,92 it also has 
characteristics which can distinguish it from the statutes involved in 
Specht and Maroney. For instance, while chapter 123A provides for 
annual petitions for release from commitment with the burden placed on 
the Commonwealth to show why commitment should continue,93 the 
Pennsylvania statute involved in Maroney contained no affirmative provi-
sion for rele~e, leaving the length of the "sentence" totally in the hands of 
the parole board.94 Decisions of the Supreme Court subsequent to Specht 
also indicate that involuntary commitment proceedings such as those 
under chapter 123A, while certainly involving substantial individual inter-
ests, are not the equivalent of a criminal prosecution.9s 
The determination that chapter 123A proceedings are indeed civil and 
not punitive in nature significantly impairs any claim of the right to a jury 
trial, Miranda warnings, and protection against double jeopardy.96 If the 
proceedings were to be viewed as criminal, the respondent in Barboza 
would have been entitled to trial by jury97 and Miranda wamings98 as a 
matter of right. Also, the respondent's double jeopardy claim may have 
fared better if he could have shown a second punishment in relation to the 
same criminal offense.99 
Under the Supreme Judicial Court's characterization of the chapter 
123A proceedings as civil, however, the rights of the respondent are 
essentially determined under a due process balancing test. 100 This balanc-
794, 800 (1st Cir. 1973). The court continued by admitting, however, that "wi' cannot say 
that this must be so. Both the Massachusetts court and legislature have made considerable 
effort to differentiate between the treatment of the sexually dangerous, on the one hand, and 
the penalizing of criminals on the other." [d. 
92 See Commonwealth v. Travis, 372 Mass. 238, 246, 361 N.E.2d 394, 400 (1977). 
"[T]hose persons are subject to a one day to life commitment as sexually dangerous 
persons which may have far more serious consequences for the individual than criminal 
punishment." [d. 
93 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
94 355 F.2d 302, 309 (3d Cir. 1966); see Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609 n.2 (1967). 
9S See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-96 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418, 425-33 (1979). "(A) civil commitment proceeding can in 00 sense be equated to criminal 
prosecution." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979). 
96 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
97 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
98 See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 461-62 (1981); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 
(1964). 
99 See Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794, 797 (1st Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. Dias, 385 
Mass. 455, 458, 432 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1982) (if the statute is "essentially remedial and not 
punitive" double jeopardy is inapplicable). 
100 See Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794, 799-800 (1st Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. 
Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 111-12,438 N.E.2d 1064, 1068-69 (1982). The Supreme Court uses 
such a balancing approach for analogous involuntary commitment procedures. See Ad-
dington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). 
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ing consists of weighing the interests at stake for the respondentlOI against 
the interests of the Commonwealth 102 in efficiently dealing with sexually 
dangerous persons. 103 The rights already secured for respondents in chap-
ter 123A proceedings through this balancing have been significant, includ-
ing the requirement that the Commonwealth prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt,104 important notice requirements and the right to coun-
sel at key stages of the process. lOS These right, however, will apparently 
not include trial by jury, Miranda warnings during the psychiatric exam-
ination, or any claim under double jeopardy. 106 The Court has found the 
interest of the Commonwealth to be superior to any additional protection 
these rights could offer to a respondent in chapter 123A proceedings. l07 
The Court reached this result through a reasonable balancing of the 
factors involved. The difficulty involved in assessing psychiatric tes-
timony and the likely future conduct of the respondent would seem to 
make the value of a jury as a factfinder very limited. I 08 The interest of the 
Commonwealth in "efficiently and economically" dealing with emotion-
ally disturbed persons outweighs whatever value there would be. l09 A 
requirement for Miranda warnings would unnecessarily hinder the effec-
tiveness of the psychiatric examination. llo The statements made by the 
respondent during the sixty day commitment examination are not going to 
be used against him in any criminal proceeding, and the examining psy-
chiatrist is not an adverse party involved in a prosecutorial role. III The 
101 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
102 See Commonwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 112,438 N.E.2d 1064, 1069 (1982); 
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 811, 817, 438 N.E.2d 33, 37 (1982); cf. Addington 
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). 
103 The due process balancing used by the Court actually considers a third factor as well, 
the likely benefit to be derived from additional procedural protection. See Commonwealth v. 
Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 1J3, 438 N.E.2d 1064, 1070 (1982) (trial by jury unlikely to add 
significantly to respondent's protection from unfair process). This third component of the 
due process balancing test has been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court. See 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
104 Andrews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 468, 488-91, 334 N .E.2d 15, 25-28 (1975); compare 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,425-33 (1979) (standard of prooffor involuntary commit-
ment proceedings required to be greater than preponderance of the evidence, but may be 
less than beyond a reasonable doubt). 
105 See Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1080-84 (1st Cir. 1973); see G.L. c. 123A, 
§§ 4-6. 
106 Commonwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 110-16,438 N.E.2d 1064, 1069-71 (1982). 
107 See id. at III, 113,438 N.E.2d at 1068-69, 1070. 
108 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429-31 (1979). 
109 See Commonwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105,113.438 N.E.2d 1064, 1070 (1982). 
110 See id. at 113-15,438 N.E.2d at 1070-71. 
III See Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1085-86 (1st Cir. 1973); compare Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 454. 461-62 (1981) (statements made to psychiatrist used as part of criminal 
prosecution); Commonwealth v. Cain, 361 Mass. 224.226-28.279 N .E.2d 706. 709-10 (1972) 
(statements made to police used in chapter 123A proceedings). 
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warning given to the respondent that his communications will not be 
privileged is a more suitable compromise in protecting the respondent's 
interests. I 12 Finally, the interest of the Commonwealth in helping sexually 
dangerous persons and protecting its citizens from them would seem to 
clearly outweigh any claim that a double punishment was actually being 
imposed upon respondents committed under chapter 123A.1I3 
In summary, the approach taken by the Supreme Judicial Court in 
CommonweaLth v. Barboza ll4 seems to be a desirable one. While the 
potential deprivation facing a person subject to proceedings under chapter 
123A may seem grave,IIS the Court's distinction between these proceed-
ings and criminal prosectution seems to be valid. 1I6 The civil label, 
however, has not prevented the Court from providing ample procedural 
protection to respondents in chapter 123A proceedings. 1I7 Of greatest 
importance, however, is the fact that the rights which are afforded to 
respondents in chapter 123A proceedings are the result of a careful and 
intelligent balancing process rather than the obligatory trappings of a 
"criminal" label. 1I8 In this way the basic components of due process may 
be preserved while the Commonwealth is allowed to effectively perform a 
task which may not be at all adverse to the respondent's interests. 
§ 3.6. Felony-Murder Rule.* The common law felony-murder rule 
provides that a homicide committed in the commission of a felony is 
murder. I This rule as formulated in Enlish law is based on the doctrine of 
constructive malice. 2 Under this doctrine, to prove malice aforethought, 
the essential element of common law murder, the prosecutor needs only 
to establish that the defendant committed a homicide while committing a 
112 See Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1084 (1st Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. 
Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 113-14,438 N.E.2d 1064, 1070 (1982). 
113 Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794, 797-98 (1st Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. Barboza, 
387 Mass. 105, 115, 438 N .E.2d 1064, 1071 (1982). 
114 387 Mass. 105, 438 N.E.2d 1064 (1982). 
liS See supra notes 7, 92 and accompanying text. 
116 See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text. 
117 See Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d F.2d 1076, 1080-84 (1st Cir. 1973); Andrews, petitioner, 
368 Mass. 468, 334 N.E.2d 15 (1975). See supra notes 8-9. For the view that the rights 
afforded respondents in chapter 123A proceedings are in fact constitutionally inadequate, 
see Note. Out of Tune with the Times: The Massachusetts SDP Statute, 45 B. U. L. REv. 
391,407-10 (1965); Comment, Sarzen v. Gaughan: The Right to Counsel and Notice in the 
Commitment of Sexually Dangerous Persons. 9 SUFF. L. REv. 602, 610-13 (1974). 
118 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) ("procedures must be allowed to 
vary [from state to state] so long as they meet the constitutional minimum"). 
* LYMAN G. BULLARD, Jr., staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
LAW. 
§ 3.6. I Commonwealth v. Ambers, 370 Mass. 835, 839, 352 N.E.2d 922, 926 (1976). 
2 Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 512, 209 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1965). 
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felony.3 The effect of the felony-murder rule, therefore, is to substitute 
the intent to commit the underlying felony for the requisite malice 
aforethoughL4 Under the Massachusetts murder statute, chapter 265, 
section 1 of the General Laws, which incorporates the felony-murder 
doctrine,s a felony-murder may be either first degree or second degree 
murder.6 A felony-murder perpetrated in the commission of a felony 
punishable by death or life imprisonment is first degree murder, while a 
felony-murder perpetrated during the commission of a felony punishable 
other than by death or life imprisonment is second degree murder. 7 
Historically, the vast majority of felony-murder convictions in Massa-
chusetts have rested on felonies which are inherently dangerous to human 
life.s Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial Court and other state courts and 
legislatures have severely limited the application of the felony-murder 
rule.9 These courts and legislatures have limited the application ofthe rule 
because of the injustice of substituting the intent to commit any underly-
ing felony for the malice aforethought required for murder. 1o In three 
cases decided during the Survey year,1I the Supreme Judicial Court fur-
ther narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule by requiring that 
the nature of the underlying felony triggering the rule be such that the 
3 /d. The felony-murder rule applies to accomplices as well. Commonwealth v. Ambers, 
370 Mass. 835, 839, 352 N.E.2d 922, 925 (1976). Thus, if an accomplice intentionally 
encourages or assists in the commission of the underlying felony and has the requisite intent, 
his complicity in that underlying felony will establish his guilt of first or second degree 
murder if a homicide occurs during the commission of the felony. Id. 
4 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 502, 436 N.E.2d 400, 407 (1982). 
5 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 505, 512, 209 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1965). 
6 See Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 502, 436 N.E.2d 400, 407 (1982). 
7 See G.L. c. 265, § I. See also Commonwealth v. Ambers, 370 Mass. 835, 839-40, 352 
N.E.2d 922, 926 (1976). 
8 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 505 n.15, 436 N .E.2d 400, 408 n.15 (1982). 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724,405 N.E.2d 939 (1980) (breaking and 
entering with intent to commit larceny and to put a person therein in fear); Commonwealth 
v. Hicks, 377 Mass. 1,384 N.E.2d 1206 (1979) (robbery); Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 
Mass. 472, 379 N.E.2d 1040 (1978) (robbery and kidnapping). 
9 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 566-67,141 N.E.2d 269, 275 (1957) 
(homicide must be probable consequence of underlying felony); People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 
672, 733, 299 N.W.2d 304, 328-29 (1980) (common law felony-murder rule abrogated); 
Burton v. State, 122 Tex. Crim. 363, 366-67. 55 S.W.2d 813, 816 (1932) (death must be 
caused by voluntary act). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 635-636 (1979) (mens rea of 
recklessness or criminal negligence required); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 707-701 (1976) 
(common law felony-murder rule abolished); Ky. REv. STAT. § 507-020 (Supp. 1980) (no 
felony-murder rule). 
10 See Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 503 n.12, 506-07, 436 N .E.2d 400, 407 
n.12, 409-10 (1982). 
11 Commonwealth v. Licciardi, 387 Mass. 670, 443 N.E.2d 386 (1982); Commonwealth v. 
Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 442 N.E.2d 399 (1982); Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 
436 N.E.2d 400 (1982). 
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intent to commit that felony demonstrates a conscious disregard for 
human life. 12 
In Commonwealth v. Matchett, 13 the defendant, a veteran and a martial 
arts expert,14 was hired by Samson to help him collect a gambling debt 
from Colvin.15 On February 12, 1979, Matchett and Samson drove to 
Pittsfield where Colvin lived with his father, telephoned the Colvin house 
twice, and visited it once, with all contacts taking place between one a.m. 
and four~thirty a.m.16 Colvin's father answered each time and told the 
men that Colvin was not at home.t' The next morning, when his father 
told him of the phone calls, Colvin looked "nervous" according to his 
father's testimony.lS Shortly after seven a.m., the defendant and Samson 
were successful in making contact with Colvin by telephone and arranged 
a meeting. 19 Approximately one hour later, Colvin met a neighbor outside 
his home and asked him to keep "his eyes and ears open."20 Shortly 
thereafter, the neighbor saw the defendant and Samson arrive at the 
Colvin home; Samson and Colvin went inside, followed less than a minute 
later by Matchett. 21 According to Matchett's testimony, a struggle ensued 
between Samson and Colvin, and Colvin was shot twice, once in the 
shoulder and once in the abdomen.22 He died two days later.23 
Matchett was indicted on a charge of murder in the first degree. 24 The 
trial judge instructed the jury that they could find the defendant guilty of 
murder in either the first or second degree. 25 He further instructed them 
that a verdict of second degree murder should be returned if the defendant 
"acted with express malice aforethought, i.e. an intention to kill without 
excuse or mitigation, or with implied malice aforethought, the implication 
12 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 507,436 N.E.2d 400, 410 (1982). See also 
Commonwealth v. Licciardi, 387 Mass. 670,673-74& n.2, 443 N.E.2d 386, 389& n.2 (1982); 
Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 651, 442 N.E.2d 399, 403 (1982). 
13 386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982). 
14 [d. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402. 
15 [d. at 494, 436 N.E.2d at 402. 
16 [d. at 494, 436 N.E.2d at 402-03. 
17 [d. at 494-95, 436 N.E.2d at 403. 
18 [d. 
19 [d. 
20 [d. 
21 [d. at 496, 436 N.E.2d at 403. 
22 /d. at 496-97 & n.6, 436 N.E.2d at 404 & n.6. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
23 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 497, 435 N.E.2d 400, 404 (1982). 
24 [d. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402. 
2S id. at 497, 436 N .E.2d at 404. The judge instructed the jury that first degree murder 
could be found "based on deliberately premeditated malice aforethought or the felony-
murder rule, with the underlying felony being an armed assault in a dwelling house with 
intent to commit a felony." [d. See G.L. c. 265, §§ I, 18A. 
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arising from the underlying felony of extortion.26 The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty on the second degree murder charge, and the defendant 
appealed, claiming in part that the trial judge had erred in instructing the 
jury that a second degree murder verdict was permissible using the 
felony-murder rule. 27 The defendant contended that the judge's instruc-
tions regarding the felony-murder doctrine were erroneous for three rea-
sons: the record in the case was devoid of evidence of extortion; the 
felony-murder rule does not apply to the statutory crime of extortion; and 
the felony murder rule is unconstitutional. 28 On its own motion, the Su-
preme Judicial Court accepted the case for direct appellate review. 29 
The Court dismissed the defendant's first claim of error, that the record 
contained no evidence of extortion. The Court found that on the evidence 
presented, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had 
threatened Colvin with physical harm if Colvin refused to pay Samson the 
gambling debt.30 The Court then addressed the question of whether a 
felony murder charge can be predicated on the felony of extortion.3! The 
Court stated that it had never specified precisely which felonies warranted 
application ofthe felony murder rule nor had it expressly limited the rule's 
application to common law felonies.32 The Court noted that courts gener-
ally apply the felony-murder rule grudgingly and narrowly.33 The reason 
for this reluctant application, the Court continued, is that a felony-murder 
rule that treats all homicides resulting from the perpetration of a felony as 
26 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 498, N.E.2d 400, 404 (1982). See G.L. c. 
265, § 25. 
27 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 492-93, 436 N .E.2d 400, 402 (1982). 
28 [d. at 498-99, 436 N.E.2d at 404-05. 
29 [d. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402. 
30 [d. at 501,436 N.E.2d at 406. The Court reached this conclusion based on the following 
facts. Colvin owed Samson $1,500 for more than one year and the trip to Pittsfield was for 
the sole purpose of collecting that debt. Samson, who was perfectly capable of driving 
himself to Pittsfield, hired Matchett, who Samson knew carried guns and was a martial arts 
expert, as a "driver." Matchett brought with him a veritable arsenal of weapons, consisting 
of a loaded pistol and revolver, ammunition, a sawed-off shotgun, a large dog, a pair of 
handculIs and a knife. The pair set out at 1: 30 a.m. and stayed out until approximately 4 a.m. 
looking for the Colvin house. Based on this activity, the jury could reasonably infer that 
upon finding David Colvin, or in the telephone conversation preceding their meeting, one 
or both of the defendants maliciously threatened Colvin in order to collect the money, again, 
the sole purpose of the trip. [d. 
31 [d. at 502, 436 N.E.2d at 406. The Court pointed out that it had never before applied 
the felony-murder rule when the underlying felony was extortion. [d. at 504, 436 N.E.2d at 
408. 
32 /d. at 505, 436 N .E.2d at 408. Extortion is a statutory felony in Massachusetts. See 
G.L. c. 265, § 25. 
33 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 505, 436 N.E.2d 400, 409 (1982). 
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a murder regardless of the perpetrator's intent in committing the underly-
ing felony violates the "most fundamental principle of the criminal 
law. "34 That principle, the Court stated, is that a person cannot be held 
criminally liable for causing a particular result unless he had a culpable 
mental state regarding that result.3s Because the felony-murder rule is 
based on the theory "that the intent to commit the felony is equivalent to 
the malice aforethought required for murder,36 the Court noted, the 
theory can be viable only if the nature of the felony is such that intent to 
commit that crime demonstrates a "conscious disregard of the risk to 
human life."37 The Court pointed out that many statutory felonies, such 
as receiving stolen goods or possessing buglarious instruments, involve 
little danger to human life.38 The felony-murder rule could not apply to 
such felonies, the Court concluded, since the requisite intent to commit 
these felonies involves no intent equivalent to the malice aforethought 
required for murder. 39 
Accordingly, the Court held that when death results from the perpetra-
tion of the statutory felony of extortion, a defendant cannot be convicted 
of felony-murder unless the jury finds that the extortion involved circum-
stances showing the defendant's conscious disregard of the risk to human 
life.40 The trial judge's charge was erroneous, the Court found, because it 
did not include this limiting instruction on the application of the felony-
murder rule.41 Rather than speculating on whether the jury verdict of 
second degree murder was based on a finding of express malice 
aforethought or the felony-murder rule, the Court reversed the judge-
ment, set aside the verdict and remanded the case to the superior court for 
a new tria1.42 
In the second felony-murder case decided during the Survey year, 
Commonwealth v. Moran,43 the Supreme Judicial Court considered 
whether, in light of Matchett, 44 the felony-murder rule could be applied to 
the underlying felony of unarmed robbery.45 In Moran, the defendants, 
Moran and Chenail, and the victim, Wronski, met outside a bar in Adams 
34 [d. at 506-07, 436 N.E.2d at 409. 
35 [d. at 507, 436 N.E.2d at 409. 
36 [d. at 507, 436 N.E.2d at 409-10. 
37 [d. at 507, 436 N.E.2d at 410. 
38 [d. 
39 See id. 
40 [d. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410. 
41 [d. The Court noted that its conclusion vitiated the need to reach the constitutionality 
of the felony-murder rule in this case. [d. at 508 n.l7, 436 N.E.2d at 410 n.17. 
42 /d. at 511, 436 N.E.2d at 412. 
43 387 Mass. 644, 442 N.E.2d 399 (1982). 
44 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982). 
45 Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 645, 442 N.E.2d 399, 402 (1982). 
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and entered the bar together.46 Wronski bought Moran and Chenail one or 
more drinks,47 then left the bar and began walking towards his truck.48 
The other two emerged from the bar and Moran told Chenail to go after 
Wronski because he owed them another drink.49 Moran and Chenial 
pursued Wronski and confronted him at his truck. 50 Witnesses at the 
scene saw a person dressed like Moran punching another person inside 
the truck. 51 Wronski's body was discovered in his truck the next morning; 
his empty wallet was found in a nearby river a day later,52 
Moran and Chenail were convicted by a jury in superior court of both 
unarmed robbery and first degree murder based on the felony-murder 
rule. 53 The defendants appealed the murder conviction, arguing that the 
felony murder rule is unconstitutiona1.54 They contended that the 
felony-murder rule violates the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement 
that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt 
because the rule presumes the mental state required for murder from the 
mental state required for the underlying felony. 55 The Court dismissed 
this argument, stating that the felony-murder rule does not presume the 
malice aforethought required for murder,56 but rather the intent to commit 
the underlying felony is the required malice aforethought within the mean-
ing of the law. 57 This occurs, according to the Court, because the effect of 
the felony-murder rule is to substitute the intent to commit the underlying 
felony for the requisite malice aforethought of murder. 58 The Court there-
fore upheld the constitutionality of the felony-murder rule. 59 
The jury had convicted the defendants in Moran, however, before the 
Matchett Court issued its holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of 
murder based on the felony-murder rule where the underlying felony was 
extortion unless the facts of the extortion showed the defendant's "con-
46 [d. at 645, 442 N.E.2d at 400. 
47 [d. 
48 [d. 
49 [d. at 646, 442 N.E.2d 401. 
50 [d. at 645, 442 N.E.2d at 400. 
51 [d. at 647, 442 N.E.2d at 401. 
52 [d. at 646, 442 N.E.2d at 401. 
53 /d. at 645, 442 N.E.2d at 400. 
54 [d. Defendant Moran also moved for required findings of not guilty on the charges of 
unarmed robbery and murder. /d. at 646,442 N.E.2d at 401. The Court, however, held that 
the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find each element of the crime of 
robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. [d. at 647, 442 N.E.2d at 401. The Court accordingly 
denied the motion. [d. 
55 [d. at 648, 442 N.E.2d at 402. 
56 [d. at 650, 442 N.E.2d at 403. 
57 [d. at 649, 442 N.E.2d at 403. 
58 [d. at 649, 442 N .E.2d at 402. 
59 [d. at 650, 442 N.E.2d at 403. 
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scious disregard of the risk to human life. "60 The Moran Court therefore 
reviewed the judge's jury instruction on felony-murder to determine 
whether the instructions complied with Matchett despite the defendant's 
failure to object to the rule's application to this case.61 The judge had 
instructed the jury that the element of malice aforethought, a necessary 
component for a murder conviction, is supplied by participation in a 
felony punishable by life imprisonment.62 The Moran Court, however; 
referred to its decisIon in Matchett as establishing the principle that 
criminal liability for murder is not justified absent proof of the defendant's 
culpable mental state regarding that result.63 As the Matchett Court 
stated, the defendant will be held to have had the requisite mental state for 
the killing if the ihtent to commit the underlying felony demonstrates a 
conscious disregard for human life.64 Applying this holding to the Moran 
case, the Court concluded that homicides resulting from unarmed robbery 
may not be treated as murder without proof of a culpable mental state 
regarding the killing, since unarmed robbery is not inherently dangerous 
to human life.65 The Court therefore held that where the underlying felony 
is unarmed robbery, the felony-murder rule will apply only where the jury 
finds from the facts of the unarmed robbery that the defendant "con-
sciously disregarded the risk to human life. "66 Because the judge did not 
instruct the jury that it must find such "conscious disregard for human 
life" to convict the defendant of felony-murder, the Court reversed the 
murder convictions.67 
In the final felony-murder rule case decided during the Survey year, 
Commonwealth v. Licciardi,68 the Supreme Judicial Court in dicta im-
plied that the felony of statutory rape will not trigger the felony-murder 
rule unless the defendant's intent showed a conscious disregard for the 
risk to human life. 69 In Licciardi, the defendant was convicted of the 
kidnapping, non-consensual rape and first degree murder of the victim, a 
fifteen-year old girl. 70 The trial judge instructed the jury that it could find 
first degree murder based on malice aforethought, felony-murder or 
extreme atrocity.71 On the rape indictments, the judge initially gave the 
60 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 508, 436 N.E.2d 400, 410 (1982). 
61 Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 650, 442 N.E.2d 399, 403 (1982). 
62 [d. at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403. 
63 See id. at 650, 442 N.E.2d at 403. 
64 See id. at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403. 
65 [d. at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403. 
66 [d. 
67 [d. 
68 387 Mass. 670,443 N.E.2d 386 (1982). 
69 [d. at 674 n;2, 443 N.E.2d at 389 n.2. 
70 [d. at 670; 443 N .E.2d at 387. 
71 [d. at 673, 443 N.E.2d at 388. 
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jury the option of returning verdicts of guilty or not guilty. 72 
Upon deliberation, the jury returned to the judge and asked if "rape" 
included consensual intercourse with a child under the age of sixteen.73 
The judge concluded that it did, but that the distinction between non-
consensual or forcible rape and consensual or statutory rape presented a 
problem regarding felony-murder. 74 The judge noted that strict construc-
tion of chapter 265, section 1 of the General Laws7S would allow a 
felony-murder conviction based on statutory rape since a life sentence can 
be imposed for a statutory rape conviction.76 The judge added, however, 
that no case authorized a first degree felony-murder conviction based on 
statutory rape,77 and that it seemed uhlikely that death would occur 
during consensual intercourse, thus making a felony-murder conviction 
unwarranted. 78 
The judge changed the verdict slips on the rape indictments to require 
the jury, in the event it found the defendant guilty, to indicate whether the 
rape was forcible or consensual.79 The judge further instructed the jury to 
state whether it relied on felony-murder if it found the defendant guilty of 
first degree murder, because a general verdict would not reveal the theory 
on which the verdict was based.80 The jury found the defendant guilty of 
forcible rape and of first degree murder based on both felony-murder and 
extreme atrocity, but not on malice aforethought.81 
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court and argued that 
the questions posed by the verdict called for an impermissible "special 
verdict. "82 He argued alternatively that asking the jury "special ques-
72 Id. at 673, 443 N .E.2d at 389. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
7S See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
76 See G.L. c. 265, § 23. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
77 Commonwealth v. Licciardi, 387 Mass. 670, 674, 443 N.E.2d 836, 389 (1982). 
78 /d. The Supreme Judicial Court noted that the judge's concern about using the felony 
of statutory rape as a basis for felony-murder conviction was well justified in light of 
subsequent decisions by the Court in Moran and Matchett.Id. at 674 n.2., 443 N.E.2d at 389 
n.2. Since Licciardi was decided on December 3, 1982, after both Moran and Matchett, it 
must have been argued before either of those cases were decided. Although this comment by 
the Supreme Judicial Court about using statutory rape as a basis for felony-murder is only 
dictum, it appears after Moran and Matchett that a conviction for murder based on the 
felony-murder rule with the underlying felony being statutory rape will be upheld only where 
the jury firtds that the defendant acted with "conscious disregard for human life." See 
Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 507, 436 N.E.2d 400, 410 (1982). 
79 Commonwealth v. Licciardi, 387 Mass. 670, 674, 443 N .E.2d 386, 389 (1982). 
80 Id. 
8! Id. at 675, 443 N.E.2d at 389-90. 
82 Id. A "special verdict" is a statement offacts as found by the jury involving no ultimate 
verdict, from which the judge determines judgment; it is impermissible in Massachusetts. 
Id. 
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tions" was unconstitutional. 83 The Court held first that no special verdict 
was involved, since the jury reached a general verdict on the charge of 
first degree murder.84 Second, the Court held that the special questions 
had no tendency to lead the jury to a guilty verdict and were proper in that 
they made it possible to determine whether the defendant's conviction of 
first degree murder was based solely on felony-murder with the underly-
ing felony being statutory rape.8S The significance of the Licciardi deci-
sion, however, is the apparent approval by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
the trial judge's distinction between forcible rape and statutory rape for 
purposes of the felony-murder rule.86 In a footnote that was unrelated to 
the holding and therefore dictum, the Court commented briefly that the 
judge's concern whether statutory rape could be the basis for felony-
murder was well justified in light of Matchett and Moran. 87 
The decisions in Matchett, Moran and Licciardi by the Supreme Judi-
cial Court reflect a growing international and national trend. 88 England 
abolished the felony-murder rule in 1957, and reinstated an absolute 
requirement of malice aforethought for murder.89 In the United States, 
many state legislatures have either abandoned or limited the application of 
the rule. 90 State courts have followed suit,91 indicating their dissatisfac-
tion with the notion of substituting the intent to commit an underlying 
felony for the malice aforethought required for murder, regardless of 
the felony's nature and the danger it poses to the individua1.92 The basic 
flaw in the felony-murder doctrine is that it runs contrary to a fundamental 
principle of criminal law that criminal liability for causing a particular 
result, in this case murder, can not be justified absent culpable intent with 
respect to that result. 93 Under this fundamental principle, if a defendant 
has committed a statutory felony which poses no inherent danger to 
human life and if he intends no such harm, yet death results, the death 
cannot be deemed murder. By requiring that the intent needed for the 
83 Id . .. Special questions" involve a general verdict by the jury coupled with answers to 
written questions on essential issues of fact and are allowed in Massachusetts. Id. 
84 Id. at 676, 443 N.E.2d at 390. 
85 Id. at 676-77, 443 N.E.2d at 390-91. 
86 See id. at 673-74 and n.2, 443 N.E.2d at 289 and n.2. 
87 Id. at 674 n.2, 443 N.E.2d at 389 n.2. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
88 See Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 503 n.12, 436 N .E.2d 400, 407 n.12 
(1982) (trends in limitation of felony-murder rule). See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying 
text. 
89 Comnxmwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 503 n.12, 436 N.E.2d 400, 407 n.12 (1982) 
(citing Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. c. 11, § I). 
90 See id. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
91 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
92 See, e.g., People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 708, 299 N.W.2d 304, 334 (1980). 
93 Id. at 709-11, 299 N.W.2d at 334. 
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underlying felony must demonstrate the defendant's conscious disregard 
for the risk to human life, the Supreme Judicial Court was merely follow-
ing this long-established criminal law principle. 
The Matchett decision appears to provide a two-part test for discerning 
which felonies will trigger the application of the felony-murder rule in the 
future. Under the first part of the test, the felony-murder rule will apply 
when the underlying felony is inherently dangerous to human life and the 
requisite intent for that felony is present.94 When a death results from the 
perpetration of a felony that is not inherently dangerous, the second part 
of the test dictates that the felony-murder rule will apply only when the 
defendant displays a conscious disregard for the risk to human life in 
committing that felony. 9S The latter application of the felony-murder rule 
will require courts to examine closely the defendant's intent in committing 
felonies which are not inherently dangerous to see if the circumstances 
surrounding the commission of the felony show the requisite "conscious 
disregard" for human life. 
The effect of Matchett, Moran and Licciardi is to remove the felonies of 
extortion, unarmed robbery and, arguably, statutory rape96 from the 
felony-murder rule unless the conscious disregard for the risk to human 
life is present in a particular case. These decisions do not appear to 
overturn any past decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court. 97 For exam-
ple, the Court has long required that a homicide resulting from the com-
mission of a felony be the natural and probable consequence of the act. 98 
Further, the Court had never delineated precisely which underlying 
felonies give rise to the rule's application.99 Finally, the great majority of 
felony-murder convictions in Massachusetts for both statutory and 
common-law felonies have rested on inherently dangerous felonies. tOO 
In conclusion, during the Survey year the Supreme Judicial Court 
narrowed the future application of the felony-murder rule by delimiting 
which underlying felonies will trigger the rule's application. In so doing, 
the Court relied on the fundamental criminal law principle that criminal 
liability for murder cannot be justified absent culpable intent regarding 
that result. In the future, if a defendant commits a felony inherently 
dangerous to human life, and death results, the felony-murder rule will 
apply. In addition, if death results from the commission of a felony not 
94 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 507, 436 N.E.2d 400, 410 (1982). 
9S Id. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410. 
96 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
91 See Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 504 & n.14, 505 & n.15, 436 N.E.2d 
400, 408 & nn.14, 15 (1982). 
98 Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 567, 141 N.E.2d 269, 275 (1957). 
99 Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 505, 436 N.E.2d 400, 408 (1982). 
100 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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normally dangerous to human life j but the circumstances surrounding the 
felony's commission indicate the defendant's conscious disregard for the 
risk to human life, the felony-murder rule will also apply. 
§ 3.7. Speedy Trial. * The sixth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides a criminal defendant with the right to a speedy trial in 
federal court. l This right is extended to criminal defendants in state courts 
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 A state 
criminal defendant in Massachusetts has a co-extensive right to a speedy 
trial under article eleven of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 3 
Although neither the federal nor the state constitution expressly defines 
"speedy trial," the United States SUpreme Court, in Barker v. Wingo,4 
determined that proper resolution of speedy trial claims under the federal 
constitution depended upon an ad hoc judicial balancing of certain factors 
relating to the conduct of the prosecutor and the defendant in criminal 
proceedings.s The Barker Court identified four factors which courts must 
assess in determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to a 
speedy trial has been violated: •• Length of delay, the reason for the delay, 
the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. "6 
The Court in Barker cautioned, however, that no one of the four factors is 
dispositive to a finding of a deprivation of the speedy trial right. 7 Instead, 
the Court stated that the factors were related and all four should be 
considered, together with any other relevant circumstances, in determin-
ing whether the defendant has received a speedy trial. 8 
* BRIAN J. KNEZ, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.7. 1 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial. ... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
2 See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1976). The Supreme Court has 
noted that the right to a speedy trial is one of the most basic rights preserved by the 
Constitution. [d. at 226; Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1973); Dickey v. Arizona, 
398 U.S. 30, 37 (1970). 
3 "Every subject of the Commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having 
recourse to the laws .... He ought to obtain right and justice freely ... promptly, and without 
delay; conformably to the laws." MAss. CONST. art. XI. See Commonwealth v. Gove, 366 
Mass. 351, 356 n.6, 320 N.E.2d 900, 905 n.6 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hanley, 337 Mass. 
384,387,149 N.E.2d 608, 610, cert. den., 358 U.S. 850 (1958). 
4 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
5 [d. at 530. 
6 [d. 
7 [d. at 533. 
8 [d. For example, in Barker, there was a five year delay between the defendant's arrest 
and his subsequent trial for murder. [d. In the interim, the prosecution obtained numerous 
continuances, primarily for the purpose of first trying the defendant's alleged accomplice so 
that, if convicted, his testimony would be available at the defendant's trial. [d. at 534. The 
Supreme Court nevertheless held that the defendant's right to a speedy trial had not been 
violated even though more than four years of the delay was attributed to the prosecutor's 
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In contrast to the ad hoc nature of the Barker analysis is the strict 
remedy which is imposed when a court determines that a defendant's 
sixth amendment rights have been infringed. Once a court has properly 
determined that a criminal defendant's constitutional speedy trial right 
has been violated, the only permissible remedy is dismissal of the charges 
with prejudice to the state. 9 The rationale behind this severe sanction is 
that any failure to afford the defendant a speedy trial, unlike other guaran-
tees of the sixth amendment, cannot be cured by a new trial. 10 
In Barker, the Supreme Court envisioned a flexible constitutional test 
based on practical considerations for determining when a speedy trial has 
not been provided. 11 Accordingly, the Court refused to set a particular 
time period beyond which any delay would presumptively infringe upon 
the defendant's speedy trial rightS.12 The Barker Court did not, however j 
forbid the states from prescribing such periods so long as they were 
consistent with constitutional standards. 13 Following the directive of 
Barker, Massachusetts has promulgated both procedural rules by the 
Supreme Judicial Court and statutory provisions14 which attempt to more 
specifically define the Commonwealth's obligation to secure a prompt trial 
for criminal defendants. For instance, in 1979, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court promulgated a new rule of criminal procedure which 
sets forth specific speedy trial standards. 15 Rule 36, entitled "Case Man-
agement," essentially provides time limits for trial beyond which a crimi-
nal defendant's right to speedy adjudication is presumptively violated. 16 
Additionally, under Rule 36, the defendant may be entitled to relief even 
before the specified time periods elapse if he or she can show prejudice 
failure or inability to try the co-defendant. [d. at 533-36. Applying its newly enunciated 
balancing test, the Court found that both the excessive length of delay and the state's clear 
fault in causing much of that delay were outweighed by the minimal resulting prejudice to the 
defendant and, most importantly, the fact that the evidence showed that the defendant 
definitely did not want to be promptly tried. [d. at 534. The Court noted that the defendant 
failed to assert his speedy trial right for over three years, apparently preferring to gamble on 
his co-defendant's chances of acquittal. [d. at 534-35. 
9 See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 437-40 (1973); United States v. Novelli, 544 
F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1977); Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394, 397 (U.S. App. D.C.), cert. 
den., 371 U.S. 896 (1962). See also Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 370 Mass. 31. 35, 345 N.E.2d 
386, 389 (1976). 
10 Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434,440 (1973). See C. WHITEBREAD., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 23.01. at 475-76 (1980). 
11 Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 (1973). 
12 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972). The Barker Court noted that it could find 
"no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a 
specified number of days or months." [d. 
13 [d. 
14 See generally MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. 
IS MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(b). 
16 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(c). 
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caused by the prosecution's lack of diligence,l7 During the Survey year, 
Massachusetts courts had ~everal opportunities to examine and clarify the 
scope as well as the functional interrelationships of the various constitu-
tional, court rule and statutory speedy trial rights and remedies available 
to state criminal defendants. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS AND REMEDmS 
In Commonwealth v. Lutojj,18 Lutoff was indicted on charges of 
burning a building and other insured property.19 Two different judges of 
the superior court each denied separate motions filed by the defendant to 
dismiss the indictments for lack of a speedy trial and he was subsequently 
convicted.20 On appeal, Lutoff renewed his argument that he had been 
deprived of his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial. 21 
The indictments against Lutoff were originally returned by the grand 
jury on September 15 and 16, 1976.22 On February 4, 1977, counsel for 
Lutoff requested that the indictments be placed on the trial list for mid-
March, 1977.23 The assistant district attorney assigned to prosecute the 
case replied that, due to Lutoff's apparent readiness for trial, his office 
would place the case on the earliest trial list possible, although there 
would be no trial sitting in March or perhaps even in April. 24 On March 4, 
1977 Lutoff filed a motion for speedy trial on the ground that delay would 
cause undue hardship and violate his constitutional rights.2s The motion 
was never marked for hearing. 26 On June 23, 1977, Lutoff secured new 
counseP7 who, on that same day, advised the prosecutor that the case 
could not be plea bargained, but would have to be tried.28 It was appar-
ently agreed, however, that, due to a crowded docket in July and the lack 
of sessions in August, the case would not appear on a trial list until 
September or October, 1977.29 The case was not set for trial until March 
17 See generally G.L. c. 276, § 35. See infra notes 162-165 and accompanying text. For a 
brief discussion ofG.L. c. 277, § 72A, which was repealed by the Acts of 1981, c. 795, § 16, 
see infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text. 
18 14 Mass. App. Ct. 434, 440 N.E.2d 52 (1982). 
19 [d. at 434, 440 N.E.2d at 53. 
20 [d. at 435, 440 N.E.2d at 53. 
21 [d. at 434, 440 N.E.2d at 53. 
22 [d. at 435, 440 N.E.2d at 54. 
23 [d. 
24 [d. at 435-36, 440 N.E.2d at 54. 
2S [d. at 436, 440 N.E.2d at 54. 
26 [d. 
27 [d. 
28 [d. 
29 [d. 
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14, 1978.30 On that date, the Commonwealth did not move for trial 
because the assigned prosecutor was engaged in another criminal trial. 31 
On March 17, 1978, the court appointed new counsel for Lutoff. 32 A 
superior court judge then scheduled July 17, 1978 for trial. 33 On this new 
trial date, however, the case was not on the trial list, and it did not appear 
on any such list thereafter.34 On April 2, 1979, approximately two and 
one-half years after the grand jury returned the original indictments, 
Lutoff again moved to dismiss the indictments for denial of his federal and 
state constitutional rights to a speedy trial.35 
In considering Lutoff's motion, a superior court judge determined that, 
although the passage of thirty-two months since the return of the indict-
ments was enough to trigger a speedy trial inquiry and Lutoff's actions 
had not caused the delay, Lutoff had nevertheless failed to show that the 
delay had resulted in prejudice.36 Accordingly, the judge denied the 
motion.37 Lutoff seasonably objected to the order and, on May 9, 1980, 
again moved to dismiss the indictments on speedy trial grounds.38 A 
different superior court judge heard the second motion on july 30, 1980,39 
but the court again concluded that Lutoff had not established prejudice as 
a result ofthe delay.40 Consequently, Lutoff's motion was denied.41 Trial 
30 [d. 
31 [d. 
32 [d. 
33 [d. at 437, 440 N.E.2d at 54. 
34 [d. 
35 [d. 
36 [d. at 437, 440 N.E.2d at 55. The defendant alleged that he had been prejudiced because 
the lack of trial prevented him from obtaining employment as well as prevented the appear-
ance of two key defense witnesses. [d. at 437 n.4, 440 N.E.2d at 55 n.4. 
37 [d. at 437, 440 N.E.2d at 55. The judge concluded that the lack of demonstrated 
prejudice outweighed the remaining three factors in the Barker test. [d. See supra notes 6-8 
and accompanying text. 
38 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 437, 440 N.E.2d at 55. More than one year had passed since denial 
of the first motion and the case had yet to be assigned to trial. Id. The defendant argued that 
the case was forty-four months old, a material witness had died and another witness had 
subsequently moved out of state and lacked the means to return to testify. [d. at 437-38, 440 
N.E.2d at 55. 
39 [d. at 438,440 N.E.2d at 55. At the hearing, a new prosecutor for the Commonwealth 
indicated that she had been unable to try the case since it had been assigned to her in 
January, 1980 because of commitments to defendants wI10 were already incarcerated. [d. 
40 [d. Upon considering affidavits of couse I, the findings made by the judge on the April 2, 
1979 motion and the defendant's testimony, the judge found that other available witnesses 
could testify to the facts which would have been testified to by a key, deceased defense 
witness. [d. The judge further found that the defendant had failed to establish the relevance 
of the testimony of an unavailable out-of-state witness. [d. Finally, the judge opined that, 
other than the passage of one year, there had been no substantial changes in the defendant's 
circumstances since denial of his April 2, 1979 motion. [d. 
41 [d. 
45
Reilly: Chapter 3: Criminal Law and Procedure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1982
88 1982 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 3.7 
subsequently began on September 15, 1980 and Lutoff was convicted 11 
days later. 42 
Lutoff appealed his conviction, alleging that he had been deprived of his 
I 
right to a speedy trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution and article eleven of the Massachusetts Decla-
ration of Rights.43 In reviewing Lutoff's claim, the Massa~husetts Appeals 
Court examined each of the four factors enunciated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo: the length of delay, the reason for 
delay, the defendant's assertion of his or her right, and Iprejudice to the 
defendant as a result of the delay.44 With regard to the! first factor, the 
length of delay, the court held that the four year delay of the commence-
ment of the trial,45 while not dispositive, was unquestionably sufficient to 
justify further inquiry into whether Lutoff's constitutionaliright to a speedy 
trial had in fact been violated.46 The Appeals Court stated that, unless the 
prosecution could adequately explain the length of the delay, this factor 
clearly weighed against the Commonwealth.47 
The Appeals Court next examined the second factor off the Barker test, 
the reason for the delay. The court noted that the superior court judges 
who had denied Lutoff's motions below each attributed the delay to 
congestion in the criminal docket and the district ahorney's heavy 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 434, 440 N.E.2d at 53. 
44 Id. at 438-39, 440 N.E.2d at 55. The court noted that these factors must be carefully 
considered and balanced incident to a proper constitutional speedy triaJ analysis.ld. at 439, 
440 N .E.2d at 56. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972), and supra notes 6-8 and 
accompanying text. 
4S The Court found that since the defendant was not in custody prior to the return of the 
indictments, his right to a speedy trial did not attach until the date of tl).e return, September 
15,1976.14 Mass. App. Ct. at 439, 440 N.E.2d at 56. See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 
U.S. 307, 320 (1971) ("[Ilt is either a formal indictment or else the actual restraints imposed 
by arrest and holding to answer a charge that engage the right."); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURa § 813, at 203 (2d ed. 
1982) ("The sixth amendment right does not attach at all to those not yet accused, nor does 
it require the government to discover, investigate, or accuse any person within any particu-
lar time."). 
46 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 439, 440 N.E.2d at 56. The court subsequently noted delays in 
other cases which by comparison suggested that the four year delay in this case warranted 
further investigation (citing Commonwealth v. Look, 379 Mass. 893,402 N.E.2d 470, cerro 
denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1980) (fifty-two month delay); Commonwealth V. Beckett, 373 Mass. 
329,366 N.E.2d 1252 (1977) (fifty-five month delay); Commonwealthlv. Boyd, 367 Mass. 
169,326 N.E.2d 320 (1975) (fourteen month delay); Commonwealth ~. Gilbert, 366 Mass. 
18,314 N.E.2d III (1974) (thirty-one month delay); Commonwealth~. Home, 326 Mass. 
738, 291 N.E.2d 629 (1973) (forty-eight month delay». 
47 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 439, 440 N.E.2d at 56 (quoting Commonwealth v. Look, 379 
Mass. 893, 898, 402 N.E.2d 470, 475, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 827 (19$0». 
.. 
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caseload.48 Although there was no suggestion of any purposeful delay of 
trial by the prosecution,49 the Appeals Court nevertheless emphasized 
that neither "court congestion" nor "deficiencies in the system" could be 
a defense to the defendant's speedy trial claim. so Additionally, the court 
found that the record before it left little doubt that the greater part of the 
delay was caused by the prosecutor's preoccupation with other cases,51 
and, correspondingly, showed that none of the delay could be attributed 
to Lutoff.S2 Noting that prosecutors have the primary right to control trial 
lists under Massachusetts law as well as the concomitant obligation to 
maintain current lists of cases for trial, the Appeals Court stated that 
"prosecutors must take affirmative action to bring cases to trial, particu-
larly where, as here, the accused has pressed for an early confrontation 
with his accusers."53 The Appeals Court concluded, therefore, that the 
reason for the delay also weighed heavily against the Commonwealth. 54 
In addressing the third factor of the Barker test, the defendant's asser-
tion of his or her right, the Appeals Court quickly concluded that there 
could be little question that Lutoff had diligently attempted to obtain a 
prompt trial.55 As evidence of Lutoff's diligence, the court pointed to 
48 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 440, 440 N.E.2d at 56. 
49 Id. The sixth amendment does not permit purposeful or oppressive delays and an action 
must be dismissed if it is shown that such a delay was deliberately caused by the prosecutor. 
See C. WRIGHT, supra note 45, at § 813, at 216-19 and cases cited therein. 
50 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 440, 441, 440 N.E.2d at 56,57. The court also noted, however, that 
it might have been helpful if the Commonwealth's explanation for the delay, i.e. court 
congestion or heavy caseloads, was supported by subsidiary findings of fact more ade-
quately depicting the prevailing problems. Id. at 441) n.6, 440 N.E.2d at 56 n.6. Such a 
comment by the court suggests that administrative excuses offered by the government may 
be entitled to some favorable weight in the balancing process if the reasons for and scope of 
the administrative problems are properly presented to the court. See, e.g., Dickey v. 
Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 38 (1970) ("Crowded dockets, the lack of judges or lawyers, and other 
factors no doubt make some delays inevitable."). 
51 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 440, 440 N.E.2d at 56. The court pointed out that the prosecutor 
first assigned to the case, although having promised the defendant a prompt trial, repeatedly 
delayed placing the case on trial lists and was subsequently unavailable to prosecute when 
the case finally did come up for trial. Id. Likewise, the court noted that the second 
prosecutor conceded that she could not have tried the case earlier due to prior commitments. 
Id. at 440-41, 440 N.E.2d at 56-57. Finally, the court reasoned that the case was not 
unusually complex, and that basic investigation and preparation should have been com-
pleted when the Commonwealth complied with discovery orders on June 10, 1977.1d. at 
441,440 N.E.2d at 57. 
S2 Id. The court noted that the first superior court judge's findings obviated any argument 
that the defendant had engaged in delaying tactics by changing counsel.ld. at 441 & n. 7,440 
N.E.2d at 57 & n.7. The defendant's several counsel were apparently always prepared to 
proceed promptly to trial as they had requested.ld. at 441 & n.7, 440 N.E.2d at 57 & n.7. 
53 Id. at 441,440 N.E.2d at 57. 
S4 Id. at 442, 440 N.E.2d at 57 (citation omitted). 
55 Id. 
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Lutoff's letter to the superior court and informal request to the pros-
ecutor, seeking a prompt trial, the later formal, although unmarked, 
motion to dismiss, and Lutoff's two subsequent motions to dismiss on 
speedy trial grounds argued before the superior court and supported by 
affidavits specifying prejudice.56 . 
In examining the fourth and final factor of the Barker test, the prejudice 
to the defendant caused by the delay, the Appeals Court reiterated a 
principle previously articulated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court in Commonwealth v. Beckett57 regarding the burden of proving 
prejudice in a constitutional speedy trial case.58 The AppeiIs Court noted 
that under Beckett if the delay is deemed substantial and if the defendant 
has pressed diligently for a trial during at least a substantial portion of that 
period, then the burden falls on the Commonwealth to establish the 
absence of prejudice to the defendant. 59 The Lutoff court p~inted out that 
in the case before it Lutoff's persistent efforts over a fourtyear period to 
obtain trial were sufficient to create a presumption of prejudice. 60 After 
establishing that the burden of proof on the issue of Lutoff's claim of 
prejudice61 was shifted to the Commonwealth under the Beckett rule,62 
56 Jd. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Barker dispelled a previous view 
held by some courts that the defendant's failure to raise his or her speedy trial right forever 
waived that right. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1972). See C. WRIGHT, supra note 
45, at § 813, at 204. Nevertheless, whether the defendant has asserted the right in a timely 
manner has still been given strong evidentiary weight in determining the existence of a 
constitutional violation. See, e.g., 407 U.S. at 531-32,536 ("[WJe would be reluctant ... to 
rule that a defendant was denied ... [a constitutional right to a speedy trialJ ... on a record 
that strongly indicates ... that the defendant did not want a speedy trial.' 1); Commonwealth 
v. Look, 379 Mass. 893,900-01,402 N.E.2d 470-77, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1980) ("The 
speedy trial is not one which may be kept in reserve in the event that one's belief that the 
prosecution has overlooked or decided not to pursue his case proves to be erroneous. "). See 
generally Gelhaar, Criminal Practice and Procedure, 1980 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 4.10, 
at 183-84. I 
57 373 Mass. 329, 366 N.E.2d 1252 (1977). 
58 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 442, 440 N.E.2d at 57-58. 
59 Jd. (quoting Beckett, 373 Mass. at 334, 366 N.E.2d at 1256). 
60 Jd. at 442-43, 440 N.E.2d at 58. The court subsequently gave the basis for such a 
presumption: 
Prejudice to ... defendants because of ... [aJlong unjustified delay in "ringing ... [aJ 
case to trial "may fairly be presumed simply because everyone knows that memories 
fade, evidence is lost, and the burden of anxiety upon any criminal defendant increases 
with the passing months and years." United States v. Blaustein, 325 F. Supp. 233, 
238 (S.D. N.Y. 1971), quoting from United States v. Mann, 291 F. Supp. 268, 271 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
Jd. at 443 n.9, 440 N.E.2d at 58 n.9. See also United States v. Dowl, 394!F. Supp. 1250 (D. 
Minn. 1975); United States v. Blanca Perez, 310 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United 
States v. Skinner, 308 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
61 In the Barker analysis, a defendant's claim of prejudice must be assessed in light of the 
interests protected by the speedy trial guarantee. See C. WRIGHT, supra, note 45, at § 813, 
at 205. The Appeals Court in Lutoffpointed out that ofthe several interests ofthe accused as 
48
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1982 [1982], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1982/iss1/6
§ 3.7 CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 91 
the court proceeded to examine the trial record to determine the presence 
or absence of prejudicial impairment of Lutoff's right to present an 
adequate defense at trial. 63 
Upon review of the record, the court found that the lapse of time had 
impaired Lutoff's strategy in several respects. First, key witnesses had 
suffered unrefreshable failures of memory which tended to weaken the 
defense. 64 Second, a fire investigator, whose existence the defense had 
not been aware of until one week before trial, offered testimony which 
suggested that one of the fires in question had been intentionally set. 65 
The investigator was, however, unable to locate a report or notes made at 
the scene which would have corroborated his testimony because the 
incident had occurred' 'quite a while ago.' '66 Finally, the details surround-
ing the issuance of an important insurance binder could not be clearly 
ascertained because the issuing agent had moved to Florida and was 
therefore beyond the court's jurisdiction.67 Such evidence, the Appeals 
Court reasoned, would have helped Lutoff to rebut the prosecution's 
claim that Lutoff had fraudulently obtained insurance prior to the fire. 68 
The court, applying the Beckett rule, determined that the Commonwealth 
had not met its burden of showing lack of prejudice to the defendant. 69 
According to the court, the trial record revealed that the delay had in fact 
prejudicially interfered with Lutoff's ability to present evidence on mate-
rial issues at trial. 70 
articulated in Barker - prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimization of the 
defendant's pretrial anxiety and limitation of the possibility that the delay will impair the 
ability of a defendant to prepare a defense - the latter interest is offundamental importance. 
14 Mass. App. Ct. at 443, 440 N.E.2d at 58. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 
(1972). See also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 38 (1970); United States v. Graham, 538 
F.2d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976). 
62 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 443, 440 N.E.2d at 58. 
63 Id. at 443-45, 440 N.E.2d at 58-59. In view of the defendant's claim of prejudice at trial, 
the Appeals Court reasoned that this element of prejudice could be adequately analyzed only 
by an examination of the facts manifested at trial. Id. at 443-44 n.12, 440 N .E.2d at 58 n.12. 
Indeed, prior to trial, any inquiry as to the degree to which delay has impaired the defense 
tends to be speculative. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 45, at § 813, at 205. The United States 
Supreme Court, therefore, has held that a denial of a motion to dismiss on speedy trial 
grounds is not an appealable order and may be raised on appeal only after conviction. United 
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-63 (1978). 
64 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 444-45, 440 N .E.2d at 58-59. 
6S Id. at 444, 440 N.E.2d at 59. 
66 Id. at 445, 440 N.E.2d at 59. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
691d. at 443, 440 N.E.2d at 58. 
70 Id. at 445, 440 N.E.2d at 59. The Court also noted that there was some indication that 
the delay caused the defendant prejudicial anxiety above that reasonably associated with 
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In balancing all four factors of the Barker test, the Appeals Court 
concluded that, although Lutoff might be entitled to relief even apart from 
the question of prejudice,71 the unrebutted evidence of p~ejudice in the 
trial record eliminated any doubt that the charges should be dismissed.72 
In a final comment, the court reemphasized that institutional failures 
would not be an acceptable basis for denying a reasonably prompt trial to 
a defendant who has diligently pursued his constitutional right to such a 
trial. 73 The appropriate remedy, the court added, "lies in correcting the 
failures of the system, rather than in abridging a defendant's constitu-
tional right. "74 
In Massachusetts, as underscored by the Lutoff decision! an unjustified 
and substantial delay in bringing the defendant to trial, where the defen-
dant has diligently asserted his or her rights and the qommonwealth 
cannot show a lack of prejudice to the defendant, will resull in a violation 
of the speedy trial provisions of both the federal and state constitutions. 75 
Despite this position, commentators are in general agreement that courts 
often remain reluctant to find a violation of a criminal defendant's con-
stitutional right to a speedy trial except in the most extreme circum-
stances. 76 This reluctance apparently stems from judicial dislike of the 
uncompromising severity of the dismissal with prejudictl sanction im-
posed for a speedy trial violation as well as fear of freeing potentially 
dangerous criminals on technical, albeit constitutional, grounds. 77 The 
facts in Lutoff, h()wever, are an example of the type of eXitreme circum-
stances under which a court is clearly justified in finding a constitutional 
normal pressures of trial.ld. at 445-46 n.15, 440 N .E.2d at 59 n.15 (quoting United States v. 
Shepherd, 511 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1975». 
71 /d. at 446, 440 N.E.2d at 59. See, e.g., Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973) 
("Barker v. Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative ;demonstration of 
prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a sJi>eedy trial. ... "); 
Commonwealth v. Green, 353 Mass. 687, 690, 234 N.E.2d 534,536 (1968) ("[Under the sixth 
amendment] prejudice need not be affirmatively shown."); Commonwealtb v. Underwood, 3 
Mass. App. Ct. 522, 530, 335 N .E.2d 915, 922 (1975) ("[L]ack of a showinig of prejudice to a 
defendant is not in itself sufficient to deny a speedy trial claim .... "). 
72 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 446, 440 N.E.2d at 59. 
73 ld. at 446, 440 N .E.2d at 59-60 (quoting Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329,335, 
366 N .E.2d 1252, 1256 (1977». 
74 /d. at 446, 440 N .E.2d at 60. The court pointed out that some repair of the system was 
accomplished by the adoption of MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36. ld. at 446 n.16, 440 N .E.2d at 60 
n.16. For a detailed discussion of Rule 36, see infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. 
7S See id. at 438-47, 440 N.E.2d at 55-60. Cf Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329, 
366 N.E.2d 1252 (1977). 
76 See Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN L. REV. 525 
(1975); C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 10, at § 23.01, at 476. . 
77 C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 10, at § 23.01, at 476. See also sup~a notes 9-10 and 
accompanying text. 
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speedy trial violation under the ad hoc standard enunciated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Barker. 78 Indeed, no delicate balancing of the 
four Barker factors was actually necessary in Lutoff, because the Appeals 
Court properly found that each element unquestionably weighed in favor 
of the defendant. 79 In effect, the fact situation lent itself to no result other 
than a finding that the defendant's constitutional speedy trial rights were 
violated and a dismissal of charges with prejudice to the Commonwealth. 
Be-yond merely identifying a clear-cut constitutional violation, the 
Lutoff decision is important because it serves to highlight the availability 
and potential value of ajudicial presumption of prejudice to state criminal 
defendants in constitutional speedy trial cases. As the Appeals Court 
correctly implied, the defendant in Lutoff might still have prevailed even 
absent a showing of prejudice, provided the other factors in the Barker 
test weighed heavily in his favor. 80 Nevertheless, while proof of prejudice 
is not itself determinative under Barker,81 the presence or lack of preju-
dice remains a crucial, and often pivotal, factor which must be affirma-
tively proven by the defendant in the absence of ajudicial presumption,82 
and carefully considered by the court. 83 
78 407 U.S. 514 (1972). See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text. 
79 See supra notes 43-74 and accompanying text. Thus, in Lutoff, it was beyond dispute 
that the four year delay between the grand jury's return of indictments and the defendant's 
trial was substantial enough to trigger further judicial inquiry into whether the defendant's 
speedy trial rights had been denied. 14 Mass. App. Ct. 434, 439, 440 N .E.2d 52, 56 (1982). 
Also the evidence in Lutoff clearly indicated that virtually all of the delay was attributable 
solely to administrative failures by the Commonwealth and none of the delay was attribut-
able to the defendant. Id. at 44()'42, 440 N.E.2d at 56-57. Additionally, it was undisputed that 
the defendant had on several occasions attempted to obtain a prompt trial and thereafter 
had diligently asserted that the Commonwealth's failure to act violated his constitutional 
rights.ld. at 442, 440 N.E.2d at 57. Perhaps the only point of factual dispute in Lutoffwas 
the extent of prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. Nevertheless, although prior to 
trial two separate superior court judges denied the defendant's speedy trial motions on the 
ground that he had failed to show prejUdice, the actual trial record indicated that, as a result 
of the delay, several key witnesses suffered unrefreshable lapses of memory on important 
issues and various notes and reports tending to support the defendant's claim of innocence 
had since been lost. Id. at 442-45, 440 N.E.2d at 57-59. 
80 Id. at 446, 440 N.E.2d at 59. See supra note 71. 
81 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,533 (1972). 
82 See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 45, § 814, at 225-26 (def~ndant must affirmatively 
show at least possible prejudice). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held 
generally that a defendant has the burden of showing prejudice caused by the delay. See 
Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329, 334, 366 N.K2d 1252, 1256 (1977); Common-
wealth v. Gilbert, 366 Mass. 18,22,314 N.E.2d III, 114 (1974); Commonwealth v. Gove, 
366 Mass. 351, 361, 320 N.E.2d 900, 909-10 (1974) 
83 Commonwealth v. Underwood, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 522, 335 N.E.2d 915, 922 (1975). See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Look, 379 Mass. 893,402 N.E.2d 470, 478, cert. denied, 499 U.S. 
827 (1980) (defendant's failure to prove prejudice an important consideration in denying 
speedy trial claim); Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329, 334, 366 N.E.2d 1252, 1256 
(1977) (same). 
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In Lutoff, the Commonwealth offered two arguments in an attempt to 
rebut the presumed prejudicial effect of the delay. The prosecution argued 
first, that any lost testimony would simply have corroborated other de-
fense evidence; and second, that the gaps in testimony might have dam-
aged the prosecution as much as the defense. 84 The Appeals Court re-
jected these arguments, stating that, while they might be persuasive in an 
appropriate case, in the case before the court "the defendant was con-
victed; his conviction rest[ed] in part on memories which failed on issues 
important to his defense; and the effect of the loss of exculpatory evi-
dence in a case can seldom be determined with precisi~n.' '85 Further-
more, it seems likely that the defendant in Lutoffwould have successfully 
carried the issue of prejudice even absent the presumption because the 
trial record revealed convincing evidence of prejudice to the defendant's 
presentation of his case caused by the delay. 86 It should be noted that 
although the judicial presumption of prejudice was perhap$ not vital to the 
defendant's victory in Lutoff, its availability may neverth¢less be of great 
importance to state criminal defendants under certain circumstances. For 
example, assuming a "substantial" delay and at least timely, if not dili-
gent, assertion of the speedy trial right by the defendant, the presumption 
might well prove decisive where 1) prejudice at trial remains a pivotal 
issue after the court examines the other relevant factors and the trial 
record is unclear as to the actual effects of the delay; or 2) :the defendant's 
crucial claim of prejudice revolves not around an impairment of his or her 
defense, but rather the more speculative prejudicial effects of lengthy 
pretrial incarceration or pretrial anxiety caused by the 4elay. 
This judicial presumption of prejudice in speedy trial ca$es is not unique 
to Massachusetts courts. Federal courts have also recognized that sub-
stantial delays in bringing a defendant to trial may create a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice.8? The reason for presuming prejudice in a 
particular instance is a judicial recognition that as d~lay continues, 
memories inevitably will begin to fade, important evidence will potentially 
be lost and the defendant's anxiety over the proceeding~ will likely be-
come unreasonably exacerbated.88 In a constitutional speedy trial analy-
84 Commonwealth v. Lutoff, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 434, 445, 440 N.E.2d 52, 59 (1982). 
8S [d. As an example of a case where the Commonwealth's argument might succeed, the 
LutoJJ court cites Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329, 366 N.E.2d 1252 (1977). In 
Beckett, the defendant could not convince the Supreme Judicial Court the memory lapses on 
the part of prosecution witnesses were prejudicial to the defendant. 373 Mass. at 334, 366 
N .E.2d at 1256. Unlike the LutoJJ court, the Court in Beckett concluded that such failures of 
memory as could be gleaned from the trial record weakened only the COInmonwealth's case. 
[d.; see also Commonwealth v. Gove, 366 Mass. 351, 364, 320 N.E.2fl900, 909 (1974). 
86 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 45, at § 814, at 226-28 n.43 and castl:s cited therein. 
87 United States v. Mann, 291 F. Supp. 268,271 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
88 [d. 
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sis, the discretion of a court to determine when a delay is so substantial as 
to not only trigger further speedy trial inquiry, but also to combine with 
other relevant circumstances to create a presumption of prejudice, seems 
consistent with the flexibility notions underlying the Barker decision. One 
inevitable result of such discretion is unpredictability as to when the 
presumption will be utilized by a court. The United States Supreme Court 
in Barker indicated, however, that, while it had no constitutional basis for 
establishing quantitative speedy trial rules for the States, the States might 
themselves adopt presumptive rules which more explicitly define fixed 
time periods within which cases must generally be brought. 89 After the 
superior court had ruled on the motions in the Lutoff case, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court responded with Rule 36 of the Massachu-
setts Rules of Criminal Procedure. 90 As the Lutoff court posited at the end 
of its opinion, the specificity with which Rule 36 was drawn is likely to go 
far towards obviating future "substantial" trial delays in the Common-
wealth. 91 
B. NON· CONSTITUTIONAL MASSACHUSETTS SPEEDY TRIAL 
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
It is probable that the recently promulgated Rule 36 will become the 
primary judicial vehicle for enforcement of the speedy trial right in Mas-
sachusetts in the future. 92 The rule, entitled "Case Management," pro-
vides standards for a speedy trial including specific time limits between 
indictment and trial. 93 Subdivision (b) of Rule 36, which includes pre-
scribed time limitations, also provides for exclusions for delays attribut-
able to the normal maintenance of orderly criminal proceedings as well as 
delays attributable to actions by the defendant. 94 Once a defendant has 
established a prima facie violation under subdivision (b), he or she is 
89 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522-23, 530 n.29 (1972). 
90 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 26. For a detailed discussion of the rule and its ramifications, see, 
infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text. 
91 Commonwealth v. Lutoff, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 434, 445-46 nn.15 & 16,440 N.E.2d 52, 
59-60 nn.15 & 16 (1982). 
92 Commonwealth v. Look, 379 Mass. 893, 898 n.2, 402 N .E.2d 470, 476 n.2, cert, den., 
449 U.S. 827 (1980). See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36. See also Gelhaar, supra note 56, at § 4.10, at 
184-85. 
93 From July I, 1979 to July I, 1980, a defendant must be tried within twenty-four months 
after the defendant's return day - the day on which a defendant is ordered by summons to 
first appear or does appear to answer the charges. From July 1, 1980 to July 1, 1981, the 
defendant must be tried within eighteen months after the return day. Finally, after July I, 
1981, a defendant must be tried within one year after the return day absent any applicable 
exceptions provided for in the rule. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(b)(I)(A)-(C). 
94 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(b)(2)(A)-(H). 
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entitled to dismissal without any showing of prejudice.95 Additionally, 
under Rule 36 a defendant may be entitled tp a dismissal even before the 
time specified for bringing the defendant to trial has elapsed, Subdivision 
(c) of the rule requires dismissal of charges, notwithstanding the fact that 
the defendant is not yet entitled to dismissal under subdivisipn (b), if: 1) 
the prosecutor's conduct is unreasonably lacl<,ing in diligence; and 2) such 
conduct has resulted in prejudice to the defendant.96 A defeQ.dant arguing 
for dismissal under subdivision (c), unlike (b), must ther~fore affirma-
tively demonstrate not only unreasonable prosecutorial delay, but also 
prejudice caused by that delay.1I7 Finally, any dismissal pf charges under 
Rule 36 operates to bar future prosecution for the particuhlr offense 
charged as well as all related offenses.98 
During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Balliro,99 die Massachu-
setts Suprel1le Judicial Court examined the discretionary a~thority of a 
district court to dismiss applications for complaints pursuant to Rule 
36(c), the "speedy trial" provision requiring dismissal for prejudicial 
delay.loo In Balliro, process was issued on July 22, 1980 on twp com-
plaints charging Balliro with homicide by a motor vehicle iln~ operating a 
motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor.t° 1' Prior to the 
95 Mass. R. CRIM. P. 36(b)(l)(D). See Commonwealth v. Look, 379 Mass. 893, 898 n.2, 
402 N.E.2d 470, 476 n.2, cert, denied. 449 U.S. 827 (1980). Onc!,! the prescribed time limits 
under subdivision (b) have elapsed, the defendant no longer has the burden of proving that 
the Commonwealth unjustifiably caused prejudicial delay as under the ad hoc balancing 
standard of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
96 Specifically, Rule 36( c) provides: 
Dismissal f(}r Prejudicial Delay. Notwithstanding the fact that a defendant is not 
entitled to a dismissal under subdivision (b) of this rule, a defendan~ shall upon 
motion be entitled to a qismissal where the judge after an examination ~nd consider-
ation of all attendant circumstances, determines that: 1) the conduct of~he prosecut-
ing attorney in bringing the defendant to trial has Peen unreasonably lacking in 
diligence; and 2) this conduct on the part of t/le prosecuting attorney has resulted in 
prejudice to the defendant. 
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(c). 
97 See Commonwealth v. Ballito, 385 Mass. 618, 4~3 N.E.2d 434 (1982). For a detailed 
discussion and analysis of Balliro. see infra notes 99-145 a,nd accompanying text. See also 
Commonwealth v. Marchionda, 385 Mass. 238, 431 N.E.2d 177 (1982). 
98 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(e). Rule 36(e) provides that "[al dismissal of any charge ordered 
pursuant to any provision of this rule shall apply to all related offenses." [d. The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court, in C(}mmonwealth v. Ludwig. has held that ,a dismiss~1 of a 
complaint on speedy trial grounds is a bar to any later prosecution for the same offense. 370 
Mass. 31, 35, 345 N.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1976). In conjunction with SUbdivision (e), the 
Ludwig deci&ion requires that any dismissal of a complaint or indictment under Rule 36 
result in prejudicial dismissal of the particular charge as well as all related charges. 
99 385 Mass. 618, 433 N.E.2d 434 (1982). 
100 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(c). See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
101 385 Mass. at 619, 433 N .E.2d at 435. 
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pretrial conference on August 6, 1980, however, the district attorney's 
office was informed that blood test results showed that Balliro's blood 
contained a hypnotic drug and not alcohol at the relevant time. 102 Never-
theless, due to the negligence of the assistant district attorney assigned to 
prosecute the case, the prosecution took no action to amend the com-
plaints until September 25, 1980, the date of the trial. 103 At this time, the 
prosecution moved to amend the complaints by deleting the reference to 
"intoxicating liquor" in both complaints and inserting in each a reference 
to "narcotics, or depressants." 104 A district court judge denied the prose-
cution's motion to amend and its subsequent motion to dismiss. lOS In 
response to this adverse ruling, the assistant district attorney entered a 
noll~ prosequP06 of the charges because a material difference existed 
between the allegations of the complaints and the proof which the Com-
monwealth could have presented. l07 On the same day, at the district 
attorney's request, the arresting officer filed an application for a new 
series of complaints against Balliro. los The new complaints again alleged 
motor vehicle homicide, but, reflecting the blood test evidence, now 
charged Balliro with operating under the influence of narcotics. 109 Subse-
quently, Balliro moved to dismiss the applications alleging, inter alia, a 
violation of his speedy trial rights.110 In October, 1980, a district court 
judge, without opinion, granted Balliro's motion to dismiss the l\pplication 
for complaints .111 
The prosecution pressed on, however, and in November, 1980, a grand 
jury returned indictments charging Balliro with the same crimes as those 
for which complaints had been sought on Septe!llber 25 and denied in 
October, 1980.112 Balliro moved in superior court to dismiss these new 
indictments on March 9, 1981. 113 The superior court judge granted this 
motion after concluding that the district court had denied the September 
102 [d. There was no evidence whether the assistant district attorney disclosed the results 
of the blood tests at the August 6 pretrial conference. Id. 
103 Id. at 619, 433 N.E.2d at 435-36. 
104 Id. at 619, 433 N.E.2d at 436. 
105 Id. 
106 A nolle prosequi is defined as "the formal expression of the determination of the ... 
[prosecuting attorney] ... that he will not further prosecute the whole or separate part of a 
criminal prosecution." K. B. SMITH, CRIMINAL PRACTiCE AND PROCEDURE, 30 M~ss. 
PRACTICE SERIES § 852, at 399-400 (1970). See Commonwealth v. Daskalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 
140 N.E. 470 (1923); Commonwealth v. Meyers, 356 Mass. 343,252 N.E.2d 350 (1969). 
107 385 Mass. at 619-20, 433 N .E.2d at 436. 
108 Id. at 620, 433 N.E.2d at 436. 
109 /d. The new complaints also charged the defendant with driving so as to endanger.Jd. 
110Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
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25, 1980 application for complaints on speedy trial grounds .114 The judge 
held that the indictments had to be dismissed with prejud.ce to the Com-
monwealth. lls 
Viewing the propriety of the dismissal of the indictments on the same 
record as was before the superior court judge, the Supreme Judicial Court 
determined that the issue before it was whether, on the basis of such a 
record, the district court judge exceeded his authority in, dismissing the 
September 25, 1980 application for complaints. 116 The Coqrt held that the 
district court judge had acted within his discretion because ~he facts on the 
record were sufficient to have permitted a determination by the judge 
pursuant to Rule 36(c) that the prosecuting attorney's conduct in bringing 
Balliro to trial had been unreasonably lacking in diligenc¢ and that such 
conduct resulted in prejudice to Balliro. 117 The Court ;noted that the 
Commonwealth had conceded that the actions of the a$sistant district 
attorney were unreasonably lacking in diligence. liS Then, because there 
was no other showing of prejudice to Bailliro, the Court inferred that the 
district court judge had relied upon the assumed anxiety and concern of 
Balliro resulting from the delay as sufficient to fulfill the Rule 36(c) 
prejudice requirement. 119 The Court refused, however, to delineate the 
circumstances where, in a case of unreasonable prosecutorial delay, as-
sumed anxiety and concern alone would as a matter of law constitute 
prejudice mandating dismissal under Rule 36(c).120 Instead the Court held 
that, while subdivision (c) does concern mandatory dismi$sal of charges, 
it does not deny a judge who is considering the prejudici~l effects of an 
unreasonable prosecutorial delay, at least under circums1tances such as 
those presented in the case before the Court, "the inherent right in his 
discretion to determine that an application for a complaint should be 
dismissed .... " 121 Thus, although suggesting that it ,*ould not have 
reached the same decision, the Supreme Judicial Court declined, given 
the record in this case,122 to substitute its judgment o'n the issue of 
114 /d. 
lIS [d. (citing Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 370 Mass. 31, 35, 345 N.E.2d 386, 388-89 
(1976), and MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(e). See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
116 385 Mass. at 622, 433 N .E.2d at 437. The Court previously assumed that the Com-
monwealth could appeal from the dismissal of the indictment pursuant to MASS. R. CRIM. P. 
15(b)(1). [d. at 621 nA, 433 N.E.2d at 437 nA. 
117 [d. at 623-24,433 N .E.2d at 437-38. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(c). See also supra notes 
96-98 and accompanying text. 
118 385 Mass. at 623, 433 N.E.2d at 437-38. 
119 [d. at 623, 433 N.E.2d at 438. The United States Supreme Court has identified 
minimization of the defendant's pretrial anxiety and concern as one of ~he interests to be 
prot~cted by the speedy trial right. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); Barker 
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1971). 
120 385 Mass. at 623, 43 N .E.2d at 438. 
121 [d. 
122 Compare Commonwealth v. Marchionda, 385 Mass. 238, 242,431 N.E.2d 177, 179 
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prejudice for the discretion of the district court judge. 123 Accordingly, the 
Court concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district 
court judge to dismiss the applications once he determined that Balliro 
had been denied a speedy trial. 124 Because any subsequent prosecution 
for the same or related offense is barred when the original complaint has 
been dismissed on "speedy trial" grounds under Rule 36,125 the Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of the indict-
ments. 126 
TheBalliro decision is important in two respects. First, it was the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court's first significant discussion of the discre-
tion to be afforded lower court speedy trial determinations under Rule 
36(c). TheBalliro Court held that while Rule 36(c) concerns the mandatory 
dismissal of charges, it nevertheless does not deny judicial discretion to 
determine that the defendant has been sufficiently prejudiced by pros-
ecutorial delay to justify the required remedy under the rule. 127 The abuse 
of discretion standard announced by the Court may take on a double edged 
quality for state criminal defendants, however, in light of the shorter delays 
necessarily associated with 36(c) motions128 and the strict dismissal remedy 
associated with any violation of Rule 36. 129 Thus, in factual situations 
different from those in Balliro, it is easy to speculate that, more often than 
not, lower court judges will use their discretion to deny speedy trial motions 
to dismiss. In reviewing future district court denials of Rule 36( c) motions, 
the Court will almost certainly point to the Balliro decision as a basis for 
deferring to these discretionary denials absent clear facts which reveal a 
misapplication of the two pronged requirement of Rule 36( c) 130 or where 
judicial discretion serves to deny the defendant's sixth amendment rights 
under Barker. 131 
Second, the result in Balliro is significant because it serves to illustrate 
the functional importance of the new rule in relation to the Barker constitu-
tional standard as utilized by the criminal defendant in Lutoff.132 As the 
Balliro decision demonstrates, it is possible, although unusual, that a trial 
(1982) (Record which shows trial delay caused by defendant does not justify a dismissal for 
prejudicial delay pursuant to Rule 36(c». 
123 385 Mass. at 623, 433 N.E.2d at 438. 
124 /d. 
125 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
126 385 Mass. at 623-24, 433 N.E.2d at 438. 
127 [d. at 623, 433 N.E.2d at 438. 
128 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
129 See supra note 98. 
130 See supra note 96. 
131 See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
132 14 Mass. App. Ct. 434, 440 N.E.2d 52 (1982). For a detailed discussion and analysis of 
Lutaff, see supra notes 18-91 and accompanying text. 
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clelay of less than 12 months caused by the prosecution cotilld be de~med 
prejudicial and therefore violative of a criminal defenda~t's right to a 
speedy trial.133 The purpose of Rule 36(c) is to protect a defendant's right 
I 
in such an instance.134 Thus, while subdivision (b) of Rul~ 36 ultimately 
sets a definitive standard of 12 months after which time the defendant's 
speedy trial rights have presumptively been violated,13S subdivision (c) 
undertakes a more qualitative approach which is applicable only to defen-
dants not yet qualified to make a motion under subdivision (b),136 As 
written, Rule 36(c) appears to impose a constitutional standard which is 
comparable, although perhaps not coextensive, with the ad hoc balancing 
test mandated by Barker as a prerequisite to a finding of ~ constitutional 
speedy trial violation. 137 Indeed, Rule 36( c) has been read as simply 
putting the Barker constitutional standard for judicial decision-making into 
functional terms for speedy trial motions brought within onei year.13& Argu-
ably, however, there is at least one important difference in the judicial 
analysis required under Rule 36( c) and the analysis mandated by the 
Barker standard - the importance of the length of the delay. This differ-
ence may determine the ~fficacy of each approach for Massachusetts 
criminal defendants depending on the given factual circumstances. Of 
course, once the time limit for trial mandated by Rule 36(lil) has expired, 
the defendant has established a prima facie violation anp the court is 
required to dismiss the charges regardless of whether the liefend!lnt was 
prejudiced, unless the Commonwealth can satisfactorily excuse the de-
lay,139 
133 385 Mass. at 623, 433 N .E.2d at 438. 
134 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(c), and supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
135 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(b)(1), and supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
136 Thus, Rule 36(c) applies "notwithstanping the fact that a defendant is not entitled to a 
dismissal under subdivision (b) .... " MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(c). 
\37 In comparison with a defendant's burden of proving and f\ court's ~uty to balance the 
four factors enunciated in Barker - delaY, reason for delay, diligent asse*ion and prejudice 
- in a speedy trial claim under the federal and state constitutions, Rule 36(c) simply 
requires a defendant to prove, and Balliro gives a court broad discretion to determine, that 
there has been sufficient prejudice caused by unreasonable prosecutorial delay to warrant 
dismissal of the charges. Compare Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530"33 (1972) (ad hoc 
balancing of four factors) with Commonwealth v. Balliro, 385 Mass. 618, 433 N.E.2d 434, 
437-38 (1982) (Rule 36(c». 
138 A on~ year time limit assumes that the defendant's return day is after July 1, 1981. See 
MASS. R,. CRIM. P. 36(b)(1)(C), and supra note 93. 
139 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(h). Rule 36(b) apparently expresses the Supreme Judicial 
Court's belief that delays in excess of the twelve month prescribed period for trial are 
presumptively caused by the prosecution and prejudicial to the defendant. This is clellrly a 
mpre liberal, and therefore constitutionally permissible, formulation of the speedy trial 
right. Indeed, Qnce subdivision (b) is applicable, the Barker standard w~>uld seem to hold 
little value for a criminal defenpant alleging a speedy trial violation sincei the rule automat-
ically provides the defendant with a prima facie case for dismissal. See tommonwealth v. 
Look, 379 Mass. 893, 898 n.2, 402 N .E.2d 470, 476 n.2, cert. denied, 449 ~.S. 827 (1980). 
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Under the Barker test, the length of delay is a triggering device. 140 
Unless there is sufficient delay to be presumptively prejudicial as a thresh-
old matter, a court need not inquire further into either the remaining 
factors - reason for delay, diligent assertion and prejudice - or other 
relevant circumstances, but instead may deny the defendant's motion. 141 
Conversely, under the plain language of Rule 36(c), the length of the delay 
is an appropriate factor to consider in a 36( c) motion only insofar as it 
relates to the time limits imposed by subdivision (b) of the rule. 142 As a 
result of this difference, it is probable that the defendant's motion in 
Balliro, while granted under Rule ~6(c). would have been properly denied 
if grounded solely on aBarker constitutional claim. TheBalliro Court would 
clearly have been hard-pressed to find aBarker-type violation based upon a 
three month trial delay, because the threshold requirement of a presump-
tively prejudicial delay, which the defendant must overcome to justify 
further constitutional inquiry under Barker, was arguably absent under the 
facts of the case. 143 TheBalliro Court more easily found a possible violation 
of Rule 36(c), however, because the facts clearly showed that the trial 
delay, regardless of its length, was caused by an unreasonable lack of 
diligence on the part of the prosecutor and at least supported an inference 
that SQch a delay prejudiced the defendant. 144 Given the fact, therefore, 
that Rule 36(c) will only apply to short-delay motions and thereafter a 
speedy trial violation will be presumed under Rule 36(b), the aggregate 
140 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972). 
141 ld. 
142 Rule 36(c) states in part that "Notwithstanding the fact that a defendant is not entitled 
to a dismissal unqer subdivision (b) ... "a defendant shall be entitled to a dismissal where the 
judge . . . determines that: I) the conduct of the prosecuting attorney . . . has been 
unreasonably lacking in diligence .... " MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(c). The Reporters' Notes state 
that the (c)(I) subsection actually imposes two requirements on the defendant comporting 
with the length of delay and reason for delay criteria enunciated in Barker. See Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972). According to the Reporters' Notes, to satisfy (c)( I), the 
defend,iDt must establish first that the challenged delay was unreasonable and secondly that 
this delay was caused by the prosecutor. This interpretation, however, does not necessarily 
fit the plain language of the rule. A more consistent reading of (c)( I) would interpret the 
requirement as expressing the Court's belief that any delay which has been caused by 
unreasonable lack of prosecutorial diligence is itself presumptively unreasonable. The Su-
preme Judicial Court's discussion of Rule 36(c) in Balliro seems consistent with the latter 
view; once the defendant demonstrated that the delay was caused by lack of prosecutorial 
diligence, the length of the delay was irrelevant to the Court's analysis. Commonwealth v. 
Balliro, 385 Mass. 618, 623, 433 N.E.2d 434, 437-38 (1982). 
143 In Balliro, only three months had passed since the issuance of process on the two 
original complaints when the district court allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss the 
Commonwealth's application for new complaints.ld. at 619-20, 433 N.E.2d at 435-36. For a 
comparison with the delays which the Lutoff court believed warranted further investigation 
under the Barker test, see supra note 46. 
144 385 Mass. at 623, 433 N.E.2d at 437-38. See supra note 141. 
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effect of the two provisions would seem to limit the future practical utility 
of a Barker argument in Massachusetts. It should be clear, however, that 
the Barker standard, while necessarily imposing a heavi~r burden on the 
moving defendant, remains the starting point for state crirhinal defendants 
alleging speedy trial violations under Rule 36(b) and (C).14S Although a 
defendant might premise a speedy trial claim on the more lenient standards 
permitted by the Massachusetts procedural rules, there is ~o assurance that 
the court will apply such standards in a manner consistent with constitu-
tional requirements. Indeed, the Barker criteria must always act to limit the 
judicial discretion authorized under Rule 36 by the Balliro decision. For 
example, the guidelines of 36( c) are applied by a court so as to impose a 
stricter standard on the defendant than Barker permits. The court has 
undeniably exceeded its discretionary authority. 
145 It is constitutionally impermissible for the states to impose more I burdensome speedy 
trial standards upon criminal defendants than does the sixth amendmdnt as interpreted by 
the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo. 407 U.S. 514; 523 (1972). In this 
context, however, it is interesting to note a second apparent distinction between the Rule 
36(c) and the Barker approaches - the criminal defendant's obligation ~o affirmatively show 
prejudice caused by the delay. Rule 36(c) apparently establishes a~tual prejudice as a 
necessary element of the defendant's burden of proof in support ofa successful motion 
under the subdivision. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(c)(2). Although theBalliro Court held that 
it is within a judge's discretion to determine whether a defendant has proved sufficient 
prejudice to require dismissal under 36(c), a showing of prejudice by the defendant is 
nevertheless a dispositive burden of proof under the rule. Commonwealth v. Balliro, 385 
Mass. 618, 623, 433 N.E.2d 434, 438 (1982); Commonwealth v. Atkinson, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 
200,443 N.E.2d 1371 (1983) (rescript opinion). Conversely, while pre~udice is an essential 
factor to be considered and weighed in a Barker analysis, and it is geneItally incumbent upon 
the defendant to show at least a potential for prejudice arising out of any challenged delay, a 
defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial nevertheless cannot be wholly dependent on 
a showing of prejudice. 407 U.S. at 533. See supra note 71 and accomPfinying text. A literal 
reading of Rule 36(c) thus suggests a more rigorous burden on the moving defendant than 
under Barker and, therefore, may call into question the constitutionality of the prejudice 
requirement. 
Alternatively, however, the requirement might be viewed as the Supreme Judicial Court's 
belief that, as a matter of law, the prejudice inherent in any unjusti/ied delay, absent an 
affirmative showing of particular prejudice, is insufficient to justify dismissal of speedy trial 
claims based on delays of less than one year under Rule 36(c). Under such an interpretation, 
the prejudice requirement of Rule 36(c)(2) would simply encompass the Barker requirement 
that, as a threshold matter, there be presumptively prejudicial delay before further constitu-
tional speedy trial inquiry is justified. 407 U.S. at 530. But see supra note 142. Assuming that 
the one year time limit imposed by Rule 36(b) is a "reasonable period consistent with 
constitutional standards," the prejudice requirement of subdivision (c)(2) would thus 
appear to be constitutionally sound. See 402 U.S. at 523. Between the ~ffective date of Rule 
36 on July 1, 1979 and July 1, 1981, however, Rule 36(c) also applies to trial delays ranging 
from twenty-four to eighteen months. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(b)(l)(A)(B). See supra note 
92 and accompanying text. In the face of such a lengthy delay, the constitutional validity of 
the Rule 36(c) prejudice requirement under Barker seems somewhat jnore tenuous. 
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C. A NEW AND FLEXIBLE REMEDY FOR PROSECUTORIAL DELAY 
If a criminal defendant, as was the case in Ba lliro , can ultimately 
demonstrate sufficient prejudice caused by an unreasonable lack of pros-
ecutorial diligence under Rule 36(c), the required remedy is dismissal of 
all charges. 146 Similar to a dismissal for a Barker constitutional speedy 
trial violation, a dismissal under 36(c) also acts as a bar to any later 
prosecution for the same or related offense. 147 As a consequence of this 
strict sanction, it is easy to speculate that Massachusetts courts will 
generally be reluctant to find Rule 36 speedy trial violations absent com-
pelling circumstances. 148 Aside from implicitly foregoing any remedy for 
the defendant in cases involving less serious prosecutorial delay, how-
ever, a viable alternative might be the recognition of a court's discretion 
to dismiss a criminal case without prejudice to the state when the prosecu-
tion causes an unnecessary, but not unconstitutional, trial delay. The 
Federal courts currently enjoy such an option under both Rule 48(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedurel49 and the Federal Speedy Trial 
Act of 1974.150 During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Pomer-
leau ,lSI the Massachusetts Appeals Court approved a district court's 
decision to exercise similar remedial discretion in a purported speedy trial 
case. 
In Pomerleau, two complaints were issued on December 26, 1980, and 
one was issued on January 13, 1981, charging Pomerleau with receiving 
stolen goodS. 152 Pomerleau pleaded not guilty on the day the last com-
plaint was issued. 153 The cases were set for pretrial conference on Feb-
ruary 27, 1981, but three continuances were granted which ultimately 
extended the hearing date to May 26, 1981. 154 when Pomerleau's cases 
were called on May 26, together with those of two co-defendants, the 
146 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(c). 
147 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(e) and supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
149 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b). Under Rule 48(b), a federal court can choose to dismiss 
without prejudice for unnecessary delays not amounting to a constitutional violation. See 
C. WRIGHT, supra note 45, § 814, at 229 and cases cited therein. 
ISO 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1974). A dismissal for violation of the Act may be with or 
without prejudice to the government. 18 U.S.c. § 3162(c)(I). In determining which sanction 
to apply, however, the court must consider such factors as the seriousness of the offense, 
the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal and the impact of 
reprosecution on the administration of the chapter and justice. [d. 
lSI 13 Mass. App. Ct. 530, 434 N.E.2d 1288 (1982). 
IS2 [d. at 531, 434 N.E.2d at 1289. 
IS3 [d. 
IS4 [d. The record did not disclose who sought the continuances and the defendant made 
no claim that they had been granted over his objection or that the continuances violated G.L. 
c. 276, § 35 (continuance over objection of defendant not to exceed ten days). [d. 
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assistant district attorney requested another continuanc¢ to keep the 
cases of all three co-defendants together, as counsel for lime of the co-
defendants was not then present in court.lSS In response toithe Common-
wealth's request, counsel for the second co-defendant moved to dismiss 
for lack of a speedy trial. I56 Pomerleau's counsel also expressed a desire 
to move for dismissal on speedy trial grounds, but stated "[i]f they want 
to inqict [Pomerleau] and go the the Grand Jury, go ahead and do that." 1 57 
The judge subsequently dismissed the cases without prejudice to the 
Commonwealth's rights to seek these indictments. 1 58 Pomerleau's coun-
sel made no objection to this disposition.159 Pomerle~u was indicted for 
the same offenses as charged in the original complaints within two weeks 
of the dismissal. I6o Pomerleau then moved for dismissal ih the superior 
court, asserting that despite the May 26 dismissal "without prejudice," all 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense was barred.16~ The superior 
court judge denied the motion and Pomerleau was convicted on August 
4, 1981.162 
On appeal, the Appeals Court held that the district court judge had not 
exceeded his authority in dismissing the complaints without prejUdice on 
purported speedy trial grounds. 163 In so holding, the court distinguished 
four recent Massachusetts speedy trial cases in which the appropriate 
remedy was dismissal with prejudice. First, the court examined two cases 
where a trial continuance had been granted over the defebdant's objec-
tioqs in violation of chapter 276, section 35 of the General! Laws. 164 The 
Appeals Court pointed out that in both CommonweaLth v. Ludwig l65 and 
ISS Id. at 531, 434 N.E.2d at 1289-90. 
156 !d. at 531, 434 N.E.2d at 1290, 
157 Id. at 532, 434 N .E.2d at 1290. 
158 Id. Prior to this disposition, the judge was apparently annoyed with the assistant 
district attorney. Id. She seemingly was not ready for trial since neither the defendant nor 
one of the codefendants was present in the courtroom. Id. The prosecu~or claimed, how-
ever, that she was ready, her witnesses were present and the defendants were close at hand 
in the house of co~ections. Id. at 532 n.3, 434 N .E.2d at 1290 n.3. 
159 !d. at 532, 434 N .E.2d at 1290. 
160 14. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 536, 434 N.E.2d at 1292. 
164 Id. at 533-34, 434 N.E.2d at 1290-91. Section 35 provides in pertinent part: "[Tlhe 
court or justice may adjourn an examination or trial from time to time, not exceeding ten 
days at anyone time against the objection of the defendant . .. " G.L. c. 276, § 35 (emphasis 
added). 
165 370 Mass. 31, 345 N.E.2d 386 (1976). In Ludwig. the defendant Was charged with 
larceny and conspiracy. Id. at 32, 345 N.E.2d at 387. At trial, a continuaqce was granted to 
the Commonwealth over the defendant's objection which delayed the trial Ifor approximately 
twenty days. !d. The district court subsequently allowed the defendant's $otion for dismiss-
al with prejudice for a denial .of a speedy trial. Id. The defendant, h~wever, was later 
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Commonwealth v. Silva, 166 the reviewing court was able to conclude that 
the lower court's dismissal of the complaints against the defendant with 
prejudice, on purported speedy trial grounQs, was permissible based on 
the evidence.167 The Pomerleau court emphasized that the dismissals in 
Ludwig and Silva were required to be with prejudice because each deter-
mination had been on constitutional speedy trial grounds. 168 Next, the 
Appeals Court considered the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Com-
monwealth v. Fields, 169 where a statutory, and not a constitutional viola-
indicted and convicted for identical crimes. [d. The Supreme Judicial (:ourt reversed the 
convictions and held that, given a clear violation of G.L. c. 276, § 35 (continuance over 
defendant's objection not to exceed ten days), the dismissal of the complClints in the district 
court could properly have been treated as a, dismissal based upon the constitutional speedy 
trial right and, as such, was "an absolute discharge with prejudice against the Commorr 
wealth." [d. at 34-35, 345 N.E.2d at 388-89. See infra notes 166. 
166 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. :'p03, 413 N.E.2d 349. In Silva, the defendant was 
indicted for armed robbery. [d. at 2103, 413 N.E.2d at 350, Prior to trial, he moved in 
superior court to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial. [d. The motion was based 
on a prior dismissal in district court of a complaint which had charged the defendant with the 
same crime. [d. The superior court judge denied the motion and the defendant was subse-
quently convicted on the indictment. [d. The Appeals Court reversed the conviction holding 
that the district court's dismissal of the complaint, together with a clear violation of O.L. c. 
276, § 35, implied findings of fact sufficient to establish a violation of the defendant's 
constitutional right to a speedy trial. [d. at 2108-09, 413 N.E.2d at 352-53. As such, dismissal 
with prejudice to the Commonwealth was the appropriate remedy. /d. at 2108, 413 N.E.2d at 
352. 
167 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 533, 434 N .E.2d at 1290·91. 
168 [d. at 533, 434 N .E.2d at 1291. In each case, violation of the ten day time limit 
prescribed by O.L. c. 276, § 35, while not requiring automatic dismissal, served to trigger a 
constitutional speedy trial inquiry under the Barker standard. The Ludwig Court thus 
explained that the statutory violation indicated a delay which w;ls presumptiveiy prejudiciai 
to the defendant, satisfied the Barker length of delay criterion, and therefore justified further 
examination into the other speedy trial factors enunciated by the Barker qecision. Com-
monwealth v. Ludwig, 370 Mass. 31, 34 n.I, 345 N.E.2d 386, 388 n.1 (1976). See Common-
wealth v. Silva, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2103, 2107-10, 413 N.E.2d 349, 351-53. See 
also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U,S. 514, 530-33 (1972). 
169 371 Mass. 274, 356 N.E.2d 1211 (1976). In Fields, the defendant, who was already 
incarcerated on unrelated charges, was charged with armed robbery and larceny. [d. at 275, 
356 N .E.2d at 1212. He subsequently made an application to the district court under O.L.. c. 
477, § 72A (repealed, Acts of 1981, c. 795, § 16.), which provided that any prisoner serving a 
term of imprisonment, upon application to the court for a prompt trial or other disposition of 
any pending, untried indictment, information or complaint, was entitled to a trial or other 
disposition within six months after the court received the application unless the court orders 
otherwise. [d. at 275-76, 356 N .E.2d at 1212. See O.L. c. 277, § 72A (repealed, Acts of 1981, 
c. 795, § 16). No action was taken on the defendant's application, however, for almost eight 
months. [d. at 276, 434 N .E.2d at 1213. A district court judge, pursuant to the provisions of 
section 72A, dismissed the cpmplaints. [d. Four months later, the defendant was indicted, 
and ultimately convicted at trial, for the Same offense. [d. In reversing the defendant's 
conviction, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the decision of the district court judge to 
dismiss the original complaints under section 72A was proper under the circumstances. [d. 
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tion was at issue.l7° The court explained that in Fields the Supreme 
Judicial Court had held that prejudicial dismissal for a non-constitutional 
violation of chapter 277, section 72A of the General Laws was an appro-
priate remedy.171 Finally, the Pomerleau court examined the recent case 
of Commonwealth v. Balliro,172 where the Supreme Ju<ilicial Court dis-
cussed an alleged violation of Rule 36(c) of the new Massachusetts Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 173 The court noted that, as in the Ludwig, Silva, 
and Fields cases, the Balliro Court was able to conclude that the lower 
court judge had impliedly found that facts necessary to permit a determi-
nation that the defendant had been denied a speedy trial; in this instance, 
however, within the guidelines of Rule 36( c) .174 The Appeals Court em-
at 282, 434 N .E.2d at 1216. According to the Court, the appropriate consequence of such a 
dismissal was a bar of any subsequent prosecution for the same offelnse. Id. at 282, 434 
N.E.2d at 1217 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 371 Mass. 31, 33, ~45 N.E.2d 386, 389 
(1976)). 
170 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 533-34, 434 N.E.2d at 1291. 
171 Id. at 534, 434 N.E.2d at 1291. During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Jones, 
the Supreme Judicial Court had another opportunity to review an incarcerated defendant's 
claim for dismissal under the now-repealed G.L. c. 277, § 72A. 385 Mass. 12, 429 N .E.2d 
1136 (1982). InJones, the defendant, who was serving a sentence on unrelated charges, filed 
an application pursuant to section 72A for a prompt trial or other disposition of outstanding 
complaints charging him with intent to murder. Id. at 12-13,429 N.E.2d at 1136-37. The 
defendant was nevertheless tried and convicted on the charges seven and one-half months 
after the superior court received his statutory application, a delay of one and one-half 
months over the maximum allowed under section 72A (assuming the re<;:eiving court has not 
properly ordered otherwise). Id. at 13, 429 N.E.2d at 1137. 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the judgments of the superior court had to 
be reversed, and the indictments dismissed. Id. at 12-13,429 N.E.2d, at 1136. The Court 
noted that while expiration of the section 72A statutory period did not require dismissal, 
especially in cases where the defendant required or caused the delay, where the delay is not 
attributable to the defendant, then "the Commonwealth must at the very least explain why 
such delay is 'reasonably necessary and justifiable.' " Id. at 14,429 N.E.2d at 1137 (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Alexander, 371 Mass. 726, 730, 359 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1977)). The Court, 
in examining the record, found that the defendant had not consented tQ the delays and that 
the Commonwealth had failed to follow the correct procedures to apply for an extension of 
the section 72A statutory period. Id. at 14-15, 429 N.E.2d at 1137-38. Accordingly, the Court 
held that the indictments had to be dismissed. /d. at 15-16, 429 N .E.2d at 1138. 
There was no language in the Jones opinion concerning whether the dismissal was with 
prejudice. The question, however, was not in issue. Although G.L. c. 277, § 72A was 
repealed by the Acts of 1981, c. 795, § 16, all existing case law under section 72A is now 
encompassed under MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36. Commonwealth v. Look, 379 Mass. 893,898 n.2, 
402 N .E.2d 470, 476 n.2, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1980). See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36(a)(1), 
(d). 
172 385 Mass. 618, 433 N .E.2d 434 (1982). For a detailed discussion and analysis of 
Balliro, see supra notes 99-145 and accompanying text. ' 
173 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 534-35, 434 N.E.2d at 1291-92. See MASS.IR. CRIM. P. 36, and 
supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. 
174 Mass. App. Ct. at 535, 434 N.E.2d at 1292. 
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phasized that, because the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the 
defendant in Balliro was denied a speedy trial, the appropriate remedy 
was dismissal with prejudice.17s 
Unlike the four cases it discussed, however, the Appeals Court found 
that the facts in Pomerleau did not permit the inference that the defendant 
had been denied a speedy trial.176 The court first noted that there was 
clearly no constitutional or statutory violation. 177 Secondly, the court 
could find no indication or suggestion in the record that the prosecution 
was unreasonably lacking in diligence in bringing Pomerleau to trial or 
that the district court judge had made any finding that Pomerleau was 
prejudiced by any delay so as to infer a violation of Rule 36(c).178 To the 
contrary, the Appeals Court pointed out that the judge's action in dis-
missing without prejudice indicated his belief that the delay had not been 
unfair to Pomerleau. 179 Accordingly, the Appeals Court held that the 
dismissal had not been on true speedy trial grounds and, consequently, 
the district court judge had not exceeded his discretion in dismissing the 
complaints without prejudice. 180 
The court in Pomerleau concluded its discussion by suggesting that the 
term "speedy trial" only be applied to situations where a judge deter-
mines that the defendant was denied a speedy trial under constitutional, 
statutory or Rule 36 criteria which permit or require dismissal with preju-
dice. 181 Where a judge finds the prosecutor's delay less grievous, the 
court reasoned, the Commonwealth can avoid subsequent difficulty by 
requesting that the judge indicate that the defendant's speedy trial rights 
have not been found to have been violated. 182 If it is so determined, the 
Appeals Court concluded, then the judge, acting under his inherent pow-
ers to take corrective action, may impose an appropriate sanction, includ-
ing dismissal without prejudice .183 
The Pomerleau decision is significant because the Appeals Court 
clearly articulated the scope of the common law power of Massachusetts 
courts to fashion dismissal remedies for trial delay caused by the Com-
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 535-36, 434 N.E.2d at 1292. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 36. 
179 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 536, 434 N.E.2d at 1292. The court further reasoned that 
prejudice could not be implied in light of the defense counsel's apparent acquiescence to the 
possibility of future indictments as well as his failure to object to the form of the dismissal. 
Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 537, 434 N .E.2d at 1293. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
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monwealth. 184 Although the court's suggestion .of limiting the use of the 
term "speedy trial" to constitutional, statutory or court, rule violations 
was dicta, such reasoning is justified in light of the court's holding that 
judges may fashion any appropriate remedy in unnecessary delay or 
non-speedy trial cases. 18S Quite conceivably, the result of such a practice 
would be less confusion for both reviewing courts and litigants as to the 
determinative facts found and the standards applied to those facts by the 
dismissing court. Thus, recognizing that a court may dismiss with preju-
dice if it finds a "speedy trial" violation and assuming, after Pomerleau, 
that the court has an "inherent" right to dismiss without ptejudice for less 
serious delay, it would seem to be in the best interests of ~ll concerned to 
consistently elicit a specific basis on the record for aqy dismissal on 
purported speedy trial grounds. Given the ramifications of a dismissal 
with prejudice to the Commonwealth, such a remedy ~hould only be 
granted by a court after a warning is given to the prosecution that the 
severest sanction will result from a failure to proceed to trial. 186 Similarly, 
it is reasonable to expect a court to specify clearly whether the dismissal 
is compelled by the constitution, state statute or Rule 36 so the defendant 
will know with certainty whether he or she may again be. prosecuted for 
the same or a related offense. 187 
As both the Pomerleau and Balliro decisions demonstrate, the out-
come, as well as the remedy, associated with a "speedy trial" motion on 
appeal may often tum upon speculative interpretation of a barren court 
record. A possible result of this interpretation, of course, is the defen-
dant's freedom from prosecution. While the importance of this issue 
would seem to call for a clear standard in order to insure predictable 
results, the uncertainty of outcome and remedy is in fact further exacer-
bated by the ad hoc, discretionary nature of most, if not all, of the 
available constitutional, statutory and court rule standards designed to 
guarantee prompt trials for Massachusetts criminal defendants. Conse-
quently, the ultimate decision by a reviewing court will very likely be 
dependent on the extent to which the practitioner, keeping in mind the 
184 By comparison, it is generally agreed that Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which authorizes dismissal with or without prejudice for unnecessary delay, is 
also a "restatement of the inherent power of the court to dismiss a case for want of 
prosecution." C. WRIGHT, supra note 45, at § 814, at 209. 
185 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 537, 434 N.E.2d at 1293. 
186 Such a requirement would be consistent with the general belief by federal courts that 
under FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) the power to dismiss with prejudice under the Rule should be 
utilized with caution and only after a forewarning to the prosecution. See, C. WRIGHT, supra 
note 45, at § 814, at 229-30 , 
187 /d.; see generally Commonwealth v. Silva, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. it03, 2110 n.9, 413 
N.E.2d 349, 353 n.9. ("[I]t would have been a better practice for the Dis.rict Court judge to 
have clearly identified the basis for his action and to have stated whethet the dismissal was 
with prejudice."). 
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functional relationship and important criteria of Rule 36, the Barker test 
and statutory provisions such as chapter 276, section 35, develops a 
favorable record for appeal. 
In conclusion, the Commonwealth's obligation to provide, and a state 
criminal defendant's corresponding right to receive, a prompt trial can be 
found in both the federal and state constitutions, the Massachusetts Rules 
of Criminal Procedure and state statutory provisions. The rather elusive 
Constitutional definition of the term "speedy trial" has effectively re-
quired judicial interpretation of virtually every guarantee of the rights 
associated with the term. As a result, there appear to be a number of 
interrelated speedy trial standards whose application, in large part; de.. 
pends on judicial discretion. Nevertheless, it remains clear that the foun-
dation upon which such discretion is built and against which all state-
promulgated speedy trial standards must ultimately be measured is the 
flexible constitutional standard enunciated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Barker v. Wingo and recently applied by the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court in Commonwealth v. Luto!!. Consistent with the Barker 
decision and its own rule making authority, however, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court has promulgated Rule 36 of the new Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in an attempt to both quantify and clarify, within 
constitutional parameters, a criminal defendant's right to a prompt trial in 
state courts. In accordance with Rule 36(b), the Commonwealth will 
generally be obligated to try a defendant within 12 months or risk a 
prejudicial dismissal of its case. Moreover, a shorter delay may also 
require prejudicial dismissal under Rule 36( c) if a defendant can demon-
strate prejudice caused by an unreasonable lack of prosecutorial dili-
gence. As the Balliro decision indicates, however, it remains within a 
court's discretion to determine when prosecutorial delay has caused 
sufficient prejudice to require dismissal. Nevertheless, this discretion 
must always by tempered by the constitutional constraints of Barker. In 
comparison with Barker, therefore, Rule 36(c) must be interpreted as 
allowing for a more lenient, or perhaps even a coextensive constitutional 
burden on a defendant to prove a speedy trial violation. It should not be 
interpreted or applied so as to impose a heavier burden; to do so would be 
an abuse of the discretion granted in Balliro. Thus, if a defendant's claim 
for speedy trial relief is denied under Rule 36, he or she may still claim a 
constitutional violation under the Barker balancing test. 
Assuming the defendant does prevail, the remedy for a constitutional or 
Rule 36 speedy trial violation is mandatory dismissal of charges with 
prejudice to the Commonwealth. Given this uncompromising remedy, it 
seems likely that violations will be found only in the most egregious 
circumstances. Rather than foregoing any remedy in less serious cases, 
however, the Massachusetts Appeals Court decision in Pomerleau indi-
cates that state courts have inherent discretion to fashion appropriate 
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remedies for unnecessary delays not rising to true speedy trial violations, 
including dismissal without prejudice. Although potentially beneficial to 
criminal defendants seeking some type of relieffrom want df prosecution, 
the result in Pomerleau may well add simply another element of unpre-
dictability to the "speedy trial" formula unless the court exercising this 
remedial discretion makes both the basis of its decision and the extent of 
any sanction clearly known to the litigants and the reviewing courts. The 
responsibility of ensuring such clarity, however, cannot be left entirely to 
the courts. Given the discretionary nature of the standards and remedies 
associated with trial delays, it would seem equally incumbent upon the 
participating attorneys, for the sake of greater certainty in subsequent 
legal proceedings as well as greater clarity and consistency in their own 
arguments at those proceedings, to request that an explicit ~udicial deter-
mination concerning the speedy trial questions at issue be made on the 
record. 
§ 3.8. Duress as a Defense.· Massachusetts has long recognized duress 
as a defense in criminal actions.! The essence of this defense is that a 
person will not be held responsible for criminal conduct Which he was 
forced to commit. The defense of duress is based on the! theory that a 
person should not be convicted of an offense when he lacks the required 
criminal intent. 2 Although Massachusetts, unlike some $tates, has no 
statute defining duress in this context, the Supreme Judi¢ial Court has 
clearly stated the factors which must be present in order for !a defendant to 
be acquitted under this defense. According to the Court, the defendant 
must establish that there was a present, immediate and impending threat 
sufficient to induce a well-founded fear of death or serious bodily injury if 
he did not commit the criminal act.3 That is, the person must have been 
put in a position where neither he nor a person of reasonable firmness 
could have avoided committing the criminal offense under the circum-
stances.4 The person also must not have had a reasonable chance to 
escape.s 
Although the Court has articulated the necessary elemtlnts of the de-
fense of duress, it has not clearly defined the outer parlimeters of the 
defense's applicability.6 During the Survey year, the Massachusetts Court 
* ROBERT L. MISKELL, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.8. I Commonwealth v. Elwell, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 190, 192 (1840). 
2 Commonwealth v. Melzer, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 174, 180 n.3, 437 N.E.2d 549, 552 n.3 
(1982) (jury instructions); Note, Criminal Law - Duress, 9 SETON HALL,L. REv. 556,559 
(1978). ' 
3 Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 4, 15, 415 N.E.2d 805, 812. 
4Id. 
SId. 
6 For example, the Court has not firmly decided whether the prosecutipn or the defense 
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of Appeals considered whether duress was available as a defense to a 
criminal defendant claiming that he was in fear for the life of a third 
person. In Commonwealth v. Melzer,7 the Appeals Court stated that it 
was likely that the defense of duress would be available when it is a third 
person who is in an immediate danger of death or serious injury. 8 The 
court held, however, that it did not have to consider whether the trial 
judge erred by not instructing the jury that the defense was available when 
a third person was in danger, because the defendant had not established 
the elements required to raise the defense of duress successfully. 9 
In Melzer, it was established at triapo that in February of 1978, the 
defendant Jeffrey Melzer met Robert Gear in Florida, where Melzer 
helped to maintain Gear's boat. l1 During that month, Gear arranged for 
Melzer to come to Massachusetts to help repair Gear's home, which had 
been damaged in a storm.12 After a month in Massachusetts, Melzer 
returned to Florida, where he met Dwight Harrison.13 According to 
Melzer's testimony at trial, in June 1978 he accepted an offer from 
Harrison and Harrison's friend, Robert Gaita, to drive him up to Vir-
ginia.J4 During the trip, Melzer spoke about his work for Gear, whom he 
described as having a lot of money.IS Gaita and Harrison refused to let 
Melzer off when the group arrived in Virginia. Instead, they asked him to 
direct them to Gear's house in Massachusetts. 16 When Melzer declined to 
direct them, Harrison drew a gun and pointed it at the defendant. 17 Melzer 
has the burden of proof when the defendant claims duress. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 4,18-22,415 N.E.2d 805, 814-16. In addition, the Court had not decided 
whether the defense of duress is available to a person who commits a criminal offense 
because of a threat of serious bodily injury to a third person. Commonwealth v. Melzer, 14 
Mass. App. Ct. 174, 180-81,437 N.E.2d 549, 553 (1982); but see Commonwealth v. Robin-
son, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 4,15,415 N.E.2d 805, 812 (citing Rhode Island Recreation Center, 
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 177 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1949), a case in which the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that perhaps "a well-grounded apprehension of death 
or serious bodily injury to another, particularly a close relative, may constitute coercion." 
177 F.2d at 606). 
7 14 Mass. App. Ct. 174, 437 N .E.2d 549 (1982). 
8 [d. at 182, 437 N .E.2d at 554. 
9 [d. 
10 It should be noted that much of the testimony adduced at trial was conflicting. [d. at 
175, 437 N.E.2d at 550. 
II [d. 
12 [d. 
13 [d. at 178, 437 N.E.2d at 551. 
14 [d. Melzer's ultimate destination was Ohio. [d. 
IS [d. 
16 [d. 
17 [d. Melzer claimed that during the remainder of the trip Gaita and Harrison forced him 
to submit to sodomy, commit fellatio and swallow pills of unknown origin. [d. at 178,437 
N.E.2d at 551-52. 
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testified that he could not have escaped from Harrison and Gaita without 
getting shot. 18 Shortly before they reached Gear's house, Harrison told 
Melzer that if he did as he was told, nobody would get hurt. 19 
When the group arrived at the house, Gear, his frieI1U Robert Tracey 
and Gear's plumber Dennis Haggett were all present in tfue house. 2o After 
entering the house, Gaita pulled out a gun and annou.,.ced, "This is a 
robbery. "21 Harrison then began 3earching the house for a safe. 22 Gear, 
fearing for his life, offered to take Harrison and Gaita ,to a bank to get 
some money. 23 When Gaita and Harrison accepted Gear's offer, Melzer 
was left alone to guard Tracey and Haggett. 24 A struggle arose when 
Gear, Harrison and Gaita returned from the bank.2s As a result of this 
confrontation, Gear, Tracey and Haggett were able to, escape from the 
house. 26 Tracey and Haggett testified that Melzer shot Tracey in the leg 
while Tracey was attempting to escape. 27 Melzer testified that Harrison 
and Gaita dragged Melzer to their car and the three fled. 28 According to 
Melzer, Gaita and Harrison continued to abuse him the entire time they 
were fleeing.29 
Melzer was charged with several crimes, including armed robbery and 
armed assault in a dwelling. At the trial, the defense counsel requested the 
trial judge to instruct the jury that the defense of duress should apply if 
there had been a present, immediate and impending thr~at at the time of 
the crime of such a nature as to induce a well-founded fear of death or 
serious injury either to Melzer or to another person if th~ criminal act was 
not done. 30 The trial judge expressly declined to include the phrase "or to 
another person" in his instructions to the jury .31 Melzer was convicted of 
armed robbery and armed assault in a dwelling.32 Melzer appealed, argu-
18 Id. at 178, 437 N.E.2d at 552. 
19 Id. at 178-79, 437 N.E.2d at 552. Melzer was also forced to take a pill of unknown 
origin.ld. 
20 Id. at 175, 437 N.E.2d at 550. The group entered the house and Melzer asked Gear ifhe 
could show Harrison and Gaita the repair work he had done on the house. Id. 
21 Id. All the cash and valuables of Gear, Tracey and Haggett were taken from them. Id. 
22 Id. There was no safe in Gear's house. Id. 
23 Id. at 176, 437 N.E.2d at 550. 
24 Id. Harrison told Melzer, "[iif we're not back in forty-five minutes, dust them 
.... " Id. 
25Id. at 177,437 N.E.2d at 551. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 177-78, 437 N.E.2d at 551. Melzer, in his testimony, denied shooting Tracey. Id. 
at 179, 437 N.E.2d at 552. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 180, 437 N.E.2d at 552. 
30 Id. at 175,437 N.E.2d at 530. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 174,437 N.E.2d at 549. 
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iog that the trial judge erred by refusing to give instructions to the jury that 
fear of death or serious bodily injury to another could constitute dUress. 33 
The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that 
even if the judge erred by refusing to give the requested jury instructions, 
it was harmless error. 34 The court stated that there was no Massachusetts 
authority directly controlling on the issue of whether a serious risk to 
another person was sufficient to raise the defense of duress. 35 The court 
noted that a federal appeals court case, which the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court had cited with approval, strongly indicated that a serious 
risk of injury to another person may constitute duress.36 The court con-
cluded that although the authorities outside the Commonwealth were not 
uniform on the issue, it was likely that Massachusetts would recognize 
that duress can arise through fear of serious bodily injury to a third 
person.37 Accordingly, the court stated that it would have been "appro-
priate and wise" for the trial judge to give the jury the instructions that 
had been requested by the defendant. 38 
In upholding Melzer's convictions, the Appeals Court explained why it 
was harmless error for the trial court not to instruct the jury that duress 
can arise through fear of serious bodily injury to another. The court began 
its analysis by focusing on the requirement that the actor must have been 
positioned so as to have no reasonable opportunity to escape in order for 
the defense of duress to be applicable.39 According to the court, Melzer 
33 Id. at 174-75, 437 N .E.2d at 550. 
34 Id. at 182, 437 N.E.2d at 554. 
35 Id. at 181,437 N.E.2d at 553. 
36 Id. at 181-82,437 N.E.2d at 553. The court discussed Rhode Island Recreation Center, 
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1949), which was cited with 
approval in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 4, 15,415 N .E.2d 805, 812. In 
R.I. Recreation Center the court stated that perhaps a "well-grounded apprehension of 
death or serious bodily injury to another, particularly a close relative, may constitute 
coercion." 177 F.2d at 606. 
37 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 182,437 N .E.2d at 554. The court thought it likely that Massachu-
setts would adopt the approach of the MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Proposed Official Draft 
1962), which states: . 
Id. 
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute 
an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful 
force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. 
38 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 182,437 N.E.2d at 554. The court also noted that the trial judge 
probably should have charged the jury that they could take into account the proximity and 
relationship between the defendant and the third person who was subject to the risk of 
serious harm. Id. at 182 n.5, 437 N.E.2d at 554 n.5. 
39 /d. at 182-83, 437 N.E.2d at 554 (quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1981 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 4, 15,415 N.E.2d 805, 812). 
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had to show that he had no reasonable opportunity to escape.40 The court 
concluded that the defendant made no such showing. T~e court stated 
that uncontested evidence revealed that for a period of time during the 
robbery Melzer was left alone with the victims Tracey aM Haggett and 
yet made no attempt to escape.41 Because Melzer continued to hold the 
victims while Gaita and Harrison took Gear to his bank1 the court rea-
soned that Melzer could not raise the defense of duress b¢cause of a fear 
of serious injury to himself.42 
After determining that Melzer had not been in fear for his own safety, 
the court then examined the possibility of Melzer's fear qf serious injury 
to other people. Melzer indicated in his testimony that he had feared Gear 
would be seriously injured if Melzer released Tracey and Haggett when 
Harrison and Gaita went to the bank.43 The court was ndt persuaded by 
this testimony, reasoning that if Melzer's story was believed, Melzer and 
Gear were in equal danger. According to the court, "Nothing suggested 
that Gear's risk would be lessened if Melzer failed to take the opportunity 
to escape. "44 The court stated that because the jury rejected the defense 
as applied to Melzer alone, the result would have been the,same ifthe trial 
judge had mentioned Melzer's possible concern over the: risk to Gear.45 
The court concluded, therefore, that even if the trial judge's failure to 
mention the risk to Gear was error, it was harmless error. 46 
The Appeals Court's opinion in Melzer is significant because it indicates 
that Massachusetts courts will recognize the defense of duress when there 
is a threat of serious bodily injury or death to a third person, as well as 
when that threat is directed at the defendant himself.47 The policies 
40 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 184,437 N.E.2d at 554. The court recognized the principle that 
even if a criminal defendant gives incredible testimony, he is entitled to jury instructions on 
the hypothesis that the testimony is true. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Campbell, 352 Mass. 
387,398,226 N.E.2d 211, 219 (1967) (quoting People v. Carmen, 36 Cal. 2d 768, 773, 228 P.2d 
281, 285 (1951). 
41 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 183,437 N.E.2d at 554-55. See supra notes 21-25 and accompany-
ing text. 
42 Id. at 183, 437 N.E.2d at 555. 
4J Id. at 184-85, 437 N.E.2d at 555. "When asked why (in the face of Harrison's and 
Gaita's alleged sexual abuse of him) he did not 'take off when ... [he] had ... [a] chance,' he 
[Melzer] replied, 'Because they told me they were going to kill ... Gear.' "Id. at 184 n.7, 
437 N.E.2d at 555 n. 7. The court termed this evidence "meager, if not trivial." Id. at 184-85, 
437 N.E.2d at 555. Melzer also suggested that he feared for the safety of his mother, but 
because she was far from Massachusetts at the time, she was in no immediate danger. Id. at 
184, 437 N.E.2d at 555. 
44 Id. at 185, 437 N.E.2d at 555. 
4S Id. 
46 Id. The court noted that Melzer's failure to report to the proper ,authorities after his 
ultimate escape from Harrison and Gaita "gave color" to his failure to escape during Gear's 
trip to the bank. Id. at 186, 437 N.E.2d at 556. 
47 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. 
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underlying the defense of duress support this extension. First, the defense 
is based on the idea that it is better for the defendant, when faced with the 
option of either suffering bodily injury or committing a criminal offense, 
to violate the law rather than to suffer the physical harm.48 Under this 
theory, the defendant's criminal conduct is justified because he avoided a 
harm that was more significant.49 This reasoning applies with equal weight 
when the threatened harm is directed to a person other than the defen-
dant. 50 In both instances, violating the penal code is a lesser evil than 
permitting the infliction of serious bodily injury or death. 
The second policy reason for applying the defense of duress when a 
third person is threatened involves the relationship between the defendant 
and the person threatened. Because the person threatened is often either a 
relative or friend of the defendant, the defendant's impulse to protect that 
person may be as strong, if not stronger, as the desire to protect his own 
life. 51 It would be improper to allow a defendant to commit a crime to 
prevent serious injury to himself, but not to prevent an injury to another. 
Although the Melzer court reached the proper result when it concluded 
that Massachusetts probably would apply the defense of duress when 
injury is threatened to a third person, the court's decision not to allow the 
defense in the matter before it seems incorrect. Assuming that the defense 
of duress is available when a third person is threatened with bodily harm, 
the elements necessary to invoke the defense are a present, immediate 
and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-founded fear of 
death or serious bodily injury to the defendant or another if the act is not 
done.52 The defendant also must not have a reasonable opportunity to 
escape.53 According to Melzer's testimony, Melzer was in a position to 
escape when Gaita and Harrison left him at Gear's home to watch Tracey 
and Haggett.54 Melzer testified, however, that he did not escape at that 
time because he feared for Gear's safety.55 The court recognized that 
Melzer had a reasonable opportunity to escape but ignored the possible 
48 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 49, at 374 (1972). 
49 Id.; see also Note, Criminal Law - Duress, supra note 2, at 559; Hersey & Avins, 
Compulsion as a Defense to Criminal Prosecution, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 283, 291 (1958). 
50 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 378. These commentators conclude it 
should be sufficient if the harm is aimed at "a member of his [defendant's) family or friend 
(or it would seem, even a stranger)." Id. 
51 Hersey & Avins, supra note 49 at 286. 
52 See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 4, 15,415 N.E.2d 805, 812. 
53 Id. 
54 See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text. 
55 See supra notes 18-25, and 43 and accompanying text. According to his testimony, 
Melzer was (I) forced by Harrison and Gaita to participate, (2) told that if he did as he was 
told no one would get hurt, and (3) told th'lt Gear would be killed if Melzer escaped when 
Harrison and Gaita went to the bank. Jd. 
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concern which Melzer had for Gear. While it is clear Melzer could have 
escaped from Gear's house without the threat of death (i}r serious bodily 
injury to himself, it is not at all certain that Gear would nbt have been put 
in greater danger if Melzer had escaped.56 The court'~ statement that 
"nothing suggested that Gear's risks would be lessened if Melzer failed to 
take the opportunity to escape, "57 disregards the important consideration 
of increased danger to a third person in applying the defense of duress 
when the -threatened injury is to the third person. While there was no 
evidence that Gear's risk would be lessened if Melzer did not escape, 
there was testimony which indicated that the risk to. Gear would be 
increased if Melzer did escape.58 
The standard on appeal for determining whether a trial court's error is 
so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial is whether the claimed defect 
influenced the jury and tainted its verdict. 59 Assuming" as the Appeals 
Court apparently did, that the defense of duress is available when a third 
person is threatened, the Melzer court's conclusion that the trial court's 
failure to give this instruction was harmless error seems l incorrect. There 
was evidence in this case which, if believed by the jury, would indicate 
that Melzer did tiot have a reasonable opportunity to escape, if the fear of 
possible injury to third persons is considered.60 It seems clear, therefore, 
that under the standard appropriate for appellate review, the trial judge's 
refusal to give the requested instructions was more than harmless error. 
In conclusion, the Massachusetts Appeals Court in M~lzer clearly indi-
cated that Massachusetts courts will recognize the defense of duress when 
a person other than the defendant is in immediate dangeIi of serious bodily 
injury or death. This position is correct when the underlying purposes of 
the defense are considered. The court's opinion, howe\jer, loses some of 
its effectiveness because the court did not correctly analyze the applica-
bility of the defense of duress to the particular facts before it. Hopefully, 
the defense will be more properly applied in future cases involving threats 
of death or serious injury directed at persons other than the defendant 
himself. 
§ 3.9. Armed Robbery - Armed with a Dangerous Weapon - Apparent 
Ability Doctrine.* During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Howard,! 
56 There was testimony which, if believed, indicated that Gear would be killed if Melzer 
escaped. See supra note 45. 
57 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 185, 437 N.E.2d at 555. 
58 [d. at 184 n.1, 437 N.E.2d at 555 n.7. 
59 Commonwealth v. Smith, 342 Mass. 180, 189, 172 N.E.2d 597, 602 (1961) (quoting 
People v. Kingston, 8 N.Y.2d 384, 387, 208 N.Y.S.2d 956, 959,171 N.E.2d 306, 308 (1960». 
60 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
* LAUREN C. WEILBURG, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.9. t 386 Mass. 607,436 N.E.2d 1211 (1982). 
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the Supreme Judicial Court clarified the scope of chapter 265, section 17 
of the General Laws, the statute proscribing armed robbery in Massachu-
setts.2 In Howard, the Court held that this law does not apply to the 
situation where a defendant appears to be armed with a dangerous 
weapon during the course of a robbery. 3 According to the Court, section 
17 will be violated only when it is proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
a defendant actually had a dangerous weapon in his possession when the 
robbery was committed.4 
The Supreme Judicial Court first defined' 'the gist of the crime of armed 
robbery" in 1865.5 In Commonwealth v. Mowry, the Court rejected the 
contention that actual use of a dangerous weapon is a prerequisite to a 
conviction for this crime.6 Rather, the Court ruled that under the pre-
decessor of thapter 265, section 17, armed robbery is committed when a 
person in possession of a dangerous weapon robs another, whether or not 
that weapon is used to inflict harm. 7 The Court based its holding on a 
finding that the mere presence of the weapon increases the danger of 
resistance and conflict. The presence of a weapon, the Court concluded, 
is a substantial aggravation of the crime of robbery and warrants a convic-
tion for armed robbery.s In 1872, in Commonwealth v. White,9 the Su-
preme Judicial Court further ruled that assault with an unloaded gun 
constitutes a violation of the statute proscribing assault while armed with 
a dangerous weapon.lO The White Court held that the secret intent of the 
defendant and his inability to actually shoot the victim are immaterial.!! 
The Court found the defendant's outward demonstration of the ability to 
2 O.L. c. 265, § 17 provides: 
Whoever, being armed with a dangerous weapon, assaults another and robs, steals or 
takes from his person money or other property which may be the subject of larceny 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years; 
provided, however, that any person who commits any offense described herein while 
masked or disguised or while having his features artificially distorted shall, for the 
first offense be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five years and for any 
subsequent offense for not less than ten years. 
Because Howard essentially deals with the concept of being "armed with a dangerous 
weapon," it will also have application to O.L. c. 265, § 15A (assault and battery with a 
dangerous weapon) and O.L. c. 265, § 15B (assault with a dangerous weapon). 
3 386 Mass. at 608, 436 N.E.2d at 1212. 
4 Id. at 611, 436 N.E.2d at 1213. 
5 Commonwealth v. Mowry, 93 Mass. (II Allen) 20, 22 (1865). 
6 /d. at 21-22. 
7 [d. at 22-23. 
8 [d. at 23. 
9 110 Mass. 407 (1872). 
10 [d. at 409. 
II /d. 
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commit a battery to constitute the mischief which is punishable as a 
breach of the peace. 12 
These two nineteenth century cases led to the development by the 
Supreme Judicial Court of the "apparent ability" doctrine.13 Under this 
doctrine, a defendant's objectively menacing conduct or use of an instru-
mentality which appears to a reasonable individual to have the potential to 
inflict harm will satisfy the "dangerous weapon" requirement l4 of the 
armed robbery and armed assault statutes. IS In Commonwealth v. Hen-
son, 16 for example, the defendant was convicted of assaultl with a danger-
ous weapon for firing two blanks from a fake gun at an off-duty police 
officerY The Henson Court found that the objectively mehacing conduct 
of the defendant produced fear of harm and, consequently, had a ten-
dency to produce a breach of the peace. IS According to the Henson 
Court, even an apparent ability to accomplish a battery with a weapon 
constitutes an aggravated form of assault; the presenc¢ of a weapon 
causes a greater threat to the public peace and order because the natural 
reaction of the victim may be more sudden and violent than in cases 
where no weapon is involved. 19 
In Commonwealth v. Tarrant,20 the Supreme Judicial Court refined the 
apparent ability doctrine by clarifying the meaning of the term "danger-
ous weapon" as used in the armed robbery and armed assault statutes.zt 
Specifically, the Tarrant Court held that for the purpose of determining 
whether an instrumentality is a "dangerous weapon," the proper inquiry 
is whether the instrumentality is one that presents an objective threat of 
danger to a person of reasonable and average sensibility. 22 Where a 
neutral object is used to help perpetrate a robbery, the Court's determina-
tion turns on whether the instrumentality has the apparent·ability to inflict 
harm, whether the victim reasonably so perceived it, and whether the 
defendant used the instrumentality to further the robbery.23 In Tarrant, 
the Court concluded that a defendant who had robbed his victim while 
12 [d. 
13 See R. PERKINS. CRIMINAL LAW 91-93 (1957). 
14 [d.; see also, Commonwealth v. Henson, 357 Mass. 686, 693, 259 N.E.2d 769, 774 
(1970); Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 367 Mass. 411, 417, 326 N.E.2d 710, 715 (1975). 
15 See supra note 2. 
16 357 Mass. 686, 259 N .E.2d 769 (1970). 
17 /d. at 689-90, 693, 259 N.E.2d at 771-72, 774. 
18 /d. at 689, 259 N.E.2d at 771. 
19 [d. at 693, 259 N.E.2d at 774; see also Commonwealth v. Perry, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 
378 N.E.2d 1384 (1978) (assault and robbery while armed with a toy gun violates G.L. c. 265 
§§ 15A, 15B and 17). 
20 367 Mass. 411, 326 N.E.2d 710 (1975). 
21 See supra note 2. 
22 367 Mass. at 416, 326 N .E.2d at 714. 
23 [d. at 417, 326 N.E.2d at 715. 
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accompanied by a German shepherd dog was guilty of armed robbery. 24 
In reaching this result, the Tarrant Court relied on the menacing appear-
ance of the dog to the victim, and the defendant's use of the dog to 
prevent the victim from resisting. 25 
The Supreme Judicial Court further extended the scope of the apparent 
ability doctrine in Commonwealth 1'. Novicki 26 and Commonwealth 1'. 
RichardsY In these two cases, the Court established that armed robbery 
is committed when a robber exerts "constructive force" upon his vic-
tim.28 "Constructive force" includes the use of threatening words or 
gestures or the display of a deadly weapon which causes fear in the mind 
of the victim. 29 According to the Court, an essential element of the crime 
of armed robbery is that force and violence must be exerted on the victim 
or that the victim be put in a state of fear or apprehension by the perpe-
trator. 30 
The most recent decision of the Supreme Judicial Court applying the 
apparent ability doctrine to an armed robbery conviction was handed 
down in 1975. In Commonwealth v. Delgado,31 three men entered a 
grocery store and robbed the manager at knife point. 32 During the course 
of the robbery the defendant Delgado said to his accomplices, "Hold [the 
manager] or I'm going to shoot him. "33 No gun was seen by the victim 
and later, when Delgado was apprehended, no gun was found on his 
person or in the area where he was arrested.34 The Court upheld the 
defendant's conviction for robbery while "armed with a dangerous 
weapon, to wit: a gun."35 The Court found that the defendant's state-
ment, uttered during an ongoing robbery, was sufficient to cause the 
victim reasonably apprehension with respect to his physical well-being. 36 
The Court observed that "the jury could reasonably conclude that the 
defendant should be taken at his word. "37 
24 [d. at 412. 326 N.E.2d at 712; see also. Commonwealth v. Farrell. 322 Mass. 606. 78 
N.E.2d 697 (1948) (a lighted cigarette is a dangerous weapon under G.L. c. 265 § 15A when 
it is used to inflict serious bodily injury). 
25 367 Mass. at 412.326 N.E.2d at 712. 
26 324 Mass. 461, 465. 87 N.E.2d 1,3-4 (1949). 
27 363 Mass. 299. 303-04. 293 N.E.2d 854.858 (1973). 
28 [d. at 304. 293 N.E.2d at 858. 
29 [d. 
30 324 Mass. 461.465.87 N.E.2d 1.3-4 (1949). 
3I 367 Mass. 432. 326 N.E.2d 716 (1975). 
32 [d. at 433-34.326 N.E.2d at 717. 
33 [d. at 434.326 N.E.2d at 717. 
34 [d. at 436,326 N.E.2d at 718. 
35 [d. at 434,326 N.E.2d at 717. 
36 [d. at 437. 326 N .E.2d at 718-19. 
37 [d. The Court in Delgado based its holding on three lines of reasoning. First. the Court 
noted that the "apparent ability" standard governed the definition ofa "dangerous weapon" 
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Commonwealth v. Howard. 38 decided during the Survey year, repre-
sents a narrowing of the apparent ability doctrine. In Howard. the Court 
reviewed, on direct appeal, the superior court's denial ou the defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict on the charge of robbery while armed with a 
dangerous weapon. 39 The case arose when the defendant approached the 
victim with his right hand in his jacket and said, "Walk straight, look 
down, and don't try anything foolish or I'll pull the trigger. "40 The 
defendant then directed the victim into an apartment building where he 
demanded, and was given, the victim's wallet.41 After an occupant of the 
apartment building opened her door and saw the victim and the defendant, 
the defendant directed the victim out of the building and into an alley.42 
The defendant then demanded that the victim empty her'pockets and she 
complied.43 At this point, a police cruiser arrived at one end of the alley, 
and a second cruiser arrived shortly thereafter at the other end of the 
alley.44 The defendant was arrested at the scene .45 No gun was found on 
the defendant or in the vicinity of the arrest.46 The victim testified that she 
never saw a gun.47 The trial court judge charged the jury, over the 
defendant's objection, that the Commonwealth need not prove the exis-
tence of a weapon to establish the offense of armed robbery. 48 The judge 
stated that if the defendant had indicated and declared that he had a gun, 
for the purposes of armed robbery; the jury must decide "whether the instrumentality under 
the control of the perpetrator has the apparent ability to inflict harm; whether the victim 
reasonably so perceived it, and whether the perpetrator by use of the instrumentality 
intended to elicit fear in order to further the robbery." [d. at 435-36.326 N.E.2d at 718-20 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 367 Mass. 411. 417, 326 N.E.2d 710, 715 (1975». 
Second, the Court found that, although words are generally not sufficient to constitute an 
assault, a distinction is to be drawn between words that are merely threatening and those 
that are informational. Informational words, according to the Court can take the place of a 
threatening movement or gesture and complete the assault by causing a reasonable ap-
prehension of immediate physical harm. [d. at 436-37,326 N.E.2d at 718-19. Third, the 
Court found that it is well-established that an act of putting another in reasonable apprehen-
sion that force may be used is sufficient for the offense of criminal assault. ld. at 437, 326 
N.E.2d at 718-19 (citing Commonwealth v. Henson, 357 Mass. 686, 259 N.E.2d 769 (1970); 
Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 293 N.E.2d 854 (1973». 
38 386 Mass. 607, 436 N.E.2d 1211 (1982). 
39 /d. at 607, 608 n.1, 436 N .E.2d 1211, 1211 n.1 (1982). The Court noted that the motion 
should have been expressed in terms of a required finding of not guilty. /d.; see MASS. R. 
CRIM. P. 25. 
40 [d. at 607, 609, 436 N .E.2d at 1211. 
41 [d. at 609,436 N.E.2d at 1211. 
42 [d. 
43 /d. 
44 [d. 
45 [d. 
46 ld. 
47 ld. 
48 /d. at 608, 436 N.E.2d at 1212-13. 
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"the law will take him at his word that he did have a gun."49 The jury 
found the defendant guilty of armed robbery. 50 
Upon direct appeal the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction 
of armed robbery.51 Specifically, the Court found that the trial judge 
misconstrued the holding of Commonwealth I'. Delgado 52 when he formu-
lated the charge to the jury.53 According to the Court, Delgado did not 
mandate that ajury must presume the existence of a gun from the robber's 
assertions.54 Rather, the Delgado Court permitted the jury to infer the 
existence of a gun.55 In Delgado, according to the Howard Court, it was 
possible that the defendant had a gun and disposed of it. s6 The jury would 
therefore have been warranted in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant had a gun during the commission of the crime.57 In the 
instant case, however, the Court found that there was no evidence to 
warrant the jury finding, on the basis of a reasonable inference and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant Howard had a gun at the 
time of the robbery.58 The Court noted that no gun had been seen by the 
victim nor found by the police. 59 Moreover, the Court found that the 
defendant had neither an opportunity nor a reason to dispose of a gun 
before the police suddenly arrived and arrested him.60 
The HOI1'ard majority concluded that the Delgado case did not elimi-
nate the statutory requirement that a defendant actually have a dangerous 
weapon in his possession to commit armed robbery.61 Rather, Delgado, 
according to the Court, stood for the proposition that in certain circum-
stances the jury was warranted in inferring, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that a defendant did, in fact, have a gun at the time of the robbery .62 In the 
Howard case, the Court defined the limits of those "certain circum-
stances" as follows: a defendant's statement alone, implying that he had a 
gun, where no gun was seen or found and where he had no opportunity or 
49 ld. The trial judge relied on language from Commonwealth v. Delgado in framing the 
charge to the jury. ld. 
SOld. at 609, 436 N.E.2d at 1212. 
slid. at 608, 436 N .E.2d at 1212. The majority opinion was written by Justice Wilkins. ld. 
52 See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text. 
53 386 Mass. at 608, 436 N.E.2d at 1212. 
54 ld. 
551d. 
56 ld. at 610, 436 N.E.2d at 1212-13; see Commonwealth v. Delgado. 367 Mass. 432. 437. 
326 N.E.2d 716. 719. 
57 386 Mass. at 610, 436 N.E.2d at 1212-13. 
58 ld. at 609, 436 N.E.2d at 1212. 
59 ld. 
60 ld. at 609-10, 436 N.E.2d at 1212-13. 
61 ld. 
62 ld. 
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reason to dispose of it, cannot be sufficient to warrant a conviction of 
robbery while "armed with a dangerous weapon. "63 
The Howard Court stated that if robbery while apparently armed is to 
be proscribed by chapter 265, section 17 of the General Laws, legislative 
amendment would be required. 64 The Court refused to construe section 17 
so loosely as to eliminate the requirement that there be some instrumen-
tality which presents "an objective threat of danger to a person of reason-
able and average sensibility. "65 The Court explained that the crime of 
armed robbery is based in part on the potential for injury t~at arises from 
the possession of a dangerous weapon.6~ Without a finding of the actual 
existence of such a weapon, this potential for injury is absent. 67 The Court 
therefore concluded that while verbal threats and the victim's resulting 
apprehension are relevant to the offense of unarmed robbery, they do not 
warrant a conviction under section 17. 6X 
In a lengthy concurring opinion Justice O'Connor agreed that a convic-
tion of armed robbery was not warranted in the instant case.69 Spe-
cifically, he found that the evidence presented did not prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant in fact possessed a dangerous 
weapon at the time of the robbery.70 Justice O'Connor went further than 
the majority in Howard. however, by arguing that the Court should 
overrule the apparent ability doctrine espoused in the Tarrant and 
Delgado decisions. 71 
Justice O'Connor first criticized the Court's method of distinguishing 
Delgado from the case before it. 72 Delgado, according to Justice O'Con-
nor, stood for the proposition that a defendant's words can be the legal 
equivalent of possession of a dangerous weapon. 73 After all, Justice 
O'Connor observed, the Delgado Court had found its decision to be 
controlled by the "apparent ability" doctrine enunciated in Common-
63 /d. 
641d. at 610-1J, 436 N.E.2d at 1213. 
65 !d. at 611, 436 N .E.2d at 1213 (quoting from Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 367 Mass. 41 J, 
416, 326 N.E.2d 710, 715 (1975». 
66 ld.; see Commonwealth v. Mowry, 93 Mass. (II Allen) 20, 22 (1865) (see supra notes 
5-8 and accompanying text); see also Commonwealth v. Henson, 357 Mass. 686,693, 259 
N.E.2d 769, 774 (1970) (see supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text). 
67 386 Mass. at 611,426 N.E.2d at 1213. 
68 ld. at 611,436 N.E.2d at 1213; cf Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367 Mass. 432, 436, 326 
N.E.2d 716, 718-19 (1975) (distinction between words that are merely threatening and those 
that are also informational); see R. PERKINS, supra note 13, at 132. 
69 386 Mass. at 611,436 N.E.2d at 1213 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
70 ld. at 611, 436 N.E.2d at 1213. 
71 ld .• at 611-18. 436 N.E.2d at 1213-17. See supra notes 13-38 and accompanying text. 
72 ld. at 611, 436 N.E.2d at 1213. 
73 !d. 
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wealth v. Tarrant. 74 Justice O'Connor concluded, therefore, that the 
apparent ability doctrine, as established by the Tarrant and Delgado 
decisions, could justify a finding of armed robbery both when a defendant 
is armed with an apparently dangerous weapon and when a defendant is 
apparently armed with a dangerous weapon. 7S 
Justice O'Connor then criticized the use of the "apparent ability" 
doctrine to determine what is armed robbery within the meaning of 
chapter 265, section 17.76 He concurred in the majority's holding that 
section 17 should not be construed so loosely as to eliminate the re-
quirement that there actually be some instrumentality in the possession 
of the defendant which presents an objective threat of danger to a person 
of reasonable and average sensibilities. 77 Unlike the majority, however, 
Justice O'Connor further determined that the Court should not dispense 
with the requirement under section 17 that the instrumentality possessed 
by the defendant be actually dangerous. 78 He concluded that the rule of 
strict construction applied to criminal statutes79 does not permit a read-
ing of the language of section 17, "armed with a dangerous weapon," to 
include either a robber armed with an "apparently dangerous" weapon 
or a robber "apparently armed. "80 Justice O'Connor advocated overrul-
ing both the Tarrant and Delgado decisions, and thereby essentially 
recommended a complete abandonment of the apparent ability doctrine 
in the Commonwealth. 8 ! He proposed that the Court announce that, 
unless the Legislature amends section 17, a conviction for armed rob-
bery is improper unless the defendant actually possesses an inherently 
dangerous instrumentality or an instrumentality that was used to pro-
duce serious bodily harm. 82 
74 Id. at 611, 436 N.E.2d at 1215. 
75 /d. at 615, 436 N.E.2d at 1215. 
76 /d. at 616-18, 436 N.E.2d at 1215-17. 
77 Id. at 616, 436 N.E.2d at 1215-16. 
78 /d. at 616-17, 436 N.E.2d at 1215-16. 
79 See Commonwealth v. Devlin, 366 Mass. 132,137,314 N.E.2d 897 (1974); Common-
wealth v. Federico, 354 Mass. 206, 207, 326 N.E.2d 646 (1968). 
80 386 Mass. at 616-17, 436 N.E.2d at 1216 (1982). 
81 Id. at 617-18, 436 N .E.2d at 1216-17. Justice O'Connor stated, "In my opinion, neither 
mere words nor an instrument incapable of inflicting serious harm, used to threaten a 
robbery victim, is sufficient under section 17 to elevate unarmed robbery to armed robbery. I 
fail to see a good reason to distinguish between a statement plus a finger in a pocket and a 
statement plus a pocket comb or pen. Yet, as the law is set out today, a robber who 
effectively simulates a gun by means of a comb is 'armed with a dangerous weapon' 
whereas one who uses his finger with the same result is not." Id. at 617, 436 N .E.2d at 1216. 
82 Id. at 618,436 N.E.2d at 1217. In addition, Justice O'Connor urged that an analogous 
construction be given to G.L. c. 265 § 15B, which proscribes assault with a dangerous 
weapon.ld. 
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Justice Nolan dissented from the Court's opinion. 83 He found the issue 
presented in the case to be a narrow one: the legal sufficiency of evidence 
tending to prove that the defendant had a gun when he robbed the 
victim. 84 Justice Nolan found that the defendant's statement to the vic-
tim85 was" an evidentiary admission from which the jury may infer that he 
was then carrying a gun."86 Moreover, given that the jury believed he 
made the statement, Justice Nolan concluded that the defendant's state-
ment satisfied the standard of evidence necessary for the Court to affirm 
the superior court's denial of the defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict. 87 Finally, Justice Nolan disputed the Court's conclusion that the 
instant case was distinguishable from the Delgado decision. 88 In both 
Delgado and the instant case, according to Justice Nolan, there was no 
direct evidence of a gun. 89 The only evidence of the presence of the gun in 
each case was the defendant's statements. 90 In Howard, Justice Nolan 
observed, the defendant could have disposed of the gun between the 
apartment building and the alley.91 Justice Nolan concluded, therefore, 
that as in Delgado, the jury should be permitted to take the defendant at 
his word. 92 
In Commonwealth v. Howard, the Supreme Judicial Court delineated a 
new construction of chapter 265, section 17 and thereby clarified the 
scope of the offense of armed robbery. The armed robbery statute, the 
Court decided, does not apply to robberies committed by a defendant 
"apparently armed" with a dangerous weapon. Rather, to obtain a con-
viction under section 17 the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant was in fact armed with a dangerous weapon 
during the commission of the crime. 93 An oral assertion by the defendant 
alone is not sufficient evidence to prove possession of a weapon, although 
it constitutes evidence from which the jury may infer the presence of a 
weapon. 94 
83 Id. (Nolan, I., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 619, 436 N.E.2d at 1217. 
8S See supra text accompanying note 40. 
86 386 Mass. at 619, 436 N.E.2d at 1217; see P.I. LiACOS, HANDBOOK ON MASSACHU-
SETTS EVIDENCE 275-81 (5th ed. 1981). 
87 386 Mass. at 619,436 N.E.2d at 1217; see also Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 
671, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979). 
88 386 Mass. at 618-19, 436 N.E.2d at 1217. 
89Id. at 619, 436 N.E.2d at 1217. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 618, 436 N.E.2d at 1217. 
92 ld. 
93ld. at 608, 436 N.E.2d at 1211. 
94 ld. at 609-11, 436 N.E.2d at 1213. 
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The Court did not expressly disturb the doctrine, enunciated in the 
Tarrant decision, that a weapon need not be dangerous per se in order to 
qualify as a dangerous weapon for the purposes of section 17.95 N everthe-
less, the Howard decision, by implication, calls into question the vitality 
of the "apparent ability" doctrine. Traditionally, the mere presence of a 
weapon, though not used to inflict harm nor capable of actually inflicting 
injury, has been held to aggravate the crimes of robbery and assault. 96 
This doctrine is based on the notion that the mere existence of a weapon 
places the victim in a state of fear and raises the potential for resistance, 
conflict and injury. 97 It is difficult to imagine that a verbal assertion by a 
robber that he is armed and will use the weapon will cause any less fear or 
potential for conflict than the actual presentation of a weapon. Whether a 
robber displays a real gun, a toy gun or represents to the victim that he is 
armed, the victim will usually be placed in a reasonable apprehension of 
harm. "Constructive force" will apparently have been exercised by the 
defendant, and the crime of armed robbery will apparently have been 
committed. 98 Because this same reasoning justifies a finding of armed 
robbery when the defendant was apparently armed as well as when the 
defendant was armed with only apparent ability to inflict harm, it is 
difficult to reconcile the Court's past "apparent ability" cases with the 
Howard deCIsion. 
Moreover, the Court's refusal to construe the statute to include robbery 
by a defendant "apparently armed" with a dangerous weapon, coupled 
with its acceptance of reading the statute to include robberies committed 
while armed with an "apparently" dangerous weapon, raises questions 
about the Court's adherence to the rule that criminal statutes should be 
strictly construed. 99 Numerous other jurisdictions reject the "apparent 
ability" doctrine. In those jurisdictions, the defendant must possess the 
actual ability to harm the victim when threats are made by means of 
weapons which are not inherently dangerous if convictions under similar 
statutes are to be upheld. 100 The Court should either follow these other 
jurisdictions and read the words "armed with a dangerous weapon" 
9S Jd. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra notes 6-29 and accompanying text. 
97 See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text. 
98 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
99 See supra note 79. 
100 See, e.g., People v. Arando, 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353,407 P.2d 265 (1%5); 
Hutton v. People, 156 Colo. 334, 398 P.2d 973 (1965); People v. Ratliff, 22 III. App. 3d 106, 
317 N .E.2d 63 (1974); People v. Trice, 127 III. App. 2d 310, 262 N .E.2d 276 (1970); Decker v. 
State, 179 Ind. App. 472, 386N.E.2d 192(1979); State v. Matthews, 67 Ohio Ops. 2d 190, 322 
N.E.2d 289 (1974); see also, State v. Keller, 214 N.C. 447,199 S.E. 620 (1938); Cooper v. 
State, 201 Tenn. 149, 297 S.W.2d 75 (1956). 
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literally, or infer apparently armed as well as apparently dangerous from 
the statutory language of section 17. 
In summary, Commonwealth v. Howard raises more questions than it 
offers solutions. Although the decision offers a seemingly clear cut rule 
for the application of section 17, the Court's partial retreat from Delgado 
and its implicit questioning ofthe doctrine of "apparent ability" are likely 
to require clarification in the near future. 
§ 3.10. District Court Practice - Admission to Sufficient Facts - Con-
tinuance Without a Finding - Waiver of Trial on the Mer~ts. * A criminal 
defendant in the District Court Department of the Trial Court of Massa-
chusetts (the "district court") presently has a right to two completely 
independent trials for the same charge.! Under the usual procedure in the 
district courts, the defendant will have a bench trial in the primary 
session, and if he is unhappy with the result, he may then elect to have a 
trial de novo in the jury session, either before ajury or ajudge alone.2 The 
availability of the trial de novo expands the defendant's options at the first 
trial in several important ways.3 
One strategy which may appear more attractive to a defendant in the 
first tier of this two-tier court system is an admission to sufficient facts. 4 In 
Massachusetts, a criminal defendant may plead not guilt~, yet admit to 
facts sufficient for a finding of guilty on the charged offenSe.s In this way 
the defendant can decrease greatly the time and expense involved in 
defending his case and avoid the stigma of a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere. Furthermore, an admission will be attractive to the prosecu-
tion, and may help a defendant secure a lesser charge or a recommenda-
* ANDREW D. SIRKIN, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.10. 1 See O.L. c. 218, §§ 26A, 27A; O.L. c. 278, § 18. 
2 Actually, the defendant must waive his right to ajury trial in the first instance, see D!ST. 
CT. DEPT. SuPP. R. CRIM. P. 2, if he is to obtain two trials. After such waiver the defendant 
gets a bench trial in the primary session, the first tier of the district court system. See O.L. 
c. 218, § 26A. After the trial in the primary session, the defendant has a right to a completely 
new trial in the second tier of the district court, the jury session. [d. While the second tier is 
called the "jury" session, a defendant can opt for a bench trial in the second tier by waiving 
his right to ajury. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 19(a). If the defendant does not waive his right to a 
jury trial in the first instance, his first and only trial wiu be in the jury session. O.L. c. 218, 
§§ 26A, 27A. 
3 Because the defendant is guaranteed a new trial if he wants one, he can use the initial 
bench trial to explore strategies, discover the prosecution's case, ascertain the likely 
penalty, and generally pursue other avenues he might not if he was limited to a single trial on 
the merits. 
4 See K.B. SMITH, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 30 MAS$. PRACTICE SERIES 
§ 1202 (1983). 
5 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(a)(3); see K.B. SMITH, supra note 4, at § 1202. 
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tion of a lighter penalty. 6 It is then up to the judge to decide upon a 
disposition for the case.7 The availability of the de novo trial takes much 
of the risk out of the defendant's admission because if the disposition is 
perceived as too harsh, the defendant can get a whole new trial. 8 
Where the defendant uses an admission in an attempt to secure a more 
lenient disposition, he is often seeking a continuance without a finding. 9 A 
continuance without a finding allows the judge to put the matter over until 
some future date without making a finding as to guilt or innocence. lo 
During the continuance period, the defendant may be released with or 
without probationary supervision, and the trial judge may impose condi-
tions with which the defendant must comply. I 1 A defendant who complies 
with these conditions may sometimes have the charges against him dis-
missed. 12 Thus, the continuance may provide a defendant with an oppor-
tunity to earn a dismissal, and to thereby escape the possibility of trial, 
conviction, sentencing, and a criminal record.13 If, however, the defen-
dant violates the conditions of the continuance, a guilty finding may be 
entered by the district court without a trial on the merits because the 
defendant has already admitted to sufficient facts,14 
A defendant can seek a continuance without a finding from the court 
after a plea of guilty as well as after an admission to sufficient facts. The 
advantage of the admission route, however, is fairly obvious. If the 
defendant does not obtain a continuance, or ifhe does but is subsequently 
found guilty because he violates the terms of his continuance, he may 
simply exercise his right to a de novo trial in the jury session. IS The 
defendant has no de novo appeal right after he makes a guilty plea. 16 In 
other words, a defendant could plead guilty, receive a continuance with-
out a finding, and then be found guilty before the continuance period 
ended. This defendant would have no right to any trial on the merits at this 
6 See K.B. SMITH, supra note 4, at § 1202, at 676. The prosecutor might make conces-
sions because it is in his interest to avoid the time-consuming process of trial where it is 
reasonably possible to do so. 
7 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 28. 
8 See supra notes 1 and 2 and accompanying text. 
9 See K.B. SMITH, supra note 4, at § 1202, at 676. 
10 See O.L. c. 276, § 87; K.B. SMITH, supra note 4, at §§ 1522-23. 
II See Commonwealth v. Brandano, 359 Mass. 332,269 N.E.2d 84 (1971) (interpreting 
O.L. c. 276, § 87). 
12 See id.; Rosenberg v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 59, 360 N.E.2d 333 (1977); Com-
monwealth v. Eaton, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 732, 419 N.E.2d 849 (1981). The procedure is 
complicated if the prosecution objects to the continuance and ultimate dismissal of the case. 
See K.B. SMITH, supra note 4, at §§ 1522-26. 
13 See K.B. SMITH, supra note 4, at § 1522. 
14 See id. at § 1202. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. at § 1199. 
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point.J7 Accordingly, because of the potential denial of constitutional 
rights where a plea of guilty is used to obtain a continuance without a 
finding, substantial procedural safeguards must be observed before the 
guilty plea may be accepted to ensure a knowing and voluntary waiver of 
those rights .18 
Under district court practice, no analogous protection has been available 
to defendants who, rather than pleading guilty, admit to sufficient facts .19 
Admittedly, where the trial de novo is available, such procedural 
safeguards are not necessary. 20 The trial de novo will be available, how-
ever, only where the admission is made in the primary session and the right 
to proceed to the jury session is not waived. 21 It is possible for a defendant 
to admit to sufficient facts in the jury session, or in the primary session after 
he waives his right to proceed to the jury session. 22 An admission made in 
either of those situations is procedurally indistinguishable from a guilty plea 
because the judge can subsequently enter a finding of guilty and the 
defendant will have given up his right to a trial on the merits. 23 In sum-
mary, while a guilty plea and an admission to sufficient eacts have been 
treated differently in terms of the procedural protection given to the 
defendant, the potential for a denial of fundamental constitutional rights 
can be the same in both situations. 
During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Duquette, 24 the Supreme 
Judicial Court considered the use of an admission to sufficient facts in 
conjunction with the continuance without a finding in inst~nces where the 
defendant, if eventually found guilty, will have no right to a trial de novo. 25 
The Court held that such a guilty finding deprives the defendant of his right 
to a jury trial, his right to confront and cross-examine his accusers, and his 
right to call witnesses on his own behalf, unless the defendant has know-
17 See id. 
18 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(c). 
19 See Rule 4, Initial Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts (as amended 
through 1980). Rule 4 states that the protective procedure required before a plea of guilty 
may be accepted is "not ... applicable to a defendant who has pleaded not guilty and at the 
trial admits to a finding offacts sufficient to warrant a finding of guilty." Rule 4 was repealed, 
effective February I, 1981, and the district court practice is now governed by MASS. R. 
CRIM. P. 12(c). 
20 Because the defendant still has a right to a trial on the merits, see supra notes 1 and 2 
and accompanying text, there is no waiver of constitutional rights, and therefore no need to 
ensure that the waiver be knowing and voluntary. The defendant need only waive his right to 
a jury trial in the first instance. See supra note 2. 
21 See G.L. c. 218, §§ 26A, 27A. 
22 See K.B. SMITH, supra note 4, at § 1202. 
23 As with a guilty plea, the defendant no longer has the option of ade novo trial. See 
Commonwealth v. Duquette, 386 Mass. 834, 844-47, 438 N.E.2d 334, 341-43 (1982). 
24 386 Mass. 834, 438 N.E.2d 334 (1982). 
25 [d. at 835, 438 N.E.2d at 336. 
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ingly and voluntarily waived these rights. 26 In addition, the Court outlined 
the proper procedures to be followed whenever an admission is used in the 
jury session or the primary session where the right to proceed to the jury 
session has been waived so that the defendant's constitutional rights will be 
protected. 27 
The defendant Charles Duquette was charged with wilfull and malicious 
destruction of property. 28 In a hearing before a district court judge,29 
Duquette pleaded not guilty, but admitted to sufficient facts. 30 His case was 
continued without a finding for one year on the condition that he make 
restitution to the owner of the damaged property. 31 When Duquette failed 
to comply with this condition, a guilty finding was entered against him.32 
Duquette appealed this finding, seeking a de novo trial in the jury session of 
the district court.33 
In a preliminary hearing before a second-tier district court judge, the 
charge was reduced to wanton injury to property. 34 Duquette, without 
waiving his right to a jury trial, again pleaded not guilty, yet admitted to 
sufficient facts. 35 The judge accepted the admission notwithstanding Mas-
sachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(a)(3) which provides that such 
an admission may only be accepted if the defendant has waived his right to 
a jury trial. 36 The judge then continued the case without a finding for one 
year on the condition that Duquette make restitution.37 Duquette again 
defaulted and a default warrant was issued.38 At a hearing before yet 
another judge in the jury session, Duquette requested that his case be 
restored to the jury session docket for trial. 39 The judge denied this motion, 
26 [d. at 839, 438 N .E.2d at 339. 
27 [d. at 845-46, 438 N.E.2d at 341-42. 
28 [d. at 835, 438 N .E.2d at 336. 
29 The date of this appearance was October 17, 1978. [d. This was prior to the effective 
date of the Court Reorganization Act, Acts of 1978, c. 478, § 343, and the defendant was 
therefore not entitled to first instance jury trial. [d. at 837, 438 N.E.2d at 337. See supra note 
2. 
30 386 Mass. at 835, 438 N.E.2d at 336. 
31 [d. 
32 [d. 
33 [d. This appeal occurred after the effective date of the Court Reorganization Act, Acts 
of 1978, c. 478, § 343, and the defendant was therefore entitled to a trial de novo in the district 
court jury session. [d. See supra notes I and 2 and accompanying text. 
34 386 Mass. at 835, 438 N.E.2d at 337. 
35 [d. at 835-36, 438 N.E.2d at 337. 
36 /d. 
37 [d. at 836,438 N.E.2d at 337. 
38 /d. 
39 [d. 
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entering a guilty finding pursuant to the modified complaint, and imposed 
sentence.40 The defendant then appealed the guilty findiJlg.41 
Before the Supreme Judicial Court, Duquette argued that the guilty 
finding was erroneous because either he had been deprived of his statutory 
right to a jury trial or an involuntary guilty plea had been imposed upon 
him.42 Under Massachusetts law, Duquette asserted, a defendant who has 
appealed to the jury session of the district court cannot be tried by a judge 
unless he has waived his right to be tried by a jury. 43 Mor¢Qver, Duquette 
maintained, it was error for the judge to accept his adm~sion in a non-
jury-waived session.44 Because he had not waived his right to be tried by a 
jury, Duquette argued, the guilty finding of the jury session district judge 
could not be considered the result of a valid bench trial or a valid admis-
sion.45 As such, Duquette asserted, it amounted to the itnposition of an 
involuntary46 guilty plea.47 
In response to Duquette's argument, the Commonwealth asserted the 
defendant's admission to sufficient facts eliminated all factual issues, and 
therefore left nothing for a jury to try. 48 The defendant had waived his 
right to a jury trial, argued the Commonwealth, when ,he admitted to 
sufficient facts before a jury session district courtjudge.49 Moreover, the 
40 [d. "The third judge found that (I) the defendant had made no waiver, oral or written, 
of his right to trial by jury, (2) the defendant had not offered to change his plea of not guilty, 
and (3) it could not be determined whether a statement of facts as to the allegations of the 
complaint was made to the [second) justice .... " [d. (footnote omitted). 
41 [d. 
42 [d. at 839, 438 N.E.2d at 339. 
43 [d. at 839-40,438 N.E.2d at 339 (citing G.L. c. 218, § 27A). In order to waive his right 
to a jury trial, defendant must sign a written waiver and file it with the clerk of the court. 
G.L. c. 263, § 6; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 19(a). In addition, the judge must be satisfied that the 
waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made, and to this end, must conduct a colloquy with the 
defendant. Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 509-10, 392 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 
(1979); DIST. CT. DEPT. SuPP. R. CRIM. P. 2. 
44 386 Mass. at 838-39, 438 N.E.2d at 338. 
45 [d. at 839, 438 N.E.2d at 338. 
46 A guilty plea is assumed to be involuntary absent an affirmative showing by the state 
that it was knowingly and voluntarily made. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U;S. 238, 242 (1969); 
Commonwealth v. Morrow, 363 Mass. 601, 604, 296 N.E.2d 468, 472 (1973); Huot v. 
Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 91, 99-100, 292 N.E.2d 700, 706 (1973). Moreover, the judge 
must insure, on the record, that the defendant is aware of the constitutional rights he is 
waiving by pleading guilty. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(3). Neither of these requirements was 
met in Duquette. 386 Mass. at 841, 438 N.E.2d at 339. The Duquette Court noted: "There 
has been no showing that the defendant was questioned ... concerning the voluntariness of 
his 'plea.' Indeed, there is no evidence that the defendant was informed! at the hearing that 
his admission to sufficient facts would be treated as a plea of guilty." [d. at 841-42, 438 
N.E.2d at 340. The Court also acknowledged the lower court judge's finding that "[t)he 
defendant did not offer to change his plea of 'not guilty,' " /d. at 841, 438 N.E.2d at 339. 
47 /d. at 841, 438 N.E.2d at 339. 
48 [d. 
49 [d. at 840, 438 N.E.2d at 339. 
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Commonwealth asserted, even if the admission did not amount to a 
waiver by the defendant of his right to a jury trial, it did amount to a 
change of plea from not guilty to guilty and therefore eliminated the need 
for atrial. 50 
The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the defendant Duquette's con-
tentions and overturned the guilty findingY The Court explained that 
once defendant had appealed to the jury session of the district court, he 
had a right to a trial by jury. 52 In order to waive this right, the Court 
noted, defendant would have to file a signed, written waiver with the court 
clerk.53 Because Duquette made no such waiver, the Court stated, he had 
to be tried before a jury rather than a judge.54 The Commonwealth's 
assertion that the admission provided a factual basis for the guilty finding 
by the jury session district court judge was irrelevant, the Court noted, 
since Duquette had a right to be tried by a jury rather than a judge.55 
Accordingly, the Court held, the judge's guilty finding, absent a signed 
waiver of the jury trial right, cannot be considered the result of a valid 
bench trial.56 
Without a valid bench trial, the Court continued, Duquette could not 
have been found guilty unless he pleaded guilty.57 Duquette, the Court 
noted, did not offer to change his plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty.58 
Even if the jury session district court judge had chosen to treat defen-
dant's admission as equivalent to a guilty plea, the Court added, no guilty 
plea may be accepted without an affirmative showing that the defendant 
SOld. at 841, 438 N.E.2d at 339. The Commonwealth also argued that, pursuant to 
DlST.!MuN. CTS. SuPP. R. ClY. P. II4(a)(2)-(7), applicable to criminal proceedings under 
former Rule II of the Initial Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts, defendant 
lost his right to question the constitutionality of the process by which he was convicted 
because he didn't preserve the record of the hearing. Id. at 842, 438 N.E.2d at 340. The 
Court rejected this argument. Id. The Court reasoned that under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
U.S. 238 (1969), the Commonwealth has a constitutionally imposed burden to prove the 
voluntariness of every guilty plea. 386 Mass. at 842, 438 N.E.2d at 340. Defendant's failure 
to preserve a record, although a violation of Rule II, does not remove this burden. Id. 
Accordingly, the Court stated, the Commonwealth in such a case must "take proof from 
witnesses to reconstruct what occurred in the court when the plea was made." Id. (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Foster, 368 Mass. 100, 108 n.6, 330 N.E.2d 155, 160 n.6. (1975)). In 
Duquette, the Court noted, the Commonwealth did not even claim to be able to do this. Id. 
51 Id. at 839, 438 N.E.2d at 339. 
52 Id. at 839-40, 438 N.E.2d at 340. 
53 Id. at 840, 438 N .E.2d at 340. See supra note 2. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 841, 438 N.E.2d at 340. 
58 Id. 
89
Reilly: Chapter 3: Criminal Law and Procedure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1982
132 1982 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 3.10 
acted voluntarily and understood the consequences of his plea. 59 With no 
such showing in the case before it, the Court stated, Duquette's admission 
could not be treated as a valid guilty plea.60 The Court con¢luded that the 
defendant was entitled to a full jury trial and remanded the case to the jury 
session of the district court for trial before a jury of six.61 
The Court went on to specify the proper procedures for the use of an 
admission in the jury session of the district court.62 The C<ilurt noted that 
the jury session represents a defendant's last opportunity for atrial. 63 
Moreover, the Court stated, under current district court procedures, 
where a defendant receives a continuance judges are required to enter a 
guilty finding if the defendant violates a condition of that continuance.64 
Consequently, the Court noted, a defendant who admits to 'sufficient facts 
in order to obtain a continuance in the jury session wa~ves significant 
constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial, the right to confront 
and cross-examine one's accuser, and the right to call witnesses on one's 
own behalf. 65 It is imperative, the Court stated, that the defendant know 
and understand that he is waiving these rights. 66 
59 [d. (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) and Commonwealth v. 
Morrow, 363 Mass. 601, 604, 296 N.E.2d 468, 472 (1973». 
60 !d. 
61 [d. at 847, 438 N .E.2d at 343. 
62 [d. at 845, 438 N.E.2d at 342. The procedures outlined by the (:ourt need not be 
followed when an admission is used in the primary session of the district'court, because the 
defendant, if convicted, still has a right to a trial de novo in the jury session. [d. at 846, 438 
N.E.2d at 342. Nevertheless, even in the primary session, defendant must validly waive his 
right to an immediate jury trial. [d. In addition, if a defendant in the primary session, as a 
condition of obtaining his continuance, waives his right to a trial de n@vo, the admission 
should be treated as if it occurred in the jury session, and the procedures outlined by the 
Duquette Court should be followed. [d. at 847,438 N .E.2d at 343. This is because the finding 
of the first tier court "would then have the finality normally associated with second tier 
proceedings." [d. 
63 [d. at 844, 438 N .E.2d at 341. 
64 [d. at 839 & n.5, 438 N.E.2d 338-39 & n.5. This procedure is required by a memoran-
dum of the Chief Justice for the District Courts, dated October 15, 1979. The memorandum, 
as quoted by the Duquette. Court, reads, in relevant part: 
2. Action in Cases Returned After a Continuance Without a Finding in the Jury 
Session. If a case is continued without a finding and returned to the primary court, the 
primary court should ... ifit finds that the terms have been violated, proceed to enter 
the guilty finding ... . 
Judges sitting in the jury session should inform defendants whose cases they may be 
inclined to continue without a finding that, should they violate the conditions of the 
continuance, ... there is no right to de novo appeal thereafter. 
[d. at 839 n.5, 438 N.E.2d 338-39 n.5 (emphasis in original). 
6S [d. at 839-41, 438 N.E.2d 339-40. 
66 [d. 
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To insure that the defendant knows and understands the rights he is 
waiving, the Court outlined a six step procedure to be followed whenever 
an admission is used at the second tier of the district court.67 First, as 
required by Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(a)(3), the defen-
dant must validly waive his right to a jury trial.68 Second, the facts which 
the defendant is admitting should be formalized in a written document and 
filed with the papers of the case. 69 Third, the judge should satisfy himself 
that there is a factual basis for a guilty finding, so that he can make such a 
finding if defendant fails to comply with the conditions of the con-
tinuance.7o Fourth, the judge must inform the defendant that he is waiving 
his rights to confront and cross-examine his accusers, and to call witnesses 
on his own behalf, and question the defendant to make sure he understands 
these rights. 71 Informing and questioning the defendant in this regard, the 
judge should treat the admission as if it were a guilty plea, and follow the 
procedures outlined in Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 for 
the acceptance of guilty pleas. 72 Fifth, after the judge complies with these 
requirements, he may enter the admission in the record and continu~ the 
case or treat the admission as a guilty plea, and impose a guilty finding.73 
Sixth, if the judge continues the case and if the conditions of the con-
tinuance are violated, the judge may enter a finding of guilty provided he is 
satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.74 
The IDOst significant aspect of the Duquette decision is the Court's 
holding that in instances where an admission to sufficient facts will or may 
have the same procedural effect as a guilty plea, the judge must follow 
similar procedures prior to accepting the admission as would be followed 
prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea.75 This ruling applies where an 
admission is used in instances when the'defendant will have no right to a 
trial de novo iffound guilty. 76 Thus, a defendant in the primary session who 
has waived his right to a trial de novo, as well as a defendant in the jury 
session, who has no right to a trial de novo, may admit to sufficient facts 
only after the judge has explained to these defendants that by admitting to 
sufficient facts they are waiving their right to confront and cross-examine 
67 Id. at 845-46, 438 N.E.2d at 342. 
68 Id. at 845, 438 N.E.2d at 342. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. This procedure is required by DIST. CT. DEPT. SuPP. R. CRIM. P. 3, which reads: 
The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty nor make a finding of guilty 
upon the defendant admitting to a finding of facts sufficient to warrant the same, unless 
it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for such plea or finding. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 945-46, 438 N.E.2d at 342. 
74 Id. 
7S See supra text accompanying notes 81-83. Compare supra note 22. 
76 386 Mass. at 845, 847, 438 N .E.2d at 342, 343. 
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accusers and to call witnesses on their own behalf.77 Thereafter, the judge 
must question these defendants to insure that they understand these rights, 
and are waiving them knowingly and voluntarily.7s 
The Duquette Court did not hold, however, that other procedural 
safeguards required by Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 for 
the acceptance of guilty pleas must also be employed for admissions which 
have or may have the same procedural effect as guilty pleas. Accordingly, 
a defendant who admits to sufficient facts with no right to a trial de novo, 
unlike a defendant who pleads guilty, has no right to have the judge 
informed that his plea was made as part of a plea bargaining agreement,79 
Similarly, the admitting defendant, unlike the defendant who pleads guilty, 
has no right to be informed prior to his admission of the maximum possible 
sentence he could receive, or of the judge's intention to follow or not follow 
the prosecutor's sentencing recommendations. so FinallY, the admitting 
defendant, unlike the defendant who pleads guilty, has no right to withdraw 
his admission if the judge, after accepting the admission, decides to exceed 
the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation.S ! Thus, even after the 
Duquette decision, greater procedural safeguards surround guilty pleas 
than admissions, even where the latter may have an identical procedural 
effect. 
The Duquette Court's procedural requirements with regard to admis-
sions will not substantially alter district court procedure .. Massachusetts 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(a)(3) already requires that a defendant 
waive his right to a jury trial prior to admitting to sufficient facts. The 
Duquette Court, however, made it clear that if, by some error, the 
defendant does not validly waive this right prior to his admission, he will 
be entitled to a jury trial notwithstanding that admission. 82 Similarly, 
District Court Department Supplemental Rule of Criminal Procedure 3 
already requires that the judge satisfy himself that there is a factual basis 
for a finding of guilty before imposing such a finding based on an admis-
sion. The Duquette Court simply made this inquiry by the judge a precon-
dition to the acceptance of the admission,83 thereby formalizing what had 
already been the prevailing district court practice. Finally, the Duquette 
Court's suggestion that the defendant's admission be formalized in writ-
ten stipulations84 simply affirms the prevailing district court practice, at 
77 /d. 
78 Id. 
79 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(c). 
80 Id. 
8! Id. 
82 386 Mass. at 840-41, 438 N.E.2d at 339 (1982). 
83 Id. at 845-46, 438 N.E.2d at 342. 
84 Id. at 845, 438 N.E.2d at 342. 
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least in cases where an admission is used in conjunction with a con-
tinuance without a finding. 85 
With regard to the continuance without a finding, several aspects of the 
Duquette decision are significant. First, the Duquette Court made clear 
that a defendant's violation of the conditions of his continuance will not 
affect that defendant's right to either a jury or non-jury trial. 86 Accord-
ingly, a defendant, such as Mr. Duquette, who has not validly waived 
these rights, is entitled to receive either a jury or non-jury trial notwith-
standing his violation of the conditions of his continuance. 87 Second, the 
Duquette Court expressed approval ofthe use of the continuance without 
a finding, citing the substantial benefits derived from the practice by the 
prosecutor, the defendant, and the community.88 According to the 
Duquette Court, the prosecutor benefits because he avoids the great time 
and expense involved in trial and sentencing. 89 The defendant benefits, 
the Court noted, by obtaining an opportunity to avoid the consequences 
of a criminal conviction. 90 Finally, the Court stated, the community 
benefits because the risk of recidivism is reduced and court dockets are 
lightened. 91 The Duquette Court specifically stated that its decision did 
not preclude the use of the continuance at either tier of the district court. 92 
The Duquette decision, however, was silent with regard to the adminis-
tration of the continuance program. Consequently, the selection of defen-
dants who are eligible for the program will continue to be informal, guided 
only by unwritten custom. Similarly, the extent to which a defendant may 
appeal the decision not to grant a continuance, the decision to revoke the 
continuance, or the decision not to dismiss the case at the conclusion of 
the continuance remains uncertain. The field remains open for a defendant 
to appeal any of these decisions, as well as to challenge the validity of this 
disposition as a whole or the manner in which it is administered on 
constitutional grounds. 93 
85 M. L. GREENBERG, Criminal Bench Trials in the District Court: A View from the 
Bench, in MONOGRAPH THREE: BENCH TRIALS 93-94 (M.C.L.E. 1981). 
86 386 Mass. at 843-44, 438 N.E.2d at 341. 
87 [d. 
88 [d. at 843, 438 N.E.2d at 341. 
89 [d. 
90 /d. 
91 [d. 
92 [d. 
93 See, e.g., People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 113 Cal. Rptr. 
21, 520 P.2d 465 (1974) (requirement that district attorney concur with judge's decision to 
divert trial held unconstitutional): State v. Nolfi, 141 N.J. Super. 528, 358 A.2d 853 (1976) 
(automatic exclusion of nonresidents from trial diversion program held unconstitutional). 
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§ 3.11. Warrantless Automobile Searches. * One of the most difficult 
problems associated with the fourth amendment is its application to 
searches involving automobiles. As a general rule, the fourth amendment 
requires that law enforcement officials obtain a warrant before making a 
search.! In Carroll v. United States,2 however, the United States Su-
preme Court held that automobiles, due to their inherent m(i)bility, may be 
searched without a warrant if both probable cause for the search and 
exigent circumstances are present. 3 In the years since Carroll, the Su-
preme Court has on a number of occasions addressed the question of 
when and to what extent a warrantless search of an automobile is con-
stitutionally permissible.4 Recent decisions reflect an ongoing transition in 
this area of the laws manifested by the Court's adoption of several over-
lapping exceptions to the general warrant requirement applicable to au-
tomobile searches. 6 
* RICHARD J. McCREADY, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.11. 1 Warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment 
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
2 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
3 Id. at 149-53. 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2159 (1982) (vehicle legitimately 
stopped may be searched as thoroughly as a magistrate could authorize by warrant, if there 
is probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed in the vehicle); Robbins v. 
California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) (containers found in vehicle during a lawful warrantless 
search may not themselves be opened without a warrant) (overruled by Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 
2172); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981) (passenger compartment of 
automobile, including containers found therein, may be searched incident to the lawful 
arrest of the occupant of the vehicle without a warrant); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U. S. 443, 465-66 (1971) (no exigent circumstances justifying warrantless search of automo-
bile parked in the driveway of the defendant's home, after the defendant. was arrested there 
under an arrest warrant); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (where police have 
probable cause to search a vehicle on a public roadway, they may seize the vehicle and later 
conduct a warrantless search at the station house, despite the fact that exigent circum-
stances are no longer present); Dyke v. Taylor Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968) (probable cause 
to believe that an instrumentality or evidence of a crime is concealed in an automobile must 
be present in order for officers to conduct a warrantless search). 
S See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), overruling Robbins v. California, 453 
U.S. 420 (1981). 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1982) (applying Carroll automo-
bile exception to allow the warrantless search of a vehicle and any containers found therein 
where there was probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband as well as 
exigent circumstances); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981) (applying the search 
incident to a lawful arrest exception to permit a limited warrantless searCh of the arrestee's 
vehicle even where there is no probable cause to search the vehicle); ~dams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143, 145-49 (1972) (applying stop and frisk exception to permit a warrantless 
"frisk" to extend into the interior of a car where officer had a reasonable, "articulable 
suspicion" that his safety might be threatened by the occupant of the vehicle, despite the 
absence of probable cause). 
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Three cases decided in Massachusetts during the Survey year illustrate 
the variety of situations encompassed by present constitutional doctrines 
permitting warrantless automobile searches. In Commonwealth v. Minh 
Ngo,7 Commonwealth v. Beasley,S and Commonwealth v. Loughlin, 9 the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals Court further 
delineated the circumstances under which a warrantless search of an 
automobile will be upheld as well as the permissible scope of such a 
search in view of the circumstances presented. Each of these decisions 
presents an automobile search which the Commonwealth attempted to 
justify under a distinct, judicially recognized exception to the general 
warrant requirement. lo Specifically, the exceptions raised in support of 
the automobile searches undertaken in these cases were the automobile 
exception established in Carroll, II the search incident to a lawful arrest 
exception,i2 and the stop and frisk exception,13 
The automobile exception received treatment from the Appeals Court 
7 14 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 439 N .E.2d 839 (1982). 
8 13 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 430 N.E.2d 437 (1982). 
9 385 Mass. 60, 430 N .E.2d 823 (1982). 
10 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Minh Ngo, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 340 & n.l, 439 N.E.2d 
839, 840 & n.l (1982) (Commonwealth relying on automobile exception to justify search); 
Commonwealth v. Beasley, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 64, 430 N.E.2d 437, 438 (1982) (Court 
relying on search incident to lawful arrest exception in partially upholding search of defen-
dant's vehicle after he was arrested); Commonwealth v. Loughlin, 385 Mass. 60,62,430 
N .E.2d 823, 824 (1982) (Commonwealth relying on stop and frisk doctrine to justify protec-
tive search for weapons; alternatively relying on "consent" exception to support search of 
the automobile). 
11 See Commonwealth v. Minh Ngo, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 340 & n.l, 439 N.E.2d 839, 
840 & n.!. The automobile exception was established in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132 (1925). See supra notes 2, 3 and accompanying text, infra notes 43-46, 76 and accom-
panying text. 
12 See Commonwealth v. Beasley, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 64, 430 N.E.2d 437, 438. For 
cases developing the search incident to arrest exception, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752 (1969) and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). See infra notes 34-42, 64-69, 72-76 
and accompanying text. 
13 See Commonwealth v. Loughlin, 385 Mass. 60, 62, 430 N.E.2d 823, 824. The stop and 
frisk exception was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. I (1968). The Court in Terry held: 
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the 
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the 
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes 
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to 
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection 
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer 
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to 
assault him. 
/d. at 30. 
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in the decision of Commonwealth v. Minh NgoY In Minh Ngo, the 
Chelsea police arrested a person who was a major buyer of drugs from the 
defendant. ls The buyer agreed to cooperate with the authorities and, at 
the request of a federal agent, telephoned the defendant and arranged a 
drug deal to take place later that same day.16 The buyer telephoned the 
defendant to arrange the purchase at approximately 1:00p.m.; the meet-
ing was to take place at 3:00 p.m,17 During the two hour interim period 
between the phone call and the proposed meeting, the federal agent 
assembled a surveillance team comprised of both federal and local police 
officers. 18 The buyer agreed with the police that he would meet with the 
defendant and give a signal to the police if the defendant had heroin with 
him.19 Although the defendant failed to appear at the appointed time and 
location, a phone call from the buyer resulted in another proposed meet-
ing at a new location.20 The defendant was sitting in his iparked automo-
bile when the buyer and surveillance team arrived. 21 The buyer entered 
the defendant's vehicle and shortly thereafter signalled the police that the 
defendant had heroin with him.22 The police then arrested the defendant, 
conducted a warrantless search of his automobile, and sei~ed the drugs. 23 
At trial the defendant moved to suppress the drugs seized from his 
automobile, contending that no exigent circumstances j\.lstified the war-
rantless search.24 The trial judge ruled that the prosecution had met its 
burden of justifying the warrantless search under the automobile excep-
tion and denied the motion. 2s The defendant then petitioned for review of 
the denial in the Appeals Court. 26 
The Appeals Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's 
motion. 27 The Appeals Court agreed that the warrantless search of the 
vehicle was proper under the automobile exception be~ause there was 
probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband,28 and exigent 
14 14 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 439 N.E.2d 839 (1982). 
15 Id. at 339, 439 N.E.2d at 839. 
16 Id. at 339-40, 439 N.E.2d at 839. 
17 Id. at 341, 439 N.E.2d at 839. 
18 Id. at 340, 439 N.E.2d at 839. 
19Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 340, 439 N.E.2d at 840. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24Id. at 340-41, 439 N.E.2d at 840. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 340, 439 N .E.2d at 840. The defendant conceded that probable cause was present. 
Id. at 341, 439 N.E.2d at 840. 
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circumstances surrounded the search.29 According to the court, probable 
cause arose at the time of the 1:00 p.m. phone call made by the buyer to 
the defendant. 30 The court relied primarily on two factors in reaching the 
conclusion that exigent circumstances prevented the police from obtain-
ing a warrant.31 First, a considerable amount of time was necessary to 
assemble and position a surveillance team.32 Second, the two hour period 
was not a sufficient amount of time to collect the information concerning 
the defendant, reduce it to affidavit form, and go before a magistrate to 
obtain a search warrant.33 
It is interesting to note that although the trial judge specifically found 
that the search of the defendant's vehicle took place after he was ar-
rested,34 the Appeals Court did not consider the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in New York v. Belton35 to be controlling.36 In Belton, 
the United States Supreme Court held that police may conduct a warrant-
less search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle after they have 
lawfully arrested the occupant of the vehicle. 37 The Belton decision rested 
upon the search incident to lawful arrest exception, rather than the auto-
mobile exception, to the general warrant requirement. 38 The Common-
wealth, at the suppression hearing in Minh Ngo, specifically disavowed 
29 /d. at 340, 439 N.E.2d at 840. 
30 [d. at 341. 439 N.E.2d at 840. 
31 Id.The defendant contended that, although the police did not know what vehicle the 
defendant would be driving prior to the arrest and search, they nonetheless had time to 
obtain an "anticipatory warrant," leaving certain information to be filled in at the time of the 
search. /d. at 342, 439 N.E.2d at 840-41; Commonwealth v. Soares, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1696, 424 N.E.2d 221. The court determined that considering all the circumstances, two 
hours was too short a time for the police to obtain any warrant. 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 341,439 
N.E.2d at 840. 
32 /d. 
33 ld. The court noted that the defendant had been the subject of a police investigation for 
a long period of time and that a large amount of information and material had been collected 
by the police concerning the defendant. /d. 
34 [d. at 340 n.l, 439 N.E.2d at 840 n.1. 
35 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
36 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 340-41 n.l, 439 N.E.2d at 840 n.!. 
'37 453 U.S. at 460-61. The Court in Belton further stated: 
[d. 
[P]olice may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger 
compartment, for ifthe passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also 
will containers in it be within his reach . . . such a container may, of course, be 
searched whether it is opened or closed, since the justification for the search is not 
that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial 
arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have. 
38 Compare New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search incident to arrest excep-
tion) with Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (overruled by United States v. Ross, 
102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982» (automobile exception). 
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justifying the search of the defendant's vehicle as a search incident to a 
lawful arrest. 39 Instead, the Commonwealth stated that it was relying on 
the automobile exception to support the warrantless search.40 The Com-
monwealth's choice of the automobile exception rather than the search 
incident to lawful arrest exception can likely be attributed to the uncer-
tainty surrounding the application of the latter exception in the context of 
post-arrest automobile searches prior to the Belton decision.41 More 
significant than the underlying reasons for the Commonwealth's choice, 
however, is the fact that the Appeals Court confined its analysis to the 
particular exception chosen by the Commonwealth.42 
In addition to not applying the Supreme Court's holding in Belton, the 
Appeals Court in Minh Ngo further stated that it was not relying on the 
United States Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement regarding the 
automobile exception, United States v. Ross, 43 to uphold the trial court's 
decision.44 The Ross Court held that where police have probable cause to 
search a legitimately stopped automobile, a search as thorough as that 
which could be authorized in a magistrate's warrant may be conducted 
without a warrant.45 The Appeals Court in Minh Ngo expressed its 
uncertainty concerning whether the Ross holding could be applied in the 
present case, because the car searched was parked rather than stopped by 
the police.46 
39 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 340-41 nJ, 439 N.E.2d at 840 n.l. 
40 ld. 
41 Belton was decided after the Minh Ngo suppression hearing. ld, Prior to Belton no 
Supreme Court decision had been rendered applying the search incident to a lawful arrest 
exception to a post-arrest automobile search. Thus, the limits on the exception as posited in 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), would have been controlling. In Chimel, the 
Court held that the area within the immediate reach of an arrestee, at the time he is arrested, 
may be searched without a warrant. 395 U.S. at 763. 
Although the Court in Belton held that despite the arrestee no longer being in the 
automobile, it could be searched incident to a lawful arrest, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), it 
would not have been unreasonable for a court, relying on Chimel alone, to have concluded 
that no search incident to a lawful arrest could extend into the interior of ail. automobile 
when its occupant was placed under arrest outside of the vehicle. 
42 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 340-41 n.l, 439 N.E.2d at 840 n.l. The Court stated that because 
the defendant's evidence at the suppression hearing was "pitched toward the automobile 
exception," as a result of the Commonwealth's statement, it did not consider Belton, 453 
U.S. 454 (1981), to be dispositive. 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 340-41 n.l, 439 N .E.2d at 840 n.l. 
43 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). 
44 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 341 n.2, 439 N.E.2d at 840 n.2. 
45 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2159 (1982). 
46 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 341 n.2, 439 N.E.2d at 840 n.2. The AppeaiJS Court cited Justice 
Marshall's dissent in Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2174 (1982). In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Marshall stated: "The Court confines its holding today to automobiles stopped on the 
highway which police have probable cause to believe contain contraband. I do not under-
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The Minh Ngo decision apparently stands for the proposition that a 
planned search of a vehicle, based on probable cause arising several hours 
prior to the search, does not per se preclude a finding of exigent circum-
stances. Specifically, where probable cause arises at a time prior to the 
intended search and it is administratively impracticable to take the time to 
complete the procedures necessary to obtain a search warrant, exigent 
circumstances may be found which alleviate the search warrant require-
ment. Whether the two hour lapse of time presented in the Minh N go case 
will rise to the level of a "safe haven" period on which officers may rely 
in deciding not to obtain a warrant cannot be posited with absolute 
certainty. Because the Appeals Court cited more than one factor in 
support of its finding of exigent circumstances, the time element may not 
in itself have been the controlling factor on which the appeals court 
predicated its holding.47 
While the Commonwealth relied on the automobile exception to justify 
the warrantless automobile search in Minh Ngo, in Commonwealth v. 
Beasley48 the government resorted to another exception, the search inci-
dent to a lawful arrest exception, to support the warrantless search of the 
defendant's automobile.49 In Beasley, the defendant pulled off to the side 
of a deserted section of the roadway in Milton at approximately 1: 30 a.m. 
in response to the flashing of a police cruiser spotlight.50 The police 
cruiser was sitting alongside another cruiser on the side of the road.5! The 
trooper who flashed his spotlight stated that he did not intend to stop the 
defendant, but rather he flashed the light to warn the defendant to slow 
down. 52 Nevertheless, when the defendant pulled over and stopped, both 
the troopers and the defendant alighted from their vehicles.53 After briefly 
conversing, the troopers walked the defendant back to his automobile and 
one of the troopers looked into the vehicle with his flashlight and spotted 
marijuana. 54 The trooper entered the car and removed both the marijuana 
and some fireworks which he observed on the front seat floor. 55 After 
arresting the defendant,56 one of the troopers searched the glove com-
stand the Court to address the applicability of the automobile exception rule announced 
today to parked cars. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1970." 102 S. Ct. at 
2174. 
47 See 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 341, 439 N.E.2d at 840. See also supra notes 31-33 and 
accompanying text. 
48 13 Mass. App. ct. 62, 430 N.E.2d 437 (1982). 
49 Id. at 64-65, 430 N .E.2d at 438. 
50 Id. at 63, 430 N.E.2d at 437-38. 
51 Id. at 63, 430 N.E.2d at 437. 
52 Id. at 63, 430 N.E.2d at 437-38. 
53 Id. at 63, 430 N.E.2d at 438. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. Defendant was arrested for possession of fireworks. Id. 
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partment and removed an envelope, which he opened and found to con-
tain money. 57 The troopers then asked the defendant if they could search 
the trunk.58 The defendant apparently indicated in some way that they 
could.59 The troopers found revolvers and ammunition in the trunk which 
they seized.60 
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress both the envelope contained 
in the glove compartment and the revolvers and ammunition found in the 
trunk of the defendant's automobile. 61 The trial judge granted the motion 
as to all of those items. 62 The Appeals Court reversed the trial court's 
decision to suppress the envelope, but upheld its decision to suppress the 
revolvers and ammunition.63 
In overruling the suppression of the envelope found in the glove com-
partment, the Appeals Court relied on the United States Supreme Court's 
holding in New York v. Belton, 64 decided after the lower ~urt's ruling.65 
The Belton 'decision, which upheld a post-arrest search of the passenger 
compartment of an arrestee's vehicle,66 specifically included a closed 
glove compartment in its definition of "containers" that may be searched 
within a vehicle under the search incident to lawful arrest exception. 67 
The Beasley court held, therefore, that a warrantless search of a glove 
compartment is permissible if made incident to a lawful arrest. 68 
With respect to the search ofthe trunk ofthe defendant's car, however, 
the Appeals Court noted that the Belton decision limits the scope of a 
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest to the interior of the auto-
mobile and does not extend to the trunk.69 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded, the warrantless search of the defendant's trunk in; Beasley could 
not be justified as incident to a lawful arrest. 70 The Appeals; Court rejected 
the Commonwealth's contention that the defendant consented to the 
trunk search, abiding by the lower court's finding that the burden of 
57 [d. at 64, 430 N.E.2d at 438. 
58 [d. 
59 [d. 
60 [d. 
61 [d. at 63, 430 N.E.2d at 437. 
62 [d. 
63 /d. 
64 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
65 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 64, 430 N.E.2d at 438. 
66 See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. 
67 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 n.4 (1981). The Court included within its definition of "container" 
luggage, boxes, bags, clothing or any other opened or closed receptacle found within the 
interior of the automobile. Id. 
68 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 64, 430 N.E.2d at 438. 
69 Id. at 64 nJ, 430 N.E.2d at 438 n.l. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 n.4 
(1981). 
70 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 64-65, 430 N.E.2d at 438. 
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establishing "free, voluntary" consent, "unfettered by coercion," had 
not been met by the Commonwealth. 71 
It should be noted that the Appeals Court decided Beasley before the 
United States Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. 
Ross.72 In Ross, the Court held that where there is probable cause to 
believe that contraband may be found somewhere in a vehicle that has 
been lawfully stopped, the officers may conduct a search, without a 
warrant, "as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant" 
under the circumstances. 73 The Supreme Court did not expressly mention 
the effect of its holding in Ross on the prior limitations on a search 
incident to a lawful arrest which were established in Belton. 74 It would be 
reasonable to infer, however, that once a search incident to a lawful arrest 
has led to a discovery of contraband in the passenger compartment of an 
automobile, the probable cause necessary to justify a warrantless search 
of the trunk of the vehicle arises. The Supreme Court's decision in Ross 
lends support to this inference by expressly rejecting its prior decision in 
Robbins v. Cal(f'ornia,75 a case whose facts are substantially similar to 
those in Beasley. 76 Consequently, the Beasley decision, insofar as it 
upholds the suppression of evidence found as a result of the search of the 
defendant's trunk, is of questionable validity in light of Ross. 
71 /d. The court noted that the defendant was under arrest and guarded by at least two 
officers when he allegedly consented to the trunk search. Jd. at 65, 430 N.E.2d at 438. In 
addition, the keys to the vehicle had been taken from the defendant without his permission 
and he was not informed of his right to refuse consent. Jd. 
72 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). 
73 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2159. 
74 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). In Ross, the government did not argue before the Supreme 
Court that the warrantless search of a container found in the defendant's vehicle was 
justified as incident to a lawful arrest. See 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2161 n.2 (1982). 
7S 453 U.S. 420 (1981). 
76 In Robbins, the defendant was stopped early in the morning by officers because he had 
been driving erratically. 453 lJ .S. 420, 422 (1981). The defendant alighted from his vehicle 
and approached the patrol car. /d. When asked for his license and registration, he returned 
to his car accompanied by the officers, opened the car door, and the officers smelled 
marijuana smoke. Jd. One of the officers patted down the petitioner and found a vial of 
liquid. /d. The officer then searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle and discov-
ered marijuana. Jd. The police officers then opened the tailgate of the defendant's station 
wagon and raised the cover of a recessed luggage compartment./d. In the compartment they 
found two packages wrapped in green plastic which they opened, finding more marijuana 
contained in each. /d. 
The Robbins Court, while considering the search of the luggage compartment permissible 
under the automobile exception, held that the green plastic containers could not be opened 
without a warrant. /d. at 428-29. The Court in Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), overturned 
Robbins, holding that containers found during a legitimate automobile exception search may 
be themselves opened and searched if there is probable cause to believe they contain 
contraband. 102 S. Ct. at 2172. 
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In Commonwealth v. Loughlin,77 the Supreme Judicial Court consid-
ered the application of yet another exception to the general rule requiring 
a search warrant, the stop and frisk exception, in the cont~xt of a warrant-
less automobile search.78 Defendants Loughlin and Searle!! were the occu-
pants of a Chevrolet EI Camino that a state police trooper ~bserved parked 
in the breakdown lane on a deserted, poorly lit portion of a highway at 
1:00 a.m.79 The trooper pulled up behind the vehicle,! whose distress 
signals Were flashing, and observed the defendant Loughlin standing at 
the right rear of the vehicle.80 When the police cruiser st(J)pped, Loughlin 
walked quickly to the open passenger door and entered the vehicle. The 
defendant Searles, sitting in the driver's seat, ducked! out of sight.81 
Searles then jumped from the vehicle and approached the trooper.82 
Searles immediately produced both his license and the vehicle registration 
and then returned to his seat, at the trooper's request. 83 The trooper then 
asked the passenger Loughlin for identification.84 Loughl~n responded by 
giving his name and address, but produced no other ideqtification.8s The 
trooper then ordered Loughlin from the vehicle; "pat-fmsked" him and 
removed wads of money from his pockets, which Loughli~, in response to 
questioning, had informed the trooper were "cigar~ttes. "86 Subse-
quently, the trooper ordered Searles from the vehicle and commanded 
both of the defendants to lean "spread eagle" over the front of the 
vehicle.87 The trooper asked if there were any weapons in the vehicle and 
Searles responded, "No weapons. You can check. '~88 The trooper 
searched the interior of the vehicle and found no wea.,ons.89 He then 
asked if there were weapons in the back of the vehicle ahd Searles again 
responded, "No, you can check."90 The flatbed of the vehicle was cov-
ered by a canvas, which the officer pulled aside. 91 He found marijuana in 
the course of the search, and arrested the defendants.92 
Both defendants moved to suppress the marijuana seized from the rear 
77 385 Mass. 60, 430 N.E.2d 823 (1982). 
78 Id. at 62, 430 N.E.2d at 824. 
79 Id. at 61, 430 N.E.2d at 824. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 !d. at 61-62, 430 N.E.2d at 824. 
84 Id. at 62, 430 N.E.2d at.824. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90ld. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
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of the vehicle. The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that the search of 
the flatbed was consensual.93 The defendants subsequently were con-
victed of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and sought 
appellate review of the trial court proceedings.94 The Appeals Court 
overturned the convictions on the grounds that the defendants' motions to 
suppress were improperly denied. 95 The Supreme Judicial Court granted 
the Commonwealth's motion for further appellate review and, in a four to 
two decision, affirmed the ruling of the Appeals Court.96 
The majority of the Court agreed with the reasoning of the Appeals 
Court, ruling that once the defendant Searles had produced a valid license 
and registration and the defendant Loughlin had identified himself, any 
justifiable investigation was complete and the defendants should have been 
permitted to continue on their way.97 The Court concluded that the 
trooper acted illegally in ordering the defendants from the vehicle and 
conducting a pat-frisk of Loughlin.98 With respect to the warrantless 
automobile search, which the Commonwealth contended was consensual, 
the Court determined that the consent was traceable to the illegal "stop 
and frisk" search and was not an intervening act of free will sufficient to 
dissipate the taint of illegality.99 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
relied on the principles set forth in Brown v. Illinois, tOO governing the 
admissibility of a confession given after an illegal arresLtOt The Court 
noted that Searles was not advised of his right to refuse to consent to the 
search and, that no significant time elapsed between the illegal exit orders 
and pat-frisk and the "consent" to the vehicle search.t02 The Court 
therefore considered the marijuana seized in the course of the automobile 
search to be subject to the exclusionary rule as applied under the "fruits 
of the poisonous tree" doctrine. t 03 
93 Id. at 61, 430 N.E.2d at 823. 
94 /d. at 60-61, 430 N.E.2d at 823. 
95 Id. at 61, 430 N.E.2d at 823. 
96 Id. at 61 and n.2, 430 N .E.2d at 824 and n.2. 
97 Id. at 62, 430 N.E.2d at 824. 
98 /d. at 63-64, 430 N.E.2d at 824-25. 
99 Id. at 63-64, 430 N.E.2d at 825. 
100 422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
101 /d. at 603-04. The Court in Brown stated: 
/d. 
The question whether a confession is the product ofa free will under Wong Sun [,371 
U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963),] must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is 
dispositive .... The temporal proximity of the arrest and confession, the presence of 
intervening circumstances, ... and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct are all relevant. . . . The voluntariness of the statement is a 
threshold requirement. ... And the burden of showing admissibility rests, of course, 
on the prosecution. 
• 
102 385 Mass. at 63-64, 430 N.E.2d at 825. 
103 Id. at 63, 430 N .E.2d at 825. The "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine requires that 
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In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Hennessey emphasized the 
strictly limited, single justification supporting a stop and frisk search. l04 
The Chief Justice observed that from its origins in Terry 'v. Ohio,105 the 
stop and frisk search has consistently been held permissible only when the 
search is directed toward concealed weapons and is based upon an 
officer's "articulable suspicion" that his life might be in danger. l06 With-
out discussing the issue of whether the search of the vehicle was sup-
ported by Searles' consent, the Chief Justice concluded that the search 
was illegal because the impetus for the search was not self-protection but 
rather "a search for evidence." 107 
Justice Nolan, joined by Justice Lynch, dissented, arguing that the 
majority opinion unnecessarily expanded the protection of individual 
rights under the fourth amendment. 108 The dissenters determined there 
was sufficient cause for the trooper to reasonably believe that his safety 
was threatened, given the suspicious actions of the defendants upon the 
approach of the officer and the fact that the incident took place late at 
night in a deserted area. 109 Further, the dissenters rejected the majority's 
holding that the gesture of identification is sufficient to obviate the need 
for any further investigation. llo In the dissenters' view, the need for 
protective precaution was not removed by the simple identification pro-
cedure. 111 The trooper was justified in ordering the deferidants from the 
vehicle I 12 and conducting a pat-frisk of Loughlin to determine whether he 
was armed. 113 In addition to finding the stop and frisk seaI1ch justified and 
nonviolative of the defendants' fourth amendment rights! the dissenters 
agreed with the trial judge's finding that the defendant Searles validly 
consented to the search of the vehicle. 114 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Loughlin rely on different 
authorities in support of their conclusions. The majority turned to Com-
any product of an illegal search or seizure, be it direct or indirect, mUst be excluded as 
evidence unless the prosecution can show that indirect evidence was arrived at through 
independent sources, or that the taint of the illegal act has been dissipated by intervening 
circumstances or an extended period of time between the act and the later discovery of the 
indirect evidence. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963). 
104 385 Mass. at 64-66, 430 N.E.2d at 825-26 (Hennessey, C.J., concurring). 
105 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
106 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Almeida, 373 Mass. 266, 270-71, 366 N.E.2d 756, 759 
(1977); Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 405-06, 318 N.E.2d 895, 898 (1974). 
107 385 Mass. at 65, 430 N .E.2d at 826. 
108 Id. at 66-69, 430 N.E.2d at 826-28 (Nolan, J., joined by Lynch, J., dissenting). 
109 Id. at 68-69, 430 N.E.2d at 827-28. 
110 Id. at 67, 430 N.E.2d at 827. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 67-68, 430 N.E.2d at 827. • 
113 Id. at 68, 430 N.E.2d at 827 (Nolan, J., joined by Lynch, J., dissenting). 
114 Id. 
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monwealth v. Ferrara,115 a 1978 Supreme Judicial Court decision, to 
support its position that the search of both Loughlin's person and the 
vehicle were illegal. I 16 In Ferrara, the Court held that once officers have 
legitimately stopped an automobile, in the absence of probable cause to 
believe criminal activity is afoot, the officers are initially limited to making 
a "threshold inquiry" consisting of a request that the driver of the vehicle 
produce a valid license and registration. I I 7 Any further inquiry, according 
to the Ferrara Court, must be based on either probable cause or a 
reasonable suspicion, supported by the facts, that the officer's safety 
might be threatened by the occupant(s) of the vehicle. ttS The Court in 
Loughlin did not view the actions of Searles and Loughlin subsequent to 
the threshold inquiry and prior to the trooper ordering them from the car 
as sufficient to "warrant a reasonable person to believe that the defen-
dants were armed and presently dangerous."tt9 In summary, the 
Loughlin majority considered the limited "threshold inquiry" posited in 
Ferrara 120 to operate in the Loughlin case as a restriction on the troopers' 
investigative actions with respect to the defendants and their vehicle. 121 
The dissenters in Loughlin, on the other hand, thought the actions of 
the defendants in Ferrara 122 were considerably less suspicious than the 
actions and circumstances leading to the stop and frisk search in 
Loughlin.123 They considered the case of Commonwealth v. Almeida, 124 
115 376 Mass. 502, 381 N.E.2d 141 (1978). 
116 385 Mass. at 62, 430 N .E.2d at 824. The court stated that it agreed with the appeals 
court's holding thatthe principles expressed in Ferrara, 386 Mass. 502, 505, 381 N .E.2d 141, 
144 (1978), were controlling. 
117 376 Mass. 502, 505, 381 N.E.2d 141, 144 (1978). 
11" ld. In Ferrara, officers posted on surveillance duty outside a cleaning establishment 
observed an automobile, occupied by the defendants, stop in front of the cleaners.ld. at 503, 
381 N .E.2d at 143. The driver of the automobile, within a short time period, went in to the 
cleaners and back out to the automobile three times and then drove off. Jd. The officers 
followed the vehicle after observing one of the passengers look back at the police vehicle and 
say something to the driver. Jd. The vehicle drove several miles, the driver committing no 
violations, but after the driver made a sharp tum, the officers stopped the vehicle. Jd. The 
driver upon request produced a valid license and registration and the two passengers 
verbally identified themselves. Jd. The officer addressing the passengers ordered them from 
the vehicle. Jd. He then spotted a gun, previously obstructed from view, on the rear seat of 
the vehicle. Jd. The officer seized the gun, frisked the occupants of the vehicle and placed 
them under arrest for illegal possession of firearms. ld. 
The Ferrara court made no finding on the issue of whether the stop of the defendants' 
vehicle was proper. Jd. at 505, 381 N.E.2d at 144. Instead, the court focused on the post-stop 
investigatory actions of the officers and considered the exit order leading to the discovery of 
the gun unjustified after the threshold inquiry had been made. ld. 
119 385 Mass. at 62, 430 N .E.2d at 824. 
120 376 Mass. 502, 505, 381 N.E.2d 141, 144 (1978). 
121 385 Mass. at 62, 430 N.E.2d at 824. 
122 376 Mass. 502, 503, 381 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1978). See supra note 1I8. 
123 385 Mass. at 66, 430 N.E.2d at 826 (Nolan, J., joined by Lynch, J., dissenting). 
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decided by the Court in 1977, to be controlling. 12S In Almeida, the Court 
upheld a warrantless stop and frisk search of both an automobile and its 
occupant, finding that the search was justified by the officers' reasonable 
suspicion that their safety was threatened. 126 The Almeida Court applied 
a "totality of circumstances" test in reaching its conclusion that the facts 
supported a reasonable suspicion that the officers' safety might be threat-
ened by the defendant. 127 The Court took into account the high crime area 
in which the officers discovered the defendant, late hour of the night, and 
the defendant's inability to produce the vehicle's regis~ration upon re-
quest. 128 The Court found the search conducted by the officers in Almeida 
to be within the limits of what was "minimally necessary" for their 
protection, under the circumstances presented. 129 The dissenters in 
Loughlin, in comparing Ferrara and Almeida, considered the distinguish-
ing factor to be the degree of suspicion aroused by the defendant's actions 
and surrounding circumstances in these cases. 130 
124 373 Mass. 266, 366 N .E.2d 756 (1977). 
125 385 Mass. at 67, 430 N.E.2d at 827 (Nolan, J., joined by Lynch, J., dissenting). 
126 373 Mass. 266, 272-73, 366 N.E.2d 756, 760 (1977). 
127 [d. at 271-72, 366 N .E.2d at 760. The facts in Almeida were as follows. Two officers 
patrolling late at night in a high crime area of Boston, discovered the defendant sitting in a 
vehicle with the lights off and the engine running in a private parking lot. [d. at 268, 366 
N.E.2d at 758. The officers pulled alongside the defendant's vehicle and asked him several 
questions. [d. In response to the questions, the defendant informed the officers that he was 
not from the area and that the car he was driving was borrowed. [d. When one of the officers 
alighted from the police cruiser and asked the defendant for his license and registration, the 
defendant produced a license, but failed after approximately fifteen seconds to produce a 
registration. [d. at 269,366 N.E.2d at 758. The officer then ordered the defendant from the 
automobile. [d. The other officer took the defendant to the front of the vehicle while the 
officer giving the exit order walked around to the passenger side of the automobile, opened 
the door and looked into the vehicle. [d. The interior light came on when the officer opened 
the door and, leaning into the vehicle, he spotted what appeared to be a gun holster jutting 
out from under the front seat. [d. Reaching under the seat, the officer removed the holster, 
which he found to contain ammunition. [d. He subsequently opened the cpnsole compartment 
and found a revolver. [d. at 269, 366 N.E.2d at 759. The defendant was then placed under 
arrest. [d. 
128 [d. at 272, 366 N.E.2d at 760. 
129 [d. The court considered the cursory search of the defendant's vehicle justified, since at 
the inception of the auto search the defendant had not been placed under arrest and, thus, 
"there was no assurance that he would not be returning promptly to his seat behind the 
wheel of the automobile." [d. The search of the automobile was therefore deemed by the 
court to be protective in nature, limited to the area from which the susp~ct might gain access 
to a weapon. [d. Cf Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 405-408, 318 N.E.2d 895, 
898-900 (1974) (court holding "stop and frisk" search of defendant and his automobile 
unjustified in its initiation, but recognizing that if there had been cause to conduct the search, 
the search could have extended into the interior of the defendant's vehicle since he was not 
under arrest at the time the search was initiated). 
130 385 Mass. at 66-67,430 N.E.2d at 826-27 (Nolan, J.,joined by Lynch, J., dissenting). 
106
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1982 [1982], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1982/iss1/6
§ 3.11 CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 149 
In response to the rationale of the dissenters, the majority in Loughlin 
expressed the view that the propriety of the officers' actions in Ferrara 
and Almeida did not hinge on the level of suspiciousness of the defen-
dants' actions, but rather the relevant distinction between these cases was 
in the "order of events."!3! The majority elaborated on this "order of 
events" analysis by stating that a command to exit the vehicle, ifitJoliows 
the "threshold inquiry" of requiring the driver to produce a license and 
registration, is only justified if supported by probable cause to believe that 
the defendant "has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a 
crime."!32 If, however, the exit order precedes the threshold inquiry, 
then the question is whether the officer reasonably believes that his safety 
is threatened.!33 
It is unclear how this curious "order of events" test which the majority 
posits in Loughlin distinguishes the Ferrara and Almeida cases. In neither 
of these prior cases did the officer order a defendant to exit the vehicle 
prior to a threshold inquiry. In order to justify the Almeida decision under 
this "order of events" test it is necessary to make the dubious presump-
tion that the defendant's failure to produce a registration within fifteen 
seconds in that case gave rise to probable cause justifying the subsequent 
order to exit his car. 
The rule laid down by the majority in Loughlin could give rise to a trap 
for the unwary officer. While the majority treats the "order of events" 
test as one established in prior cases, the technical application prescribed 
by the Court fails to take into account any evaluation of the "totality of 
circumstances" which might support a reasonable suspicion, short of 
probable cause, that precautions need be taken by the officer after a 
threshold inquiry pertaining to license and registration has been com-
pleted. The Loughlin Court departs in its analysis from Ferrara byestab-
lishing what appears to be a per se rule that no further inquiry or precau-
tions may be taken without probable cause, once a threshold inquiry has 
been made pursuant to a legitimate "stop." 134 On the other hand, reason-
able suspicion short of probable cause may justify a precautionary exit 
order prior to the threshold inquiry .135 Finally, it is important to recognize 
that the Loughlin decision, in addition to the "order of events" test it 
announces, may be relied on in the future for the principle that a strong 
presumption militates against finding a valid consent to an auto search if 
131 [do at 62-63 n03, 430 NoE02d at 824-25 n030 
132 [do 
133 [do 
134 [do 
135 [do 
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an officer persists in taking precautionary or investigatory measures, 
absent probable cause, after a threshold inquiry has been made. 136 
Juxtaposition of the three principle Massachusetts cases discussed 
herein demonstrates the complexity encountered by courts i attempting to 
provide guidelines for determining when an automobile search is permis-
sible without a warrant. This complexity can be attributed in part to the 
current recognition in the area of automobile searches of several overlap-
ping exceptions to the warrant requirement under the fourt~ amendment. 
The principal cases decided during the Survey year, Minh !/Vgo, Beasley 
and Loughlin, illustrate the variety of approaches under which warrant-
less automobile searches may be analyzed and, further, the potentially 
differing results which these approaches may yield depending upon the 
exception adopted to justify the warrantless search. For example, the 
Minh Ngo decision demonstrates that where the automobile exception is 
used to justify the search, the inquiry is limited to whether there is 
probable cause for the search and whether exigent circumstances are 
present. Further, in Minh Ngo, the Appeals Court gave liberal scope to 
the term "exigent circumstances," permitting a warrantless search planned 
two hours prior to its execution under this exception. This approach 
compares favorably from the State's perspective with the search incident 
to a lawful arrest exception as applied by the Appeals Court in the Beasley 
case. Where the prosecution justified the warrantless search under this 
latter theory, the Appeals Court, relying on New York v. Belton, imposed 
additional restrictions on the scope of the search within the contours of 
the vehicle. The question remains unresolved whether a court will hold 
the State to the exception pleaded or allow the search if .facts are pre-
sented that bring the search within any recognized exception. In both 
Minh Ngo and Beasley the court limited its analysis to the exception 
asserted by the State. 
While both Minh Ngo and Beasley concerned warrantless searches 
clearly founded on probable cause, the Loughlin case invplved a "stop 
and frisk" search based on suspicion rather than probaqle cause. The 
Supreme Judicial Court in this case took a restrictive approach to permit-
ting auto searches under the "stop and frisk" exception .0 the warrant 
requirement. Specifically, the court adopted a per se rule that once the 
occupants of a vehicle produce valid identification no further inquiry may 
be conducted in the course of an investigative auto stop. It remains 
uncertain after Loughlin whether any search for weapons extending into a 
vehicle may be conducted prior to the "initial" inquiry and, further, 
whether any set of circumstances short of overt and express threats will 
justify a precautionary vehicle search after an initial inquiry has yielded 
valid identification. 
136 See id. at 63-64, 430 N.E.2d at 824-25. 
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§ 3.12. Grand Jury Indictment - Probable Cause to Bind-Over for Trial 
- Sufficiency of Evidence. * Under the United States Constitution, I a 
warrant to arrest2 a criminal suspect cannot be issued without an initial 
finding of probable cause to arrest. 3 Massachusetts law provides that 
probable cause to arrest exists if, at the time the arrest warrant is re-
quested, the facts and circumstances would justify a prudent man in 
believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.4 
In making this determination, the judge may consider all the evidence he 
deems to be reasonably trustworthy, including evidence that would be 
inadmissible at triaLS If the judge finds the evidence sufficient to meet the 
probable cause standard, an arrest warrant may then be issued.6 
After arrest, the defendant is arraigned,' and pretrial discovery begins.8 
The suspect may not be tried, however, absent a finding of probable cause 
to bind-over for trial. 9 Probable cause to bind-over is a determination that 
there is sufficient likelihood of the suspect's guilt to justify subjecting him 
to a public trial. lo Under Massachusetts law, this determination may be 
made through a preliminary hearing or a grand jury indictment. 11 The 
* ANDREW D. SIRKIN, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 3.12. I U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, as interpreted in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 
192, 195 (1927). 
2 In Massachusetts, an arrest can sometimes be made without a warrant. See, e.g., G.L. 
c. 276, § 28; G.L. c. 766, §§ 37B, 37C. Nevertheless, in all instances where a warrant is 
required, the warrant cannot be issued without a finding of probable cause to arrest. 
Commonwealth v. Stevens, 362 Mass. 24,26,283 N.E.2d 637, 675 (1972). 
3 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 362 
Mass. 24, 26, 283 N .E.2d 673, 675 (1972). 
4 Commonwealth v. Stevens, 362 Mass. 24, 26, 283 N .E.2d 673, 675 (1972). 
5 Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 377 Mass. 650, 656, 387 N.E.2d 1135, 1140 (1979). 
6 Commonwealth v. Stevens, 362 Mass. 24,26,283 N.E.2d 673,675 (1972). 
7 An arraignment is a proceeding before a judge wherein the charges against the suspect 
are read to him and his plea is entered. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 7(d). The arraignment must take 
place as soon after the arrest as is reasonably possible. Commonwealth v. Dubois, 353 Mass. 
223,226,230 N.E.2d 906, 907-08 (1967). The reasonableness of the delay is determined on a 
case by case basis. Commonwealth v. Banuchi, 335 Mass. 649, 656-57,141 N.E.2d 835,840 
(1957). Generally, arraignment takes place the day of the arrest, or the first business day 
following the arrest. Commonwealth v. Dubois, 353 Mass. 223, 226, 230 N .E.2d 906, 908 
(1967); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 3(a), Reporters Notes, 43C Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 19 (West 
1980); District Court Standards of Judicial Practice, The Complaint Procedure, Standard 
2100, Commentary, at 5 (1975). 
" See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14. 
9 Lataille v. District Court of Eastern Hampden, 366 Mass. 525, 531, 320 N .E.2d 876, 881 
(1974). See G.L. c. 263, § 4; G.L. c. 276 § 38. 
10 Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 849, 298 N .E.2d 819, 824 (1974). 
II Lataille v. District Court of East Hampden, 366 Mass. 525,530-31,320 N .E.2d 876, 881 
(1974). Criminal proceedings may be initiated in the superior court or in the district court. 
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 3(a). If proceedings are initiated in the superior court, they are initiated 
by an indictment. Id. In such a case, the indictTent serves as a finding of probable cause to 
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quantum of evidence required for the determination of probable cause to 
bind-over depends upon which of the two procedures is used. 12 
In order to find probable cause to bind-over for trial through a prelimi-
nary hearing,13 a judge must find that the evidence introduced, if uncon-
troverted at trial, would be sufficient as a matter of law to support a guilty 
finding. 14 Prior to the Survey year, however, the Supreme Judicial Court 
had never specified the quantum of evidence necessary to support a 
finding of probable cause to bind-over for trial through a grand jury 
indictment. ls During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. McCarthy,16 
arrest, MASS. R. CRIM. P. 6(a)(2), and probable cause to bind-over. Lataille v. District Court 
of Eastern Hampden, 366 Mass. 525, 530-31, 320 N.E.2d 876, 881 (1974). Once the defen-
dant has been indicted, he may be arrested, arraigned, and held for trial, and he is not 
entitled to a preliminary hearing. /d. at 531, 320 N.E.2d at 881. 
If proceedings are initiated in the district court, they are initiated by a complaint. MASS. R. 
CRIM. P. 3(a). If an arrest warrant is required, see supra note 2, a justice must find probable 
cause to arrest. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. After the defendant is arrested 
and arraigned, the district court will determine whether it has concunrent jurisdiction with 
the superior court over the offenses charged. See G.L. c. 218, § 26. If the district court does 
not have jurisdiction, or if it chooses not to exercise its jurisdiction, a preliminary hearing 
will be held to determine whether there is probable cause to bind-over the defendant for trial 
in the superior court. G. L. c. 218, § 30; Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 845-46, 298 
N .E.2d 819, 822 (1973). If probable cause to bind-over is found at the,preliminary hearing, 
the defendant will be bound-over for trial in the superior court. G.L. c. 218, § 30. if the 
offense charged is punishable by imprisonment in state prison, however, the defendant must 
be indicted prior to being tried in superior court, even if he has already received a prelimi-
nary bind-over hearing. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 3(b)(l). Thus, in some cases, probable cause to 
bind-over must be found through both a preliminary hearing and an indictment. 
if the district court does have jurisdiction over the offense charged, see G. L. c. 218, § 26, 
and it chooses to exercise that jurisdiction, the defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing 
to determine if he should be held for trial in the district court. G.L. c. 276, § 38; Myers v. 
Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 845-46, 298 N.E.2d 819, 822 (1974). In such cases, the 
defendant will not be entitled to an indictment in addition to a preliminary hearing. MASS. R. 
CRIM. P. 3(b)(1), Reporters Notes, 43C Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 20 (West 1980). 
12 See inJi'a notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
13 The preliminary hearing is a full adversarial proceeding. Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 
Mass. 843,845-46,298 N.E.2d 819, 822 (1974). The defendant has a rillht to be present, id .. 
and to be represented by counsel. ld. Both the defendant and the prosecutor may present 
admissible evidence, id. at 849 n.6, 298 N.E.2d at 824 n.6, including testimony, and may 
cross-examine each other's witnesses. ld. at 846, 298 N .E.2d at 822. The purpose of the 
preliminary hearing is to prevent individuals from being held unjustifiably and prosecuted. 
/d. at 849, 298 N.E.2d at 825. This purpose is effectuated by screening out cases which, 
because of insufficient evidence of the suspect's guilt, should not go to trial. ld. Accordingly, 
the preliminary hearing judge makes two determinations: first, whether a crime in fact has 
been committed, and second, whether there is probable cause to believe that the suspect is 
guilty of that crime. /d. at 847, 298 N.E.2d at 822. See G.L. c. 276, § 42. 
14 /d. at 849, 298 N.E.2d at 824. 
15 A grand jury consists of between sixteen and twenty-three jurors convened periodically 
to act as an accusatory body. S. KADISH AND M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITs 
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the Court finally addressed the question of what must be shown to estab-
lish probable cause to bind-over through a grand jury indictment. The 
McCarthy Court held that a grand jury may not find probable cause to 
bind-over a criminal defendant for trial unless it has heard evidence 
sufficient to establish the identity of the defendant and to find probable 
cause to arrest him.!' 
The defendant in McCarthy was charged with assault with intent to 
rape. IS The only evidence presented to the grand jury was the hearsay 
testimony of the investigating officer relaying information given to him by 
the victim and the victim's sister.19 The officer testified that the defendant 
was one of those present at a party at which William Maloney attempted 
to rape the victim.20 The grand jury heard no evidence of any activity by 
the defendant except his presence at the party where the attempt took 
place.21 Nevertheless, the grand jury returned an indictment against the 
defendant for assault with intent to rape. 22 The defendant subsequently 
was convicted and sentenced at trial. 23 
PROCESSES 1140 (3d ed. 1975); see generally Trichter & Lewis, The Grand Jury, Putative 
Grand Jury Witnesses, and the Right to Limited Counsel - A Historic Overview and 
Modest Proposal, 20 S. TEX. L.J. 81 (1979); Lewis, The Grand Jury; A Critical Evaluation, 
13 AKRON L. REv. 33 (1979); Murov, An Examination of the Grand Jury; Inquest and Quest, 
51 N.Y. ST. B.J. 17 (1979); Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OR. L. REV. 101 
(1972); Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 701 (1972). 
A grand jury hears evidence on numerous criminal matters and attempts to determine in 
each case whether there is sufficient evidence to justify holding and prosecuting the suspect. 
S. KADISH AND M. PAULSEN, supra, at 1140. The proceedings are secret, and are held 
without a judge. Id. at 1140-41. If the grand jury returns an indictment, this is considered a 
finding of probable cause to bind-over, and the defendant can be held for trial. Lataille v. 
District Court of Eastern Hampden, 366 Mass. 525, 531, 320 N.E.2d 876, 881 (1974). During 
the grand jury proceedings, the prosecutor simply appears before the grand jury and 
presents evidence of the defendant's guilt. S. KADISH AND M. PAULSEN, supra, at 1140. 
Unlike the evidence presented at a preliminary hearing, the evidence presented before a 
grand jury need not be admissible at trial. Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 377 Mass. 650, 655, 
387 N .E.2d 1135, 1139 (1979); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 373 Mass. 591,594,368 N .E.2d 
1210,1211 (1977); Commonwealth v. Hare, 361 Mass. 263, 267, 280 N.E.2d 138, 141 (1972); 
cf. Myers v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 843, 849 n.6, 298 N.E.2d 819, 824 n.6 (1973). 
Moreover, unlike a preliminary hearing, the defendant has no right to be present during 
grand jury proceedings. S. KADISH AND M. PAULSEN, supra, at 1141; cf. G.L. c. 276, § 38. 
16 385 Mass. 160, 430 N.E.2d 1195 (1982). 
17/d. at 163,430 N.E.2d at 1197. 
18 Id. at 161, 430 N.E.2d at 1195. 
19/d. at 162 n.4, 430 N.E.2d at 1196 n.4. 
20 Id. at 161,430 N.E.2d at 1196. Maloney was a codefendant who pleaded guilty. Jd. at 
161 n.3, 430 N.E.2d at 1196 n.3. 
21 /d. at 161, 163-64,430 N.E.2d at 1196-97. 
22 Jd. at 160, 430 N.E.2d at 1195. 
23 Jd. at 161,430 N.E.2d at 1196. The execution of the sentence was stayed by a single 
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The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction,24 holding that the 
indictments against McCarthy should have been dismissed because of the 
insufficiency of the evidence heard by the grand jury. 25 The evidence 
heard by the grand jury was insufficient, the Court held, in that, although 
the grand jury heard evidence that a rape had been attempted by some-
one, they heard no evidence that any criminal acts were. actually per-
formed by the defendant. 26 At most, the Court observed, the grand jury 
heard evidence only of the defendant's presence while a rape was being 
attempted. 27 The Court noted that mere presence during a.crime or even 
failure to act to prevent the crime does not, standing alone, render a 
person guilty either as an actor or an accomplice. 28 Accordingly, the 
Court stated, the grand jury heard no evidence of defendant's criminal-
ity.29 
The Court acknowledged the well-settled principle that the competency 
and sufficiency of the evidence underlying a facially valid indictment 
would not ordinarily be reviewed. 30 Nevertheless, the Court noted, the 
grand jury must hear some evidence that the accused himself committed 
the crimes charged, and must identify the accused in the indictment.31 In 
addition, the Court held, the evidence heard by the grand jury must be 
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to arrest. 32 To meet this 
standard, the Court held, the evidence heard by the grand jury must 
include "reasonably trustworthy information ... sufficient to warrant a 
prudent man in believing that the defendant had committed or was com-
mitting an offense."33 The Court held that unless the evidence heard in 
justice of the Appeals Court pending appellate review of the trial judge's denial of defen-
dant's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictments. ld. The Supreme Judicial Court then 
allowed defendant's application for direct appellate review. /d. 
24 ld. at 164,430 N.E.2d at 1197. 
25 ld. 
26 /d. at 163, 164, 430 N .E.2d at 1197. 
27 /d. at 163-64, 430 N.E.2d at 1197. 
2. ld. 
29 /d. at 164,430 N.E.2d at 1197. 
30 /d. at 161-62, 430 N .E.2d at 1196. 
31 /d. at 163, 430 N .E.2d at 1197. See Connor v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 572, 576, 296 
N.E.2d 172, 176 (1973). 
32 385 Mass. at 163,430 N.E.2d at 1197. 
33 /d. (quoting Commonwealth v. Stevens, 362 Mass. 24,26, 283 N .E.2d 673,675 (1972), 
quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1972». In Stevens, the Court further stated: 
Where hearsay is the basis [there must bel a substantial basis for crediting the 
hearsay, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960); United States v. Harris, 
403 U.S. 573, 581 (1971); Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 349 Mass. 626, 631-32 (1954). 
Credibility is established by meeting two requirements, ... 1) there should be 
underlying facts and circumstances indicating the informant's reliability, and 2) there 
should be underlying facts and circumstances on which the informant bases his 
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the grand jury is at least sufficient to establish the identity of the accused 
and probable cause to arrest him, the indictment returned by the grand 
jury is invalid and all subsequent proceedings taken in reliance upon the 
indictment are void.34 
Addressing the case before it, the Court explained that because the 
grand jury that indicted the defendant McCarthy heard no evidence that 
he performed any criminal act, they did not hear sufficient evidence to 
warrant a prudent man in believing that McCarthy had committed an 
offense.3S Accordingly, the Court continued, the grand jury heard in-
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to arrest. 36 The Court 
concluded that because the grand jury must hear sufficient evidence to 
establish probable cause to arrest in order to return a valid indictment, the 
indictment returned against McCarthy was invalid and his conviction had 
to be reversed.37 
The McCarthy de~ision is significant because the Supreme Judicial 
Court has long been reluctant to specify a minimal evidentiary standard 
for grand jury indictments. The question was first addressed by the Court 
in the 1893 decision of Commonwealth v. Woodward,38 which held that if 
the indictment was valid on its face,39 the Court would not inquire into the 
competency or sufficiency of the underlying evidence.4o This principle 
remailJed intact for 80 years,41 until it was qualified by the Court's deci-
sion in Connor v. Commonwealth. 42 In that case, the Court held that the 
grand jury must hear some evidence that the accused committed the crime 
information that the defendant is engaged in criminal activity. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U.S. 108, 112-16 (1963). See McCray v. United States, 386 U.S. 300, 324 (1967); 
United States v. Cobb, 432 F.2d 716,719 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Mendoza, 
433 F.2d 891, 894 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 943 (1971); Williams v. 
Adams, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Fuller, 441 F.2d 755, 759 (4th 
Cir. 1971); United States V. Buonomo, 441 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1971). 
362 Mass. 24, 27, 283 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1972). 
34 385 Mass. at 163,430 N.E.2d at 1197. 
3S ld. 
36 ld. 
37 ld. at 164,430 N.E.2d at 1197. 
3. 157 Mass. 516, 32 N.E. 939 (1893). 
39 For an indictment to be valid on its face, it need only state the elements of the crime 
alleged in statutory form, and "enable the defendant to plead the conviction or acquittal in 
bar to another prosecution for the same offense." Commonwealth v. Hare, 361 Mass. 263, 
267, 280 N.E.2d 138, 141 (1972). 
40 Commonwealth v. Woodward, 157 Mass. 516, 518, 32 N.E. 939, 940 (1893). 
41 See. e.g., Commonwealth v. Walsh, 255 Mass. 317,319, 151 N.E.2d 300, 301 (1926); 
Commonwealth v. Galvin, 323 Mass. 205,211-12,80 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1948); Common-
wealth v. Hare, 361 Mass. 263,267, 280 N.E.2d 138, 141 (1972). 
42 363 Mass. 572, 296 N.E.2d 172 (1973). 
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charged.43 The Connor Court also held that the indictment must contain a 
description of the accused sufficient to identify him as the specific indi-
vidual that the grand jury intended to indict.44 The next qualifications of 
the Woodward principle came in Commonwealth v. St. Pierre. 45 In that 
decision, the Court stated that although a valid indictment could be based 
entirely on hearsay,46 the credibility of the hearsay evidence may fall so 
low as to invalidate an otherwise valid indictment.47 The St. Pierre Court 
suggested that an indictment might be found invalid for this reason when 
the evidence would be insufficient to support a finding of probable cause 
to arrest or search.48 In Commonwealth v. McCarthy,49 the Supreme 
43 Jd. at 576, 296 N .E.2d at 175. Connor involved a challenge to an indictment that 
identified the accused as "John Doe," and contained no other words describing him.ld. at 
575,296 N.E.2d at 174. After the indictment was returned, but before trial, the prosecutor 
moved to amend the indictment by substituting petitioner's name for "John Doe." /d. at 
573,296 N .E.2d at 173. The motion was allowed, and petitioner was subsequently convicted 
of first degree murder. Jd. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed.ld. at 578, 296 N.E.2d at 
176. The Court reasoned that an indictment of "John Doe" containing no further words of 
description is actually an indictment of anyone whose name the judge allows to be substi-
tuted for "John Doe." Jd. Consequently, the Court noted, the grand jury's power to accuse 
becomes vested in the judge who rules on the motion to substitute the names on the 
indictment. Jd. Moreover, the ultimate defendant is subjected to a public trial without any 
evidence that the grand jury had found probable cause to believe that he committed the 
crime charged. Jd. Accordingly, the Court held that the grand jury must hear some evidence 
that the accused committed the crime charged, and "it must appear that there is a warrant-
able inference, from a consideration of the indictment's description of the accused, together 
with proof concerning the proceedings before the grand jury, that the grand jury indicted the 
defendant." Jd. 
44 Jd. at 577, 296 N.E.2d at 176. 
45 377 Mass. 650, 387 N .E.2d 1135 (1979). 
46 Hearsay is an out-of-court statement introduced in court to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted therein. Commonwealth v. Leaster, 362 Mass. 407, 412, 287 N .E.2d 122, 125 
(1972). 
47 Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 377 Mass. 650, 656, 387 N.E.2d 1135, 1140 (1979). St. 
Pierre involved, inter alia, a challenge to an indictment based entirely on the the testimony 
of a State Trooper who had no personal knowledge of the case. ld. at 653, 387 N.E.2d at 
1138. The testifying trooper was substituting for the trooper who had investigated the case 
but could not be present during the grand jury proceedings. ld. The grand jury returned an 
indictment based entirely on the substituting trooper's testimony, and the accused was 
subsequently convicted of mayhem and assault and battery .ld. The Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed. ld. at 665, 387 N.E.2d at 1145. The Court noted that it is well settled in the 
Commonwealth that an indictment is not invalid merely because it is based entirely on 
hearsay. ld. at 655, 387 N.E.2d at 1139. The Court questioned, however, whether in 
"extraordinary circumstances," the credibility of the hearsay testimony heard by the grand 
jury might be so low as to justify the dismissal of the indictment. ld. at 656, 387 N .E.2d at 
1139 (quoting Commonwealth v. Commins, 371 Mass. 222, 224, 356 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1972». 
48 ld. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. The Court noted that this standard, if 
adopted, would be lower than that required for a finding of probable cause to bind-over at a 
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Judicial Court has explicitly adopted the standard suggested in St. 
Pierre. 50 
Because the evidence underlying the McCarthy indictment was in-
sufficient to establish the identity of the accused and probable cause to 
arrest him, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether evidence that 
did meet these requirements might nevertheless be insufficient to support 
an indictment. 51 In fact, the McCarthy Court explicitly left open the 
question of whether evidence that met the requirements set forth in 
McCarthy, but failed to reach the level of sufficiency required to support a 
finding of probable cause to bind-over at a preliminary hearing,52 might be 
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause to bind-over by a grand 
jury.53 In others words, the Court did not decide whether the quantum of 
evidence sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to bind-over is 
the same regardless of whether probable cause to bind-over is found by a 
grand jury or through a preliminary hearing. 54 
The quantum of evidence sufficient to support a finding at a preliminary 
hearing of probable cause to bind-over for trial was first determined in 
Myers v. Commonwealth, 55 decided in 1973. The Myers Court adopted a 
directed verdict standard in defining the level of evidence sufficient to 
support a determination to bind-over at a preliminary hearing.56 Under 
the directed verdict standard, the Court noted, the credible admissible 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing must be sufficient at law to 
overcome a motion for a directed verdict at trial,57 To meet this require-
ment, the Court stated, the evidence must be such that, if it were admitted 
and believed at trial, a jury could reasonably conclude that the prosecu-
tion had proven every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable 
preliminary hearing.ld. at 656 n.6, 356 N.E.2d 1140 n.6. (For a discussion of the amount of 
evidence required for a finding of probable cause to bind-over at a preliminary hearing, see 
infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.) The Court, however, did not find it necessary to 
resolve this issue because the hearsay testimony would have been sufficient to support an 
arrest or search warrant. Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 375 Mass. 650, 656-57, 387 N.E.2d 
1135, 1140 (1979). Accordingly, the Court held that the hearsay evidence underlying the 
indictment in St. Pierre was sufficient to support the indictment. Id. The Court also 
considered other issues which were unrelated to the indictment but found no error. Id. at 
657-65, 387 N .E.2d at 1140-45. 
49 385 Mass. 160, 430 N.E.2d 1195 (1982). 
50 See supra text accompanying notes 16-37. 
51 385 Mass. at 162 n.5, 430 N .E.2d at 1196. 
52 See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. 
S3 385 Mass. at 162 n.5, 430 N.E.2d at 1196 (1982). 
S4 Id. 
ss 363 Mass. 843, 298 N .E.2d 819 (1973). 
S6 /d. at 850, 298 N .E.2d at 824. 
S7 /d. 
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doubt. 58 The Court noted that this quantum of evidence is greater than 
that required to find probable cause to arrest, and less than that required 
to find a defendant guilty at triaP9 In arriving at this standard, the Court 
reasoned that the decision to hold the defendant for trial has more serious 
and far-reaching implications both for the defendant and for the state than 
the initial decision to arrest. 60 Accordingly, the Court explained, more 
evidence should be required to justify the decision to hold for trial than to 
justify the decision to arrest. 61 Therefore, the Court held, a finding at a 
preliminary hearing of probable cause to bind-over requires "a greater 
quantum of legally competent evidence" than a finding of probable cause 
to arrest. 62 
The Court's reasoning in Myers would seem to support a future holding 
by the Court that a finding by a grand jury of probable cause to bind-over, 
like a finding at a preliminary hearing of probable cause to bind-over, 
requires "a greater quantum of legally competent evidence" than a 
finding of probable cause to arrest. This conclusion follows from the fact 
that a finding of probable cause to bind-over, whether it is made by a 
grand jury or at a preliminary hearing, has the same practical effect; in 
both cases, the defendant is held for trial.63 As noted by the Myers Court, 
holding the defendant for trial has more serious implications than arrest-
ing the defendant, and therefore should require more evidence.64 Conse-
quently, more evidence should be required for a grand jury indictment 
which allows the defendant to be held for trial than for an arrest warrant. 
Moreover, the Court's holding in McCarthy, that a grand jury indictment 
requires at least as much evidence as an arrest warrant,65 does not 
preclude a future holding that a grand jury indictment in fact requires 
more evidence than an arrest warrant. 66 It is therefore open to argument 
in future cases that a finding by a grand jury of probable cause to bind-
over, like a finding at a preliminary hearing of probable cause to bind-
over, requires more evidence against the defendant than a finding of 
probable cause to arrest. 67 
5" id. 
59 id. 
60 id. at 849, 298 N .E.2d at 824. 
61 id. 
62 id. 
63 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
64 Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 849, 298 N.E.2d 819,824 (1973). 
65 385 Mass. at 163, 430 N .E.2d at 1197. 
66 id. at 162 n.5, 430 N .E.2d at 1196 n.5. 
67 id. Many states have statutorily imposed the same standards of evidentiary sufficiency 
to both indictments and preliminary hearings. See, e.!?, IDAHO CODe § 19-1107 (1948); 
IOWA R. CR1M. P. 4(3) (1978); MONT. REV. CODE § 95-1408(3) (Crim. Supp. 1977); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 29-10,1-33 (1974); see also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 
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§§ 340.5, 330.5 (1975). It must be noted, however, that even if the Court adopted the same 
("directed verdict") standard for grand jury indictments as it has adopted for preliminary 
hearings, see supra text accompanying notes 55-62, the essential character of the grand jury 
proceeding, as well as the types of evidence admissible therein, would remain quite different 
than that of the preliminary hearing. For a discussion of the differences, see supra note 15. 
See Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 371 Mass. 650,656 n.6, 386 N.E.2d 1135, 1140 n.6 (1979) 
("[The preliminary hearing] does not partake of the history of the grand jury with its ex parte 
character merging investigatory and accusatory role."); see generally Lataille v. District 
Court of Eastern Hampden, 366 Mass. 525, 531-2, 320 N.E.2d 877, 881-2 (1974); Note, The 
lmprobability of Probable Cause - The lnequity of the Grand Jury lndlctment Versus the 
Preliminary Hearinf? in the l/Iinois Criminal Process, 1981 SOUTHERN ILL. L.J. 281. The 
differences in the two alternative modes ot ascertaining probable cause to bind-over raise 
significant questions about whether defendants who are indicted receive the same protection 
from unwarranted prosecution as defendants who receive a preliminary hearing. See Note, 
The lmprobability of Probable Cause, supra, at 286-98. At least two states have concluded, 
oaseo on (filS argument, (hat a detendant IS entltled to a probable cause heanng even when 
he has been indicted. See Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 586 
P.2d 916 (1978) (reaching this result under the California State Constitution's Equal Protec-
tion Clause); People v. Duncan, 388 Mich. 489, 201 N. W.2d 629 (1972) (reaching this result 
under supervisory power). 
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